Defining, Measuring, and Enabling Transparency for Electronic Medical Systems by Pierina Brustolin Spagnuelo, Dayana
  
 
PhD-FSTC-2018-75 
The Faculty of Sciences, Technology and Communication 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Defence held on 28/11/2018 in Luxembourg 
 
to obtain the degree of 
  
 
DOCTEUR DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG 
 
EN INFORMATIQUE 
 
by 
 
Dayana PIERINA BRUSTOLIN SPAGNUELO 
Born on 20 August 1989 in Florianópolis, Brazil 
 
DEFINING, MEASURING, AND ENABLING 
TRANSPARENCY FOR ELECTRONIC MEDICAL 
SYSTEMS 
 
 
Dissertation defence committee 
Dr Peter Y. A. RYAN, dissertation supervisor 
Professor, Université du Luxembourg 
 
Dr Paulo ESTEVES-VERÍSSIMO, Chairman 
Professor, Université du Luxembourg 
 
Dr Gabriele LENZINI, Vice-chairman 
Senior Research Scientist, Université du Luxembourg 
 
Dr Simone FISCHER-HÜBNER 
Professor, Karlstad University 
 
Dr Jean Everson MARTINA 
Senior Lecturer and Researcher, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 
 

UNIVERSITY OF LUXEMBOURG
DOCTORAL THESIS
Defining, Measuring, and Enabling
Transparency for Electronic Medical
Systems
Author:
Dayana P. B. SPAGNUELO
Supervisor:
Prof. Dr. Peter Y. A. RYAN
Daily advisor:
Dr. Gabriele LENZINI
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Applied Security and Information Assurance Group
SnT - Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust
November 28, 2018

iii
Declaration of Authorship
I, Dayana P. B. SPAGNUELO, declare that this thesis titled, “Defining, Measuring, and
Enabling Transparency for Electronic Medical Systems” and the work presented in
it are my own. I confirm that:
• This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research de-
gree at this University.
• Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or
any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been
clearly stated.
• Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly
attributed.
• Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With
the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work.
• I have acknowledged all main sources of help.
• Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have
made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed my-
self.
Signed:
Date: November 28, 2018

vAbstract
Dayana P. B. SPAGNUELO
Defining, Measuring, and Enabling Transparency for Electronic
Medical Systems
Transparency is a novel concept in the context of Information and Communication
Technology (ICT). It has arisen from regulations as a data protection principle, and
it is now being studied to encompass the peculiarities of digital information. Trans-
parency, however, is not the first security concept to be borrowed from regulations;
privacy once emerged from discussions on individual’s rights.
Privacy began to be vigorously debated in 1890, whenWarren and Brandeis anal-
ysed legal cases for which penalties were applied on the basis of defamation, in-
fringement of copyrights, and violation of confidence [244]. The authors defended
that those cases were, in fact, built upon a broader principle called privacy. But pri-
vacy was only given a structured definition almost one century later, in 1960, when
Prosser examined cases produced after Warren and Brandeis’ work [176], classify-
ing violation of privacy into four different torts; it took twenty years more before
the concept was thoroughly studied for its functions in ICT. Guidelines by the
OECD outlined principles to support the discussion of privacy as a technical require-
ment [56]. Proceeded by international standards for a privacy framework (ISO/IEC
29100), which translated the former legal concepts into information security terms,
such as data minimisation, accuracy, and accountability.
Transparency has a younger, but comparable history; the current General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) defines it as a principle which requires “that any in-
formation and communication relating to the processing of those personal data be
easily accessible and easy to understand [..]". However, other related and more ab-
stract concepts preceded it. In the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) of 1996, the Privacy Rule demands to document privacy policies and
procedures and to notify individuals of uses of their health information. Former
European Directives, i.e., 95/46/EC and 2011/24/EU, establish “the right for in-
dividuals to have access to their personal data concerning their health [..] also in
the context of cross-border healthcare”. The same did the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) of 1966, instituting that any person has a right to obtain from agencies
information regarding their records. These and other similar requests refer to the
transversal quality called transparency.
Similarly to what happened with privacy, transparency was also the subject of
guidelines that clarify its interpretation in ICT [10]. However, no framework or stan-
dard has been defined yet that translates transparency into a technical property. This
translation is the goal of our work.
This thesis is dedicated to debate existing interpretations for transparency, to es-
tablish requirements and measurement procedures for it, and to study solutions that
can help systems adhere to the transparency principle from a technical perspective.
Our work constitutes an initial step towards the definition of a framework that helps
accomplish meaningful transparency in the context of Electronic Medical Systems.
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Introduction
Transparency is a concept invoked to implement people’s right to have control over
their data [205]. It has been defined as “the possibility to access information and
evidences revealed through a process of disclosure" [237]. It has been presented as
the “practice to inform users andmake policies and processes openly available" [124]
and as the “predisposition to increase responsibility and accountability" [75].
The recently approved General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1 describes
transparency as one of the main principles in processing of personal data. It states
that data controllers shall “provide any information [..] relating to processing to the
data subject in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form" and that
they shall “facilitate the exercise of data subject rights" (Article 12.1 and 12.2).
Transparency is also a principle that can be embraced to promote honesty and
therefore trustworthiness [126]. Transparency can also be a strategic element in
business, especially when applied in distributed data management systems, such
as cloud computing, electronic banking, or medical data-sharing. Personal data are
an asset [201, 202] and data controllers may suffer from the mistrust of data sub-
jects (e.g., users, clients, patients) who, aware of the risks of potential exposure of
personal information [101], can be reluctant to consent with the processing of their
data. Transparency here can help build and preserve trust: providers that offer de-
tailed information about their policies and practices, express them in a clear and
readable manner, and have easily-accessible documents and records of processing
operations will also have a better chance of gaining their client’s trust and stay in
business. For all these reasons transparency is considered a pro-ethical principle be-
lieved to promote accountability, improve service quality, empower people by giv-
ing them choices and right to demand better services, and foster social innovation
and economic growth [99, 166].
In the domain of medical data systems, transparency is a desirable quality. Elec-
tronic Health Records (EHRs) carry very sensitive data about a patient and are sub-
ject to exceptional protection measures2. Even though transparency is not meant to
provide such measures, it promotes having clear privacy policies, and the availabil-
ity of means for patients to verify that the system is taking or has taken the necessary
precautions to protect their data.
1.1 Medical Data Systems
It is true that to some extent transparency may be accomplished outside the do-
main of Information Technology. A conversation between a physician (or some other
1Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
2Ibid., Art. 9.
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FIGURE 1.1: Hospital information system.
member of a medical team) and their patient can be sufficiently revealing about how
personal data are handled. Nevertheless, in this work, we assume that there is, or
can be, a channel for the patient to directly access a medical system, a possibility that
has not been fully explored yet in current medical data systems; still, it is foreseen in
regulations about data protection like the GDPR.
We base our understanding of the information flow in modern medical pro-
cesses, with respect to five specific systems: i) the Visual Electronic Patient Record
(VEPR) of the São João Hospital, Portugal, a centralised data management system
that collects clinical reports from various hospital departments and makes them ac-
cessible to authorised health professionals; ii) the clinical research data system of the
National Centre of Excellence in Research Parkinson’s Disease (NCER-PD) that the Lux-
embourg Centre for System Biomedicine has developed to study the development
of the disease; iii) the Integrated Telemedicine and Telehealth System of the state of Santa
Catarina, Brazil, a platform that allows accessing medical examinations (e.g., ECGs,
ECHOs, MRIs) at distance; iv) the Shared Care Dossier (myDSP), the Luxembourgish
EHRs system, which connects patients and caregivers; v) the Microsoft HealthVault,
an online platform for storing personal health information. In what follows we de-
scribe and classify them according to the level of access the patients have to their
data.
No access
The Visual Electronic Patient Record system (VEPR) (see Figure 1.1) foresees no in-
teraction between the patients and the system [43]. In the usual scenario, the patient
goes to the specialised medical facility and is treated by the physician who, in turn,
accesses the system to retrieve the patient’s health history.
The clinical research data system of the NCER-PD (see Figure 1.2) aims to aid the
management of medical information about patients participating in long-term clinic
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FIGURE 1.2: Clinical research system.
research. In the current implementation, the patients can neither access the system,
or contact the researchers and the medical team that handle their data. The patients
entrust their data to be used in clinical research with the goal of studying a specific
disease.
Limited access
The Brazilian telemedicine system3 (STT/SC) (see Figure 1.3) foresees an interaction
between patients and the system. However, this interaction is limited to the access
to medical examinations with no contact with specialised physicians. Patients only
have contact with nurses and the technical team that handle medical equipment in
their regional medical facility.
Full access
The Shared Care Dossier4 (Dossier de Soins Partagé – myDSP, in the original lan-
guage) is an online service provided by the Luxembourgish eHealth platform (see
Figure 1.4). It stores several types of health-related information from the patients.
These pieces of information can be provided by the patients, by a trusted health
care professional, or by medical institutions, such as laboratories. In myDSP, the pa-
tients are in full control of who has access to their data, and what information can be
shared with healthcare professionals.
Finally, Microsoft HealthVault5 is an online platform that allows users to gather,
store and share health information (see Figure 1.5). The information in HealthVault
3https://telemedicina.saude.sc.gov.br/rctm/.
4https://www.esante.lu/portal/fr/.
5https://www.healthvault.com/lu/en.
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FIGURE 1.3: Telemedicine system.
FIGURE 1.4: Electronic Health Record system.
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FIGURE 1.5: Patient-centred system.
can be provided by the user, an external mobile or web applications whenever au-
thorised by the user, or by specific compatible health devices, such as blood pressure
monitors, weight scales, and others. Microsoft HealthVault is patient-centred: it al-
lows the patients to choose who can have access, edit, or act as a custodian of their
data.
Overview. A peculiarity of the medical domain is that the content produced about
patients is often not created by the patients themselves but by other subjects, such
as physicians or healthcare professionals. Commonly, data is created, edited, and
accessed without the knowledge or the consent from the patients. Such peculiarities
can be observed in the medical data systems previously mentioned. As a conse-
quence, the process of disclosure of data is not as evident as in other domains. For
example, in online banking, users are typically informed of how the system will
handle their current and future personal information when they are about to dis-
close their data to the system. With medical systems sometimes there is not even a
precise moment when the data disclosure occurs, as it depends on when a patient
visits the hospital or schedules an examination.
Another particularity of the medical domain is that the availability of health in-
formation is often related to the safety of the patients. Even though end users have
the right to control the access and usage to personal data held by service providers,
exercising this right in the medical domain may endanger patients’ lives. Hence,
solutions available in other domains may not be immediately suitable for medical
systems. It is important to consider solutions that enable doctors and the medical
team to access patient’s data in case of emergency. This is often referred to in the lit-
erature as Break-the-Glass (BTG) [64]. However, regardless of how a patient’s data
reaches the system or how it is used, regulations, like the GDPR, are in place to
protect patients’ right to be informed.
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1.2 Transparency in the recent literature
Despite not being fully explored in the context of medical data systems, there are
some works which investigate transparency in other domains and are of paramount
importance to our understanding of this property. We designate this section to the
presentation and acknowledgement of these works. We also explore them further
throughout this thesis and, where applicable, we contextualize them and explain
how they contributed to inspire several stages of our research.
The Cloud Accountability Project6 (A4Cloud for short) is a European Commis-
sion’s Seventh Framework awarded project for increasing trust in cloud-based IT
services. Several works related to this project explore the use of accountability tools,
which is advocated to contribute to the governance of cloud activities by provid-
ing transparency and policy enforcement. In particular, two works executed for
A4Cloud deserve to be highlighted here. The first, by Berthold et al. [19], focuses on
the relationship between privacy, accountability and transparency. The properties
are defined formally, in terms of information theoretic quantities, such as the Shan-
non entropy, and based on that the authors discuss the conceptual conflicts between
them. The second, authored by Fischer-Hübner et al. [67], presents transparency
in terms of data processing and classifies it into two categories: one that enables
the anticipation of consequences before disclosure of data; and another that offers
information about consequences if data has been already disclosed. This work pro-
poses usability requirements to be consideredwhen implementing transparency and
presents a few transparency enhancing tools designed to meet these requirements.
Both works contribute significantly to the understanding of transparency and its
relationship with other relevant properties. Apart from these works, a few other
technical reports and deliverables from A4Cloud also assisted us in the clarification
of transparency’s meaning in the context of medical data systems.
Also relevant to our research are two works authored by Cappelli [31] and Leite
[135], explore transparency in the context of software engineering. The authors qual-
ify transparency as a Non-Functional Requirement (NFR). As such, they advocate
that once implemented transparency should be spread across different parts of a
software, and should not affect their behaviour. The authors further explore trans-
parency in the context of a NFR framework by modelling it in a graph of concepts
and other NFR which are suggested as composing and contributing to the realisa-
tion of transparency. Both works shed light on how such a property, which cannot be
objectively said to be implemented in software, could be evaluated in a less objective
notion of satisfaction.
Finally, another work deserves to be highlighted here for its relevance to the state
of the art of transparency studies. The recent work authored by Meis and Heisel
[149] presents a thorough requirements engineering analysis of the privacy goal of
intervenability, a property said to be strongly coupled with transparency. Interven-
ability is a property that allows for end-users empowerment by giving them control
over how the processing of their data is done. In this sense, transparency relates to it
because it informs the end-users on the processing of data and exception accesses to
data (both subject of intervention from the end-users), and should also inform about
the existence of intervenability tools available in a system. The authors present a
detailed taxonomy (see Figure 1.6) which clarifies the hierarchy amongst their re-
quirements and the relationship between the two properties.
6http://www.cloudaccountability.eu/.
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FIGURE 1.6: Transparency and Intervenability taxonomy proposed
by Meis and Hiesel (image taken from [149]).
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Meis and Heisel also propose a computer-aided method to support a privacy
analysis of any given software based on its functional requirements. As interven-
ability and transparency are considered as privacy goals, this method also comprises
an analysis of those. In other words, this method would identify the need for trans-
parency and intervenability for any functional requirement of a system that foresees
processing of data.
Our work and the work carried out by Meis and Heisel are related. However, we
do not see them as conflicting, nor contradicting, rather our work agrees with the
perspective presented by these authors. Nonetheless, our work distinguishes from
[149] (and other work by the same authors) for we focus on transparency applied in
the medical data systems context. This allowed us to deepen in the subject and to
do a comprehensive analysis of transparency. Which in turn led to the study of its
different aspects, the proposal of means to evaluate it in a system, and the analysis
and modelling of transparency enhancing tools that are meant to be applied in that
domain.
1.3 Goal and research questions
Transparency is a quality considered desirable in medical data systems to defend
patients’ right to data protection. However, beyond the demands of the legal frame-
work and despite the discussions about the benefits of having transparency imple-
mented in Health Information Technology (Health IT) (e.g., [75, 83, 139, 193, 205]),
there has been no consensus on the operational meaning of the property nor clear
guidelines on how to establish it in medical data systems. This is our research goal:
Research goal. To provide a formal operational definition for transparency and to design
solutions to achieve it in medical data systems.
By clarifying the meaning of transparency in the medical domain, and providing
an operational definition for it, we can help accomplish meaningful transparency
in medical systems. The results of this research can be interpreted as a framework
to guide the implementation of transparency-by-design. To achieve this goal we have
structured our research around the following open questions:
1.3.1 How can transparency be defined in medical data systems and how
does it relate to other security properties?
Even though transparency is not a new term, it has been discussed for a while with
different meanings. In order to provide an operational definition for it in medical
systems, we first have to study its different existing interpretations. What is an ade-
quate understanding of transparency in the context of medical systems? How does
transparency relate to other known properties? Is transparency part of, or composed
by other known properties? Does transparency conflict with, or compromise any of
those?
1.3.2 How can transparency be assessed in a system?
Transparency is not a clear requirement. Its several interpretations already suggest
that it is instead a multi-faceted subjective property. Finding or proposing an ad-
equate interpretation that considers the peculiarities of the medical domain is not
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enough if there are no ways of telling whether a given system is indeed transparent.
With transparency being a complex property, how can one decide if it is being re-
alised in a system? Are there objective ways of assessing how transparent a system
is?
1.3.3 How can transparency be realised in a privacy-friendly manner?
Since transparency is a property related to the disclosure of information, intuitively
one would think that transparency can weaken or compromise people’s right for
data privacy, if not correctly implemented. Transparency is a principle intended
to promote trust; it should not come at the expense of privacy. It is essential to
understand whether transparency can become a hindrance to privacy, and where it
does, how to realise it in a privacy-friendly way.
1.3.4 Can transparency be achieved with the existing tools?
The interest in transparency has grown in the past few years, and the number of
Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs) proposed in the literature reflects this fact.
From a purely technical point of view, one could compare these tools and reason
about the aspects of transparencywhich are implemented andwell explored, and the
ones in need of more investigation. However, are those tools suitable and sufficient
to accomplish transparency in the medical data systems domain? Can they help
achieve compliance with the GDPR provisions?
1.4 Thesis overview
Each chapter and appendix in this thesis explores topics related to the questions
previously presented. An overview of contents is show in Table 1.1. In the following,
we summarise the content of the chapters and highlight our contributions.
Question 1.3.1 Question 1.3.2 Question 1.3.3 Question 1.3.4
Chapter 2 x x
Chapter 3 x
Chapter 4 x
Chapter 5 x
Chapter 6 x
TABLE 1.1: Content overview. Chapters and the research questions
they help answer.
Chapter 2: On Transparency and related properties. In this chapter, we explore
the existing interpretations for transparency and its relationship with other known
properties. This chapter contributes to answering the open question 1.3.1. To do
so, we first perform a literature review about the primary security concerns in the
medical domain, where we find out how transparency is debated in the domain,
with which meaning, and with relation to which other properties. We later propose
a definition of transparency, describe the most relevant properties linked to it, and
suggest a taxonomy that represents how these properties contribute to each other.
This chapter also starts discussing the relationship between transparency and pri-
vacy, contributing to answer the open question 1.3.3.
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This chapter is based on two academic contributions: a literature review pre-
sented in a technical report [222]; and a journal article [223] that summarises our
definition of transparency and positions it in a taxonomy of related properties.
Chapter 3: Transparency requirements. In this chapter, we expand the definition
of transparency by establishing requirements that help realise it in a medical system.
This chapter explores more technically the open question 1.3.1. In here we describe
our requirements gathering methodology and present an extensive list of software
requirements with their categories.
This chapter is based on two scientific contributions: a conference article [221]
and a scientific journal which extends it [223].
Chapter 4: Metrics for Transparency. In this chapter, we present a set of metrics
proposed to help assess how transparent a system is. This chapter presents dis-
cussions that answer the open question 1.3.2. In here we explain our methodology
when selecting and defining metrics and mathematical formulations for quantifying
transparency. We also justify and reason about their suitability. Later we propose a
guide on how to properly apply those metrics, and how to conduct a full evaluation
of transparency.
The content presented this chapter is adapted from the results published in a
workshop [217] and a conference article [218]. Another manuscript was inspired by
the results of this collaboration [219]; it was submitted to the Journal of Computers
& Security, and it is currently under review.
Chapter 5: Private verification of access logs. In this chapter, we propose a tool
for verifying if access logs comply with a given access control policy. This work
contributes to answering the open question 1.3.3 by exploring searchable encryption
schemes and reasoning on how they can be applied to achieve a privacy-friendly
transparency. In here we first review the state-of-the-art on searchable encryption,
we then propose a theoretical policy verifier. Later, we give insights into its feasibil-
ity based on algorithmic complexity and security considerations on the scheme.
This chapter is based on the work in collaboration with Thaís Bardini Idalino
(University of Ottawa) and Dr. Jean Everson Martina (Universidade Federal de
Santa Catarina). The content presented here was published in a workshop article
[106].
Chapter 6: Accomplishing Transparency in Medical Systems. In this chapter, we
systematically review what solutions, among the current Transparency Enhancing
Technologies, can help accomplish transparency in agreement with our technical
requirements and Articles we elicited from the General Data Protection Regulation.
This work contributes to answering the open question 1.3.4; we reason on the current
Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs) and discuss the aspects of transparency which
still need to be better explored from a technical perspective.
This chapter is based on the work realised in collaboration with Dr. Ana Mar-
garida Leite de Almeida Ferreira (CINTESIS - University of Porto) and Dr. Gabriele
Lenzini (SnT - University of Luxembourg). The result of this collaboration was pub-
lished in a conference article and was awarded Best Paper at the 5th International
Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy [220].
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Chapter 7: Concluding remarks. In this chapter, we present considerations taken
in conclusion to this research project. We revisit our goal and questions and dis-
cuss how this thesis addresses them. We also present some future works and open
problems which remain to be explored.
Appendix A: Transparency measurement procedure. This appendix describes in
details how to compute each metric described in chapter 4. The description is given
in a series of table, formatted according to the indications in the ISO/IEC 27004
standard.
Appendix B: Evaluation ofMicrosoft HealthVault. This appendix exemplifies the
evaluation process we propose in chapter 4: we show, step by step, how to calculate
the metrics to assess the quality of transparency on the Microsoft HealthVault. Lack-
ing any comparative analysis, this assessment exercise is not meant to suggest any
judgement on the quality of transparency and on the legal compliance of that par-
ticular service, but instead, it serves as an example of how to apply the metrics to a
real system and of how to visualise the result.
Appendix C: Transparency Enhancing Tools in the context of the GDPR. This
appendix expands the results of the work described in chapter 6: it presents a com-
prehensive table with the correlations between the TETs and each article from the
GDPR we identify as transparency-related.
1.5 Scientific contributions
Below we list the scientific contributions arising from the execution of this research
project.
Publications as main author
1. Dayana. Spagnuelo and Gabriele Lenzini. Security on medical data sharing (a
literature review). http://hdl.handle.net/10993/23241. Mar. 2015
2. Dayana Spagnuelo and Gabriele Lenzini. “Patient-Centred Transparency Re-
quirements for Medical Data Sharing Systems”. In: New Advances in Infor-
mation Systems and Technologies. Ed. by Álvaro Rocha et al. Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2016, pp. 1073–1083. ISBN: 978-3-319-31232-3. DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-31232-3_102
3. Dayana Spagnuelo andGabriele Lenzini. “TransparentMedical Data Systems”.
In: Journal of Medical Systems 41.1 (2016), p. 8. ISSN: 1573-689X. DOI: 10.1007/
s10916-016-0653-8
4. Dayana Spagnuelo, Cesare Bartolini, and Gabriele Lenzini. “Metrics for Trans-
parency”. In: Data PrivacyManagement and Security Assurance: 11th International
Workshop, DPM 2016 and 5th Int. Workshop, QASA 2016, Heraklion, Crete, Greece,
September 26-27, 2016, Proceedings. Cham: Springer International Publishing,
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rics for Transparency in Medical Systems”. In: International Conference on Trust
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On Transparency and related
properties
Medical records (e.g., test results and health reports) are about patients. Hospitals
and healthcare institutions generate them after a patient’s visit. Today they are digi-
tized, stored electronically, and accessed remotely by professionals.
European directives suggest that patients should access these records too. Be-
sides, they say, patients should have control over these data and be informed if and
when their records are shared and how secure they are. These requirements are
difficult to be met.
From a patient’s perspective, the viewpoint of this work, it may be easier to ad-
dress at least one of such requirements: to inform patients about how secure their
data are. This is a property usually referred as transparency, but a clear meaning of
the word is still missing.
This chapter is dedicated to clarify the meaning of transparency. In here we
survey the literature in medical data sharing and discuss what are the main security
concerns in it. In doing so, we investigate whether transparency is debated in this
domain, in relation to which other properties, and whichmeaning and role are given
to it. The findings of this task are described in section 2.1. Moreover, we explore
the existing transparency definitions in other domains, and discuss how they fit in
the medical data systems domain in section 2.2. Finally, we identify the concepts
that relate to transparency and review them in the context of Health Information
Technology (Health IT). This exercise is presented in section 2.3, it help us clarifying
the role of transparency in modern medical data systems.
2.1 Transparency and security in Medical Systems
According to [63] transparency ought to be regarded as an additional feature that
qualifies security. So, security can be said to be transparent when is intelligible to
human user. It opposes an opaque security, which holds technically but without the
user’s being aware of it. Thus, transparency is a socio-technical security property.
Transparency, is not a new term. It has been proposed in relation to Transpar-
ency Enhancing Tools (TETs) [113]. These are usually browser extensions that read
out web server’s privacy policies and inform users concisely, for instance, that a
web server records the user’s whereabouts and may sell the user’s data to third
parties. TETs have been discussed in relation to electronic health records [63], but
no concrete solution has been proposed. Transparency in the medical domain is still
an unfulfilled requirement.
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FIGURE 2.1: Methodology diagram.
2.1.1 Methodology and tools
To find out whether transparency was debated in the medical data systems domain,
we browsed the state of the art querying for “Security” and “Medical Data Sharing”,
and we looked for papers containing them in the title, in the abstract, in the list
of keywords, and in the entire body. We chose “Security” because it is a general
term: we expect that a paper that addresses more precise security properties will
also mention “security” somewhere its text. We chose “Medical Data Sharing” to
refine our domain to papers that discuss sharing medical data.
The literature review was conducted in two stages. Initially we executed a sys-
tematic review in 2016, it included all works published in the previous 10 years. In
2018, we again searched for works in that area, but only reviewed papers from the
last 2 years. The results of the two reviews were later appended. An overview of
our methodology is presented in Figure 2.1.
To conduct our literature review we searched for papers via “Findit.lu”1 and
Google Scholar2. The first is the largest library portal in Luxembourg, and it is
entirely dedicated on searching for electronic contents. The second is the popular
search engine from Google dedicated to the scholarly literature. Both index a large
1www.findit.lu.
2https://scholar.google.lu/.
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number of important scientific digital libraries such as, among many others, LNCS,
the ACM Digital Library, IEEEXplore, ScienceDirect, Scopus, and Medline. Brows-
ing papers through the two engines ensures we diversify as much as possible our
sources.
First, we queried without constraints on the year of publication. We got as many
as 1014 articles (603 from the first stage, and 411 from the second), too many for
us to be able to read or scan them all. Thus, we restricted the focus to the last 12
years, from 2006 to now. Excluding the repeated results and the papers not avail-
able for download, and the works that only mentioned medical systems as example,
our pool shrank down to a total of 226 papers (97 from the first stage, and 129 from
the second). We read the abstract and skimmed through the content of all of them.
It turned out that 98 papers were about medical data sharing but with no focus on
“security”: the word appeared to be mentioned but the concept is not discussed. We
read the remaining papers more carefully, again looking for papers focused on secu-
rity. After this task, we were left with a pool of 112 papers (65 from the first stage,
and 47 from the second). At this stage, we judged the number of paper selected suf-
ficient to understand whether transparency was discussed in the medical domain.
We did not conduct a snowballing search.
We organized our findings around one question: “what particular security prop-
erty the paper is about?”. To answer this question helped us to classify the papers
depending on the property, or properties, they debate. It also helps us to under-
stand whether transparency is considered as a security requirement and, if it is, in
relation to which other property.
2.1.2 Findings
Answering our main question, and so looking into what security properties our pool
of papers is about, lead us to identify nine main security categories, each concern-
ing policies, tools, or techniques meant to guarantee, preserve, or enforce a specific
property. The nine categories are the following:
1. Privacy – providing anonymity to the data owners or empowering them to
define who can operate on the data;
2. User authentication – enhancing the way in which users are authenticated elec-
tronically;
3. Access control – concerning better ways to define who can access medical data
and in what circumstances;
4. Data authenticity – solutions to prove that data origin is authentic, and that it is
coming from the source as claimed;
5. Data Integrity – solutions to guarantee and prove that the data has not been
manipulated or tampered with;
6. Confidentiality – preventing data disclosure to non-authorized third-parties;
7. Auditability – helping data owners to retrieve information clarifying how their
data is being used;
8. Accountability – helping data owners to hold someone or some entity responsi-
ble in case of data misuse;
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FIGURE 2.2: Number of papers published per category from 2006 to
now. We distinguished the first from the second 6 years.
9. Transparency – informing and clarifying about security policies and processes.
Most of the surveyed papers argue about data confidentiality (see Figure 2.2).
This property is invoked in relation to protect the data transmitted in open channels,
such as the internet, or stored in open data bases, such as the cloud. One comment
is mandatory: in the pool “confidentiality” there are 56 papers, namely [1, 2, 5, 6,
9, 11, 14, 20, 29, 33, 36–38, 50, 55, 59, 65, 91–94, 96, 100, 102, 105, 115, 118, 123,
134, 136, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 155, 161, 165, 182, 184, 189, 190, 195, 197, 200, 204,
207, 208, 211, 224, 232, 234, 240, 242, 253, 255]. Some of those were, per keywords,
first gathered under “privacy". A closer look revealed that they are using the term
inappropriately since their concern is mainly about encrypting data. But, encryption
per se is insufficient to guarantee that the user’s personal and sensitive information
remains private during the whole data life cycle; more sophisticated techniques have
to be in place for privacy to be protected. Thus, we decided to re-classify those works
as being about confidentiality, adding those up to the ones already in that category.
Confidentiality is constantly discuss together with data integrity and data au-
thenticity. That is because encryption is the technique that is more often adopted to
enforce confidentiality in medical systems and the same technique is also proposed
for data authenticity and integrity. In a total of 28 papers about data integrity (i.e.,
[5, 11, 14, 20, 36, 41, 50, 54, 55, 59, 84, 91, 94, 124, 131, 136, 140, 141, 144, 148, 158,
161, 189, 197, 200, 224, 232, 240]) only 7 works do not discuss confidentiality. We ob-
served a very similar scenario with the category data authenticity. Only 5 works do
not discuss confidentiality, out of 16 papers discussing data authenticity (i.e., [11, 14,
29, 41, 50, 54, 84, 131, 136, 140, 158, 161, 189, 197, 200, 240]). Also, almost all works
that examine data authenticity explicitly discuss data integrity too, with exception
of only one work (i.e., [29]).
After confidentiality, the second and third most discussed security properties are
privacy and access control. We found out that 45 works discuss privacy (the correct
interpretation of this term) [3, 7, 34, 39, 54, 75, 77, 84, 88, 90, 96, 97, 100, 102, 112, 120,
124, 127, 133, 137, 138, 143, 145, 161, 163, 165, 178–181, 187, 193, 196–198, 204, 207,
208, 211, 213, 214, 224, 233, 242, 246], and that 38 papers discuss access control [2, 3,
5, 6, 20, 23, 34, 58, 74, 93, 111, 112, 114, 132, 140, 141, 144–146, 161, 180, 181, 191, 193,
196, 197, 213, 215, 226, 230, 231, 240, 243, 246, 251–253, 255].
User authentication seems not a major concerns as it is present only in 6 papers
[5, 36, 50, 88, 121, 146]. We do not have enough data to justify this lack of interest in
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authentication, but we can speculate on it. An hypothesis we have is that most of the
works give for granted that medical data are accessed only by professionals and that
they are considered trustworthy. Similarly, we claim that the lack of interest in user
authentication may indicate that there is not yet a widespread concern about open-
ing the access of the health data to patients. This is, indeed, a requirement that only
very recently has been debated and brought to the attention of the society. If con-
crete actions to open up access to patients were taken into consideration, it would,
we expect, raise more attention about identification and authentication. Indeed the
works which discuss such a feature have identification and authentication as their
main requirement (e.g., see [62]). A similar speculation, i.e., that the patient-centred
approach is not yet under the bull’s-eye in medical data security, concerns also the
last three properties, transparency – the one of interest for our work, auditability and
accountability. Auditability is subject of discussion of only 4 papers [141, 164, 197,
252]. Accountability is subject of discussion of 7 papers [65, 75, 100, 124, 197, 233,
251]. While transparency is mentioned only in 9 papers [65, 75, 100, 124, 127, 157,
193, 208, 233].
Transparency has been regarded as openness about policies and processes in
[124, 157, 233]. The authors say: “there should be openness and transparency about
policies, procedures, and technologies that directly affect individuals and/or their individ-
ually identifiable health information” [124], “clear and accessible policies and procedures
help maintain the trust of participants” [233], and point out “the need for transparent
data stewardship practices, [..] as well as transparency about the transfer or sharing of any
data" [157]. Transparency has been considered a predisposition to increase responsi-
bility and therefore presented with accountability as “critical to helping society manage
the privacy risks that accumulate from expeditious progress in communication, storage, and
search technology” [75], and “increases the accountability and transparency of the HRI sys-
tem, thus, improving its trustworthiness with all parties involved" [65]. Transparency has
been also defined as the the property to be informative towards the patient in [193]:
the authors denounce the lack of transparency for “[the] patient is not automatically
aware which professionals or entities are processing her EHR and for what purposes. [The]
patient is not aware of all disclosures of the content of her EHR”.
Most recent works regard transparency as a major issue, and a critical require-
ment for the success of systems [100, 127]. Henze et al. propose the concept of
transparency by design. They advocate there should be documentation on data usage
from the design and implementation of a service in order to improve transparency.
We highlight here: “individual concerns mainly result from the fact that there is no control
or at least transparency over the access to this data", “[the] lack of precise, up-to-date infor-
mation about the data processing again leads to uncertainty and non-transparency for the
users" [100]. Kostkova et al. point out that transparency and openness are paramount
for regaining public trust; they defend that transparency implies “public understand-
ing of benefits and risks of data sharing, [..] strong disclosure, and notification mechanism
informing public about potential [privacy] violations" [127].
2.1.3 Discussion
Our review has an obvious limitation: it considers papers that matched only two
key-phrases, “security” and “medical data sharing”. However, “security” is a generic
terms under which we were able to find papers discussing more specific properties
and requirements. “Medical data sharing” is our target, so this choice is justified.
Still one could question why we did not searched for synonyms, and whether, in not
doing so, wemissed some important papers. Our searching on thewhole body of the
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FIGURE 2.3: Number of papers per year per category.
FIGURE 2.4: Properties related to Transparency and the number of
papers in which they appear.
paper, however, was sufficient to catch works about electronic health records, bio-
medical data, health care information systems, health-grid. Therefore, we judged
the choice of our key-phrases sufficiently good for our scope.
This survey, organized around the works published in the last 12 years, shows
that confidentiality and privacy are the major concerns in security for medical data
(see also Figure 2.3). Privacy is also the property that seems to be mostly related to
transparency, as it is discussed in almost every work concerning transparency (see
Figure 2.4). This comes with no surprise.
About transparency, the survey shows that this requirement has just began to be
addressed; all the considered papers see transparency related to inform users and
make policies and processes openly available. This seems to be the interpretation
of “transparency” in the medical domain, a meaning which matches what we pro-
pose. However, there is no formalization of it and no standard solution that makes
a medical system compliant to it.
Althoughwe already had some hint of it, after having looked at the recent growth
of interest as this survey reports, it is evident that there is still little attention from
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the security community towards auditability, accountability, transparency, and user
authentication, at least in relation to medical data systems. We did not searched into
the literature of auditability, for example, and checked for use cases on medical data
(e.g., as in [49]). Auditability, accountability and transparency are essential wherever
humans need to be informed about practices in sharing sensitive personal data. No
solution exists to comply with current EU regulations on this. Our first impression
is that both categories are relatively understudied in the medical sectors. We expect
a growth in attention to these properties as the idea of user empowerment will get
more popular.
User authentication seems suspiciously undervalued in the papers we surveyed.
It is hard, from the data we have, to infer why. It may be that there are already
good-enough authentication solutions to which medical systems can resort to. But,
if we have to attempt another explanation, we are keen to suppose that current med-
ical data are accessed mainly by professionals and that these roles are assumed to
be trustworthy. Authentication is therefore implemented by simple login and pass-
word. Similarly as what we claimed while discussing transparency, if the EU direc-
tive suggesting to let users access their medical data should take off, we expect the
problem of user authentication to became a pillar for the working of other several
security features, and to foster a renewed interest.
2.2 Transparency definition
Apart from the works emerged from our systematic review (see section 2.1), three
other works deserve to be commented for bringing up relevant discussions on trans-
parency in the medical domain (i.e., [186, 205, 229]). Transparency is presented by
Seneviratne and Kagal as a mean to enhance and promote privacy: medical data systems
provide transparency by allowing users to audit the operations run on data consid-
ered sensitive [205].
Ray and Wimalasiri defend that transparency in medical systems has two di-
mensions: to give access to Electronic Health Records (EHRs) and to disclose how the
systems works [186]. They present a use case which rates poorly in transparency
“due to the lack of visible privacy policies and details on the personal information that
will be stored”. Tang and Lansky have a similar opinion, they mention that an opti-
mal medical systemsmust be transparent in terms of information sources and information
access [229].
All the considered papers in medical systems see transparency related to the act
of informing users and making policies and processes openly available. This seems to be
the interpretation of “transparency” in the Health IT. However, there is basically no
further development and no standard solution that makes a medical system compli-
ant to it.
Instead, transparency has been discussed in cloud computing. Transparency has
been inspected with relation to privacy and accountability from the perspective of
end-users by Berthold et al. in [19]. TETs (see [63] and [98] for a survey) have been
developed to inform users about how data are handled. In this sense, transparency
is intended to simplify the understanding of privacy policies, an interpretation that re-
minds usability; to help check for possible violations of the privacy policy, which recall
auditability; and to allow the user to keep track of the personal data and its disclosures,
which we think refers to verifiability. Hansen [95] advocate that users should have
“a way of knowing what personal data is available in the system and who can access it”.
According to the author, transparency is about “letting the users feel in control of the
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technology”, for example by simplifying the presentation of privacy policies and the
explanation of user’s privacy rights. This is another proposition that suggest some
sort of usability.
Transparency has been also studied as a quality in software engineering for or-
ganisations. Leite and Cappelli study transparency from an organisational view and
present a graph of qualities (or soft goals) that relate to the notion of transparency
[31, 135]. They construct the graph by combining the terms associated with trans-
parency in the literature. By doing that, they find out four main qualities that pro-
vide a notion on how transparencywould be satisfied in software products: usability,
auditability, accessibility and informativeness.
There have been also a few attempts to define transparencymore rigorously. Two
definitions stand out for their clarity. The first, states that transparency is “the state
when every party in the target group possesses perfect knowledge, [..] i.e., when
no party in the target group could learn any information (in Shannon’s sense) about
the observable of interest” [19]. This definition defines a measure of transparency in
information theoretical sense; however, at least in the domain addressed here where
patients are the end users, perfect knowledge as referred in [19] is hardly measurable
in which it depends on subjective abilities of individuals to acquire knowledge. A
second definition that separates transparency in two categories: ex ante and ex post
transparency. Ex ante transparency, we quote, “enables the anticipation of consequences
before data are actually disclosed”. Ex post transparency, “offers information about any
consequences if data already have been revealed” (FIDIS deliverable D7.12 [67]).
This definition fits better the concept of transparency that has been advocated
for Health IT. It is simple and yet flexible enough to comprise the intuition one has
about what transparency should be. We adopt it in this paper with minor modifica-
tions:
Definition 1 (Transparency in Health IT). Ex ante transparency enables the patient to
anticipate what will happen to his/her medical and personal data. Ex post transparency
enables the patient to be informed or get informed about what happened to his/her medical
and personal data.
Since in medical systems is not always clear when a data is disclosed –medical
data is created andmanipulated by themedical team, sometimes without the knowl-
edge of the patient. Definition 1 interprets disclosure as the act of giving in custody
or giving access to the data. This happens whenever the data is shared with another
doctor or medical institution, for example.
2.3 Related properties
The works we cited in section 2.1 and in section 2.2 present several interpretations of
transparency. What emerges is that transparency is accompanied by the following
properties: openness, availability, auditability, verifiability, empowerment, usability
and privacy. We have emphasised these words or the phrases where those properties
emerge, and the reader may want to review the sections at this point.
Although these terms are often invoked to describe transparency, there is not an
agreement on how they relate with transparency. Is transparency a collective name
for these other properties? Is it a synonymous for some of them? Is it instead a
property itself that is only qualified better by those concepts?
And how precisely those terms help qualifying transparency? These questions
are unanswered.
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We answer to these questions by discussing what these properties mean in the
domain of Health IT and how they relate with transparency. Despite conceived for
Health IT, the correlations between the concepts that we present remain valid even
outside this application domain. The resulting taxonomy (see Figure 2.5) not only
clarifies better what transparency is, but also led us to have a neat list of require-
ments for transparency in medical data systems (see chapter 3).
Empowerment. Empowerment is a concept that appears to be closely related to
transparency. According to Oxford Dictionaries empowerment is the “authority or
power given to someone to do something" [175]. In medical systems, empower-
ment has been discussed in terms of giving individuals power to take appropriate
action with regard to personal data and privacy issues [95]; giving patients control
over their health information [192]; and “[to] allow patients to grant access to spe-
cific portions of their health data” [203]. Empowerment has been discussed with the
name of intervenability, as a means to give users the power to decide on the process-
ing of their data [149]. Because empowerment is about giving patients the power to
control their data rather than helping them understanding what happened or will
happen to their data, it does not define transparency. Instead, we see it as comple-
mentary to transparency for it gives individuals the right to react to the information
provided by a transparent system.
Openness. “The concept of openness [..] refers to a kind of transparency which is
the opposite of secrecy and most often this transparency is seen in terms of access
to information especially within organization, institutions or societies” [173]. The
Open Source Initiative (OSI), who educate in methods for software development,
reminds that open source is about disclosing source and allowing others to modify
and derive other works [169]. By rephrasing the concept in medical data systems,
we understand that openness is about allowing patient to knowwhat a process does
and how it does it, and giving them the permission to change it. This notion of open-
ness comprises the transparency as we defined it; in addition, calls for empowering
a patient, in our case, to modify his/her data. Figure 2.5 represents openness as
the father node of transparency and of empowerment: both children help defining
openness.
Accountability, Auditability and Verifiability. Accountability is “the fact or con-
dition of being accountable; responsibility” [175]. In the medical domain it has been
defined as “a concept that lets us monitor a person’s use of information and hold
that person accountable if he or she misuses the data” [75].
Auditability is defined as “an official inspection of an organization’s accounts,
typically by an independent body” (derived from the definition of “audit” [175]).
But in medical systems it has being regarded as an informal procedure made by the
patients to indicate how sensitive data was used [205]. In this sense it can be also
interpreted as “the ability to examine carefully for accuracy with the intent of verifi-
cation” [135]. Auditability and accountability are often associated with the concept
of verifiability.
Verifiability is “[being] able to be checked or demonstrated to be true, accurate,
or justified" (from the definition of “verifiable” in [175]), or “the quality of being
tested (verified or falsified) by experiment or observation" [135]. In computer secu-
rity, verifiability is a property that includes auditability. Universal verifiability, for
instance, states that anyone (thus, not only auditors) should be able to verify that the
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system’s run satisfies a given property [128] but, assuming a patient-centred focus
where there are no entities but the patient and the system, auditability and verifia-
bility become undistinguishable. We talk in this sense of verifiability/auditability.
Figure 2.5, for sake of generality, pictures verifiability and auditability as distinct
nodes helping transparency: they both enable patients be informed about what hap-
pened to their records (see the ex post interpretation in Definition 1).
Accountability ensures that who has misbehaved will be identified [130]. Bert-
hold et al. link accountability and transparency by stating that accountability is being
transparent about the occurrence of privacy breaches. In Figure 2.5, accountability
is a brother node of auditability, both are an ex post properties, and help specifying
verifiability.
Availability. Finally, transparency is constantly regarded as being informative to-
wards the patients on the usage and disclosure of their personal and medical data
[193], on the policies [95], and procedures [233]. These definitions closely relate to
the concept of availability, which can be defined as“the quality of being able to be used
or obtained" [175] or “the quality of being at hand when needed" [135]. In our context,
availability helps ex ante transparency as it provides a way for patients to obtain
information on the intentions of the systems in regard to their data. It also helps
ex post transparency when it makes available information on what happened to the
patient’s data. Availability thus helps defining transparency.
Usability and Privacy. There is a huge amount of works about these two proper-
ties, so we focus on what is most relevant for the scope of our work.
The ISO 9241-11 defines usability as “the extent to which a product can be used
by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satis-
faction in a specified context of use” [108]. Despite desirable for transparency (see
section 2.1 and section 2.2), we think that a system can be transparent even with-
out reaching the quality required by usability. But, usability improves transparency
in the sense to help users reaching their goal more effectively, efficiently, satisfacto-
rily. In this understanding, usability appears to be an attribute of transparency (a
perspective also shared by [67]). Usability is not shown in Figure 2.5, but we will
consider it in our requirements.
A similar argument holds for (information) privacy. Privacy is preserved when
sensitive information is not leaked by unauthorised entities. Interpreted as confi-
dentiality, privacy seems to conflict with transparency [173]. Instead, as pointed
out in [19], privacy and transparency can be conceptually realised without friction.
These properties do not conflict if the data that transparency intends to reveal is
not the same data which privacy intends to protect. In particular, helping a patient
anticipate what will happen or informing him/her about what has happened about
his/her data can be done without leaking sensitive information about other patients.
In this interpretation, privacy becomes a principle of minimal disclosure applied to
transparency; when called for, it improves the quality of transparency. However, the
realisation of these two properties in a practical tool is far from trivial. Some of the
technical challenges involving the implementation of privacy-preserving TETs are
presented in [67], and are also further discussed in this thesis, in chapter 5. As we
did for usability, we do not include privacy in Figure 2.5, but define for it subsidiary
requirements.
Table 2.1 summarises and rephrases the properties that help defining transpar-
ency which are adapted to the Health IT domain. Figure 2.5 shows how they relate
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Property Definition in Health IT
Accountability Enables the patients to monitor the use of his/her
medical and personal data, and to hold a person ac-
countable in case of its misuse;
Availability Enables the patient to obtain and use information
related to his/her medical and personal data when
needed;
Empowerment To give a patient authority and power to control
his/her medical and personal data;
Openness The absence of secrecy and concealment from pa-
tients of any information on policies and practices af-
fecting their EHRs.
Verifiability/Auditability Enables the patient to verify what happened to
his/her medical and personal data;
TABLE 2.1: Properties that relate with Transparency and their defini-
tion in relation to Health IT.
with transparency. Nodes are properties, and edges are positive relationship be-
tween nodes, in which the lower node helps constructing the concept of the higher
node. It is important to note that we do not infer how much each quality helps, nor
if they are enough for constructing the others.
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FIGURE 2.5: How other properties that relate with Transparency help
defining ex post or ex ante Transparency.
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Chapter 3
Transparency requirements
Instead of interviewing engineers of medical systems and lawyers expert in regu-
lations (a task which was beyond our possibilities), to establish requirements for
transparency we started from the existing literature. By reviewing works in other
domains for similar requirements, we collected existing requirements potentially ap-
plicable in health care. After having searched our sources for what engineers discuss
about medical systems and understood their concerns about transparency, we crit-
ically discussed, systematically selected, and completed a preliminary requirement
list, before delivering our list of final requirements.
3.1 Requirements establishment
To compose our final list of requirements we proceeded in six steps (see Figure 3.1):
1. Definition of sources, where we review the literature in other domains searching
for potentially applicable-to-transparency requirements, and where we collect
papers that discuss technical features in medical systems that directly or indi-
rectly address transparency;
2. Extraction of requirements, where we define the criteria to select/compose trans-
parency requirements in preparation to have a preliminary list;
3. Categorisation, where we categorize our preliminary list of requirements ac-
cording to whether they provide information or mechanisms, to whether they
concern privacy, accountability, or other security properties, and to whether
they are ex ante or ex post;
4. Refinement, where we review the requirements questioning their relevance in
the healthcare domain;
5. Grouping/rewriting, where we group similar requirements, rewrite and restyle
them;
6. Revision, where we review our requirements on the light of the two openness
properties: transparency, and empowerment.
The following sections describe the six steps in details.
3.1.1 Definition of sources
Our sources are papers and projects that mention transparency as a goal or as a sub-
ject of research, as well as papers and projects about medical data security. In addi-
tion to the works we found while exploring transparency and its related properties
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FIGURE 3.1: Our second phase’s 6 steps (left); No. requirements re-
tained/rejected (right).
(see chapter 2), we selected others by searching for “transparency” and “privacy"
to find works discussing transparency but not necessarily in healthcare, and others
more by searching for “security,” “privacy”, and “medical data”, to find articles in
healthcare that discuss properties linked to transparency. The choice of keywords
is justified by the findings presented in section 2.1: privacy seems to be the property
that most relates to transparency. Because of that, from such generic keywords we
expected to find works in healthcare discussing solutions that provide some level
of transparency according to the definition elected here (see Definition 1) without
addressing it directly. We also searched through papers cited in articles that survey
the topic [183, 203].
We have found several publications on transparency, the majority belonging to
the EU project A4Cloud (www.a4cloud.eu). Two deliverables of this project [44, 153]
comment 346 requirements for accountability. They are listed after several inter-
views with professionals, among which data protection experts. We decided to use
this project’s deliverables as our main source, since the requirements that they pro-
vide form a superset of potentially interesting requirements. To this, we added six
papers (i.e., [4, 17, 89, 103, 192, 205]), discussing technical features for medical sys-
tems that match our definition of transparency.
3.1.2 Extraction of requirements
Because we had both a list of already well stated requirements for cloud computing
and six scientific articles discussing security in medical data sharing systems, we set
two different criteria for extracting requirements:
1. To select from the list of requirements those that were already tagged trans-
parency: this because the requirements coming from theA4Cloud project where
already labelled using combinations of accountability attributes, among which
“transparency”.
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2. To identify sentences describing operations that patients are able to do, or are
allowed to do, or have the right to do, as well as tasks executed by the medical
system that concern a patient’s records and affect the patient’s right over them
(e.g., break the glass and delegation of access rights).
By applying the first criterion we sieved a total of 126 requirements. The second
criterion is meant to discern mainly patient-centred requirements. Words such as
can, should, might, and must helped us spot key sentences. We extracted additional
20 requirements for a total of 146 requirements, written according to the RFC2119 to
indicate the requirement levels.
3.1.3 Categorisation
The requirements resulting from the previous step have been classified according
to six attributes that remind the syntactic categories used in the description of a re-
quirement: “The [Active Agent] must/should/may provide a [Passive Agent] with an
[Instrument] for a [Scope]”. Agents are data providers, medical systems, consumers,
data owners, the patients or a data broker. Instrument are pieces of information or
mechanisms that realize the “being transparent” in respect to a Scope, for instance
compliance to policies, accountability, auditability. A further attribute, Transparency
Type, specifies the requirement be ex ante, ex post, or other.
3.1.4 Refinement
We refined the set of requirements by removing:
1. Requirements where the Active Agent is not “data provider”, since data provider is
(the subject managing) the medical data sharing system, the role we intend to
let provide transparency;
2. Requirements where the Passive Agent is not the consumer, since we are interested
in requirements about data providers (medical systems) and data consumers
(patients), excluding requirements about other roles not relevant or uncom-
mon in the medical domain, such as data brokers;
3. Requirements that are not about ex ante or ex post transparency;
4. Requirements about implementation; and
5. Requirements that are not about personal data.
We adopted the terminology suggested by the A4Cloud to define the Cloud
provider and the EHR systems as provider and users or patients as consumer. Here
we considered the requirements that were not explicit about the agents, allowing
the interpretation the that the provider is the Active agent and the consumer is the
Passive agent. We also removed duplicates. We had duplicates since the two lists
considered as source are not independent, and because some of the concerns ex-
pressed in medical data sharing works are in common. This step reduced the pool
of 146 requirements to 67 requirements (53 from A4Cloud and 14 from healthcare
literature).
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3.1.5 Regrouping/Rewriting
We clustered the requirements according to our categorization. We did so to discover
requirements that are in fact variations of the same concept expressed with slightly
different words; in this case, we merged those variants into one new requirement.
In this process we also identified and excluded requirements that were meaningless
in healthcare, mainly because tailored specifically to cloud computing. Finally, we
removed requirements that were mere specializations of others, leaving only those
most general; they implicitly embrace the special cases. After this step we were let
with an initial list of 41 requirements.
3.1.6 Revision
After having concluded the definition of our transparency taxonomy we reviewed
our requirements and classified them accordingly. At this point we abandon the cat-
egories presented in subsection 3.1.3, which was formulated with the goal of aiding
in the manipulation of numerous requirements. Our taxonomy is much more fitting
to the presentation of the requirements studied here.
One of the consequences of this revision is the reclassification of 5 requirements.
Because transparency and empowerment are strongly coupled properties, in our
initial list of requirements some empowerment requirements were included. Five of
these were not captured by the previous stages of our requirements establishment
process. They were initially classified by us as related to transparency, and reclassi-
fied at this stage. Our final list is composed by 36 transparency requirements.
3.2 Transparency requirements for Medical Systems
Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 present 41 requirements. While the first three tables
present the Transparency requirements separated by qualities (availability, verifi-
ability/auditability, and accountability), the latter one presents Empowerment re-
quirements. These requirements do not help qualifying transparency, but are being
presented here because they complement the discussion about transparency and its
relation with other properties. In what concerns Definition 1 the requirements pre-
sented in Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 together compose ex ante and ex post transparency as
depicted in Figure 2.5.
Attribute Value
Type Not transparency 000
Ex ante 100
Ex post 200
Property Availability 10
Verifiability/ Auditability 20
Accountability 30
Empowerment 40
Instrument Information 1
Mechanisms 2
TABLE 3.1: Category codes: attribute (left) and Value (right).
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As requirement identifier, we gave a numerical code inspired by the Dewey Dec-
imal Classification [168]. It relies on the attributes: type, the transparency type; prop-
erty, the property in the taxonomy the requirement relates to; and instrument, what
is being provided to the patient. Table 3.1 lists the codes of our attributes. Each code
is a three digits number in which the hundreds represents the transparency type, the
tens represents the property, and the units represents the instrument. Requirements
in the same class are distinguished by adding decimal ciphers to the code.
Req. Specification Type Instrument
111.1 S must provide P with real time information
on physical data storage and data storage lo-
cation of different types of data.
Ex ante Information
111.2 S must inform P on how data are stored and
who has access to them.
Ex ante Information
111.3 S must inform P from whom it purchases ser-
vices, and about any conflict of interest to-
wards data.
Ex ante Information
111.4 S, in case of using services from third par-
ties, must inform P about the existence of
sub-providers, where they are located and
whether they comply with the legal require-
ments of the country of P.
Ex ante Information
111.5 Smust inform P how it is assured that data are
not accessed without authorisation.
Ex ante Information
111.6 S should make available a document that de-
scribes the adopted mechanisms for securing
data against data loss as well as data privacy
vulnerabilities.
Ex ante Information
111.7 S should make available a document that
describes the procedures and mechanisms
planned in cases of security breaches on P’s
data.
Ex ante Information
111.8 S should make available the technical docu-
mentation on how data are handled, how they
are stored, and what are the procedures for ac-
cessing them.
Ex ante Information
111.9 Pmust be made aware of the consequences of
their possible choices in an unbiased manner.
Ex ante Information
111.10 S must inform P about who is responsible for
handling owned data.
Ex ante Information
111.11 S must inform P about storage in other coun-
tries and compliance issues related to this stor-
age with respect to laws and regulations of
both the other country and their own country.
Ex ante Information
111.12 S should inform P about the use of specific se-
curity mechanisms.
Ex ante Information
111.13 S must inform P on how to protect data or
how data are protected.
Ex ante Information
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111.14 In case of using services from third parties, S
must inform P on the responsibilities of the
different parties involved in the agreement.
Ex ante Information
111.15 S must inform P about who has the authority
to investigate any policy compliance.
Ex ante Information
111.16 Smust provide Pwith evidence of data collec-
tion practices.
Ex ante Information
111.17 Smust make available a document explaining
the procedures for leaving the service and tak-
ing the data out from the service.
Ex ante Information
111.18 S must make available a document that de-
scribes the ownership of the data.
Ex ante Information
111.19 S must provide P with disclosure of policies,
regulations or terms regarding data sharing,
processing and the use of data.
Ex ante Information
111.20 S must provide P with evidence of separating
personal from meta data.
Ex ante Information
112.1 Smust provide Pwith mechanisms for access-
ing personal data.
Ex ante Mechanisms
211.1 S, in case of security breaches, must inform
P on what happened, why it happened, what
the procedures S is taking to correct the prob-
lem andwhen services will be resumed as nor-
mal.
Ex post Information
211.2 S must inform P when the authorities access
personal data.
Ex post Information
211.3 S must notify P in case the policy is overrid-
den (break the glass).
Ex post Information
211.4 S must provide P with timely notification on
security breaches.1
Ex post Information
221.5 Smust inform P if and when data is gathered,
inferred or aggregated.
Ex post Information
TABLE 3.2: Availability requirements (S =medical system; P =pa-
tient).
3.2.1 Availability requirements
Availability requirements are mainly regarded in terms of providing information,
and serve both transparency types. However, they mostly contribute to the ex ante
notion. We present the availability requirements in Table 3.2.
Availability contributes to the notion of ex ante transparency because EHRs are
normally created and manipulated by medical teams, and so patients are not auto-
matically aware of what data the system has on them, how data are handled and
by whom are accessed. Without this pieces of information patients are not able to
anticipate what is going to happen to their data.
1According to GDPR Article 33, notification must be provided within 72 hours after having become
aware of the incident.
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Req. Specification Type Instrument
221.1 S must provide P with evidence that policies,
regulations and practices have been applied
correctly.
Ex post Information
221.2 S must provide P with evidence of the recov-
ery from security attacks.
Ex post Information
221.3 S must provide evidence of compliance with
respect to extraterritorial legislative regimes.
Ex post Information
221.4 Smust provide evidence that the data is being
maintained in the correct way.
Ex post Information
221.5 S must provide P with evidence regarding
permissions history for auditing purposes.
Ex post Information
221.6 S must provide detailed information on the
data collected about P, and what information
S has implicitly derived from disclosed data.
Ex post Information
221.7 S must provide P with evidence that revoked
consent has been executed.
Ex post Information
211.8 S must provide P with evidence of security
breaches.
Ex post Information
222.1 Smust provide P with audit mechanisms. Ex post Mechanisms
TABLE 3.3: Verifiability/auditability requirements (S =medical sys-
tem; P =patient).
Req. Specification Type Instrument
232.1 S must provide P with accountability mecha-
nisms.
Ex post Mechanisms
TABLE 3.4: Accountability requirements (S =medical system; P =pa-
tient).
Req. Specification Type Instrument
042.1 S must provide P with data sharing mecha-
nisms.
- Mechanisms
042.2 S must provide P with mechanisms allowing
the revocation of access rights.
- Mechanisms
042.3 Smust provide Pwith mechanisms for the ad-
ministration of access rights.
- Mechanisms
042.4 S must provide P with mechanisms for
amending and correcting personal data.
- Mechanisms
042.5 Smust provide Pwith mechanisms that allow
to express binding privacy policies regarding
the disclosure of data to third parties.
- Mechanisms
TABLE 3.5: Empowerment requirements (S =medical system; P =pa-
tient).
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Quality Specification
Existence S shall inform the P about the existence of transparency tools.
Usability S shall comply with a requirement in an understandable and usable
way.
Privacy S shall comply with a requirement without harming data privacy.
TABLE 3.6: Quality requirements (S =medical system; P =patient).
Availability in ex post includes requirements (like requirements 211.1-4) that in-
form patients about events that may endanger their data, like security breaches. The
goal of these requirements is to inform the patients so that they are able to under-
stand the impact of the event on their data, but not necessarily to find and blame the
responsible for the event.
3.2.2 Verifiability requirements
Verifiability contributes only to the notion of ex post transparency, and is composed
by requirements providing information and mechanisms (see Table 3.3 and Table
3.4). The first ones allow the patients to check by observation the way in which data
have been handled, and whether they have been handled in compliance to policies
and regulations. The second ones allow them to check by experimentation what
happened to their data.
Because we define ex post transparency as a way to inform the patients about
what happened to their personal data, ex post is mostly composed by verifiability
requirements.
3.2.3 Empowerment requirements
Table 3.5 shows requirements that were initially classified as related to transparency,
and later, in our revision step, were assigned to empowerment. These requirements
should not be confused with ex ante transparency requirements. In a sense, to pro-
vide ways for patients to control their personal data also helps them to anticipate
what will happen to it. But these requirements bring more than just anticipation.
Empowerment requirements directly address the problem of ownership of the data
by allowing the patients to react to the information provided by a transparent sys-
tem, and to control the usage of their data. This is a viewpoint we share with the
presented by Meis and Heisel in [149]. In that work, the authors explore aspects of
empowerment (under the name of intervenability), addressing aspects such as the
right to data portability, the right to be forgotten, and the right to object. We refrain
from exploring further the property of empowerment.
3.2.4 Quality requirements
As presented in section 2.3, we found in the literature properties that help improving
the quality of transparency, those are referred as quality requirements [238]. We list
three of such requirements in Table 3.6.
Usability and privacy emerged while we browsed the literature for definitions of
transparency, they were presented and discussed in section 2.3. Existence emerged
from the requirements elicitation process and is justified by the fact that a system
cannot be considered truly transparent if its users are not informed about the trans-
parency functionalities existent. A similar reasoning is also defended in [149] with
3.3. Discussion 33
regard to intervenability. For these reasons we decided to included it as a desired
quality.
The three quality requirements can potentially be applied over the 41 identified
requirements. If we do so, we obtain 41⇥ 4 requirements (for each original version
we add three modalities). For instance, requirement 232.1 - “S must provide P with
accountability mechanisms” have three other modalities: “[S must inform P that
there are] accountability mechanisms”; “S must provide P with [usable] account-
ability mechanisms”; “S must provide P with accountability mechanisms [that do
not disclose other private information]".
3.3 Discussion
It is generally difficult to have a complete list of requirements and our is not an ex-
ception. We know, for instance, that we overlooked technical requirements regard-
ing how to implement transparency. We did so intentionally, since we aimed to iden-
tify the non-functional rather than the technical features supporting transparency as
a property. But even if we have restricted the discussion to non-functional require-
ments it is unrealistic claiming we are complete; yet at the best of our efforts we
believe we did not missed any important requirement.
One can question that, while selecting our sources, we did not searched broadly
enough. We searched for “transparency”, “security” and “privacy”, which we think
are very general terms. In the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), trans-
parency is frequently related to security properties meant to give the users feedback
on their private data. So, for instance, even though we overlooked accountability
or/and auditability, being them more specific than security and privacy, we indeed
harvested works on those topics too. And, as we comment in chapter 2, in medi-
cal systems, privacy is the property more likely to be related to with transparency
solutions.
One could also question that the best way to achieve completeness is to discuss
with engineers working with medical systems and with health care professionals.
We did not, for instance, organised group studies, or interviews, or workshops
with medical professionals because we did not have the resources for this kind of
activities. However, even interviewing health care professional has its own limi-
tation: professionals although using medical systems may not be familiar, or just
have a non-professional understanding of terms like privacy, security, and trans-
parency; moreover there is no assurance that a population of specialist’s answers
can lead to complete set of requirements. We instead chose to rely on previous stud-
ies (A4Cloud), who in their turn had the resources to organise workshops with dif-
ferent stakeholders. The original list of 346 requirements that we “borrowed” from
A4Cloud did emerge from a workshop. Where precisely those professional figures
were asked for requirements also about transparency in the context of cloud comput-
ing. Moreover, we also extracted requirements from works debating patient-centric
desirable features on medical systems.
Besides, to build a list as complete as possible, we decided to add three quality
requirements to our pool, exploring human aspects (usability), transversal security
aspects (preserving privacy), and fairness aspects (knowledge of existence). They all
capture better the spirit of transparency. We have thus indirect reason to believe that
we have not missed much.
A similar argument gives us some guarantee about the relevance of our selec-
tion of requirements. However, although we chose carefully our sources, we cannot
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verify the relevance only by looking at the data we have. But, at least, if relevance
is intended with respect to our definition of transparency (see chapter 2), we have
some insurance because of our methodology: its selective and its integrative steps
were conceived to be compliant with that definition. However, if relevance is in-
tended with respect to regulations, our methodology may not be sufficient to give
full guarantee: it only gives best compliance with what we have found in the litera-
ture. Reaching legal compliance is a very difficult task in general, usually reached by
compliance to standards; there are no standard yet for transparency. Even the GDPR,
which promotes transparency as one of its driving principle for data protections, is
not clear on the matter and, as far as we know, there is an alive discussion about
how to be compliant to it. Our requirements constitute a reasoned first proposal that
should be followed by discussions with health care specialists, patient associations
and, regulators.
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Metrics for Transparency
The legislation on data protection in the European Union (GDPR) places emphasis
on ensuring high quality of data processing service. It proposes principles intended
to serve individuals and to guarantee that their personal information is processed
“lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner.”1. In particular, transparency is not
only regarded as essential for data processing, it is also a way for service providers
to build and preserve trust. Providers that are transparent on their data privacy
policies and practices, express them in a clear and readable manner, and have easily-
accessible documents and histories of processing operations can have a better chance
to gain and maintain their client’s trust and stay in business.
But how can transparency be modelled and implemented, and how to measure
the amount of transparency that a system guarantees? And, as a consequence, what
degree of presumption of compliance to the GDPR’s principle does a service ensure?
Although the GDPR does not give any precise and detailed definition of trans-
parency, its Recital 39 explains that “transparency requires that any information and
communication relating to the processing of those personal data be easily accessi-
ble and easy to understand, and that clear and plain language be used”, and that
“natural persons should be made aware of risks, rules, safeguards and rights in re-
lation to the processing of personal data and how to exercise their rights in relation
to such processing.”2. Such statements do qualify transparency somehow but, pur-
posely, GDPR’s descriptions are meant to concern heterogeneous perspectives and
thus are stated to leave room for interpretation. The means to adhere to the principle
of transparency thus can vary depending on e.g., the type of service, the data being
processed, and the class of individuals whose personal data it processes. All those
means can hardly be understood unless the principle is clearly and operationally
defined.
A step in this direction has been attempted by the EU Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party (WP29). In April 2018, it has published a document about practical
guidance and interpretative assistance on the new obligation of transparency3. The
document comments on the GDPR’s articles that refer to the principle (Art. 12, 13,
14, 15-22, and 34) and highlights what categories of information must be provided
to data subjects, in which manner and by using which tools. It also explains on
what qualities, called elements in the document, should the provided information
and communication satisfy (e.g., conciseness, intelligibility, easy accessibility, free of
charge).
1GDPR, Article 5.1(a).
2Ibid. (39)
3Article 29 Working Party - Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679, WP260 rev.01,
11 April 2018.
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These guidelines are certainly helpful but yet they do not indicate a best practice
that one can follow to implement the principle; no tool-kit has been proposed that
can help verify the quality of transparency of a data service.
This chapter presents a viable way to achieve this goal by following a Require-
ments Engineering (RE) approach. Here we present a well-defined methodology
that guides us to identify a list of ten fundamental functions whose role is the eval-
uation of transparency. We also discuss what aspects of the non-functional require-
ments they are expected to measure and how operatively one can apply them, fo-
cusing on what evidence one needs to collect and how to be able to calculate the
output values. Finally, we present a way of interpreting the output obtained when
applying these metrics. The interpretation is based on Evaluation Assurance Levels
(EAL) [42], it considers the quality factors of transparency to define 4 Transparency-
EALs. To exemplify the evaluation process we show, step by step, how to calculate
the metrics to assess transparency on the Microsoft HealthVault. Lacking any com-
parative analysis, this assessment exercise is not meant to suggest any judgement on
the quality of transparency and on the legal compliance of that particular service,
but rather it serves as an example of how to apply the metrics on a real system and
of how to visualize of the result. Two appendices aid the understanding of this pro-
cess: Appendix A describes in details how to compute each metric, the description
is given in a series of tables, formatted according to the indications in the ISO/IEC
27004 standard; and Appendix B presents the results of the evaluation of Microsoft’s
system.
4.1 Related works
Transparency is amulti-faceted non-functional property. It has been defined in terms
of availability, auditability, accountability and verifiability (see chapter 2). Availability is
the property of ensuring that users are able to obtain and use, whenever they need it,
information about the processing of their personal data; auditability is the property
that allows users to audit what happened to their personal data; accountability en-
ables users to monitor the usage of their data and hold a person accountable in case
of misuse4. Auditability and accountability are specialization of verifiability, which
in turn ensures that it is possible to check whether specific propositions hold on a
system’s execution.
Themulti-faceted structure that characterizes transparencymakesmodelling and
measuring it a challenging task. Conventional modelling andmeasuring approaches
are not suited to represent its peculiarities, while ad-hoc methodologies proposed to
model transparency (e.g., see [45, 149]) focus only on specific related properties (e.g.,
empowerment, accountability), serve only certain domains (e.g., cloud computing),
or cover the problem only partially (e.g., modelling but not measuring).
To approach the problem systematically, one could express transparency in terms
of Non-Functional Requirements (NFRs), then looking for “non-functional” met-
rics [122]. Unfortunately not all NFRs can be expressed in terms that allow them
to be easily measured [79, 228]; if this practice has to be followed, it requires a dedi-
cated discussion. For this task, one could refer to the IEEE Standard 10601-1998 [107],
which defines a methodology for defining metrics in general, and then follow the
suggestions in [117] to reason about the validity (“What Do They Measure and How
Do We Know?”) of a set of metrics.
4Under the GDPR, the data controller is legally accountable; nevertheless accountability aims to
identify actual responsibilities e.g., after the violation of a privacy policy.
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In the context of NFR measurement and assessment, another standard of rele-
vance is the ISO/IEC 27004 [109]. It has been conceived to define how to fulfil re-
quirements for information security management systems, but it has been built with
broad approaches and concepts so it can be applied to different organizations and
contexts. In here we refer to these standards to propose a methodology to measure
how much a system fulfils requirements for transparency.
Except those works and documents about metrics in general, little can be found
on measures for transparency. In software design for control applications, metrics
for transparency have been indeed discussed but in relation with net based algo-
rithm. In a transparent algorithm “it is easy and clear to see what the controller does
in the moment and what it will do in the next steps” [72]. Such notions and the
relative metrics are very much customized measure the net traffic in terms of signal
in input and outputs, and are hardly applicable in our context of services for data
protection.
A possible quest for metrics for transparency may look at the factors that have
been proposed to qualify transparency. For instance Sullivan et al. [227], while study-
ing requirements for trust and other trust-terms, describe transparency as an attribute
that requires the observability of several types of data concerning the users. In our
work, these trust-terms correspond to the attribute instrument (see chapter 3). No
metric is discussed but it indicates the terms to be considered when defining a crite-
rion to measure transparency.
Metrics for transparency exist in eGovernment [241], where transparency is dis-
cussed as a means of assessing accountability and qualified for efficiency, effective-
ness and accessibility of the volume of information that public administrators pro-
vide to users. Such concepts provide valid suggestions for metrics, despite none of
them is expressed formally.
There are also other relevant works on the properties composing transparency.
Accountability, for example, has been systematically analysed [73] proposing a Uni-
fied Modeling Language (UML) meta-model for defining metrics. This model helps
reasoning on complex properties, structuring them into more basic ones whose met-
rics are simpler to define. Though designed with the purpose of measuring account-
ability, themodel is not strictly tailored for it and can be generalised for other proper-
ties. In comparison with other works proposing approaches to express requirements
based on Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) techniques (e.g., [15, 51]), the one pre-
sented in [73] seems to be the most fit to model transparency. We refer this model
here.
4.2 Methodology
The process of defining metrics was conducted in two steps. Initially transparency
was decomposed into elements that describe what attributes a quality implemen-
tation should present. Based on those, fine-grained metrics were defined. This step
was conducted based on themethodology presented in the IEEE standard 1061 [107].
Later, by reviewing the meta-model proposed in [73] for transparency, we validated
those previous metrics and enriched them giving amore solid justification grounded
on a MDE approach. The two methodologies have their peculiarities, but have
proven to be compatible.
The process followed by the IEEE standard first operates at a higher level, re-
quiring to identify the quality factors and quality sub-factors that contribute to estab-
lishing transparency. The second phase consists in assigning metrics for those more
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fine-grained qualities. The standard also suggests five steps that should be followed
to define software metrics: 1. establish requirements, 2. identify metrics, 3. imple-
ment the metrics, 4. analyse them, and finally 5. validate them.
The MDE approach proposed in [73] focuses on how to establish requirements
and identify metrics, corresponding to steps 1 and 2 of the standard. The various
facets of transparency are represented in a meta-model (see Figure 4.2 and Fig-
ure 4.3), where properties are divided into smaller and less abstract elements. The
meta-model is completed by evidences, i.e., the elements a user can observe in a sys-
tem, and that confirm the proper implementation of the property in study. Metrics
are then designed to measure the evidences, hence the importance of this part of the
meta-model.
In general, both methodologies propose three main activities to be performed
when definingmetrics: 1. partitioning transparency into less abstract elements; 2. se-
lecting attributes that contribute in establishing those elements; 3. defining metrics
for those attributes. In the following, we describe how these activities were con-
ducted.
4.2.1 Partitioning transparency
Transparency is a multi-faceted concept, and assigning it a metric directly would
end up in a very coarse assessment. Instead, following the suggestion of the two
methodologies, we first identify the elements that contribute to establishing trans-
parency. In line with the IEEE standard, we call those elements factors. The search
for factors that help defining transparency does not present any difficulty. As stated
in chapter 3, implementing transparency means providing information and mech-
anisms. These are the instruments required to achieve transparency. Partitioning
those factors even further required a review of the literature on software qualities
and NFRs [31, 40, 135, 241]. Four major sub-factors appear relevant: accessibility,
informativeness, understandability, and validity. The first three refine both factors,
whereas the last one refines exclusively the “providing mechanisms” factor.
Accessibility, here in the sense of “being easy to obtain”, is a quality that refers
to both categories of instruments. Since the instrument expresses the act of pro-
viding something, it must be easy for a user to obtain it, regardless of whether its
source is information or mechanisms. Informativeness concerns the ability of convey-
ing a good quality of information, and helps understanding the excellence of any
piece of information provided (including the ones provided through the use of a
mechanism). Understandability represents the ability of “achieving a comprehensi-
ble meaning”, exploring the linguistic quality of an instrument. Validity, here in the
sense of “being precise and producing the correct result”, is linked with the pro-
vision of mechanisms, and defines how sound the mechanism is in doing its job.
Figure 4.1 summarises the selected factors and sub-factors.
For the sake of simplicity, transparency is discussed andmodelled with regard to
five requirements, specifically the ones shown in the excerpt contained in Table 4.1.
Even though this set may seem small, the requirements were carefully selected. Ex-
amples of each type of information-based and mechanism-based requirements, and
the relevant characteristic for selecting metrics, are shown. The first three require-
ments demonstrate how to attain to the transparency sub-property of availability by
providing information (111.10, 111.13 and 211.3), while the last two entail amechanism
for the transparency sub-properties of auditability (222.1) and accountability (232.1) re-
spectively.
4.2. Methodology 39
FIGURE 4.1: Transparency and its factors and sub-factors.
ID Description
111.10 Smust inform P about who is responsible for handling owned data.
111.13 Smust inform P on how to protect data or how data are protected.
211.3 Smust notify P in case the policy is overridden (break the glass).
222.1 Smust provide P with audit mechanisms.
232.1 Smust provide P with accountability mechanisms.
TABLE 4.1: Excerpt from the Transparency requirements.
Themeta-model in theMDE approach correlates several elements: Property, Base-
Property and CompoundProperty, which are the objects under study; Goal, the high-
level description of the property; Entity, the subject responsible for realising the
property; Action, representing what is executed by, or has an effect on, the entity;
Evidence and EvidenceProcessing, the tangible and observable elements of the prop-
erty; Criterion, a constraint to what should be measured; and Metric, BaseMetric and
CompoundMetric, representing a quantitative assessment to measure the property.
In the meta-model, the process responsible for collecting and processing the evi-
dence is as important as the evidence itself. Hence, another evidence is proposed in
association with each process to explain how it works. We slightly adapt this in our
work. We accept that a requirement may be implemented in several different ways,
depending on the business model of each system. However, regardless of the actual
implementation, the bottom line is that the user must be able to observe the evi-
dence in the system. This approach is alike to the software engineering technique of
black-box testing, whose purpose is to test a piece of software in the absence of any
knowledge of its internal structure, and based solely on the observation of its inputs
and outputs [16]. Since this approach was not completely aligned to what is defined
in the original meta-model, we slightly adapted it. This is referred throughout this
paper as the “black-box approach” and is further explained in section 4.2.1.
Another adjustment we did is regarding elements Goal and Criterion. We do not
adopt a goal nor a criterion at this point to leave the possibility of exploring all the
possible facets of transparency. These elements may be modelled at a later stage, in
order to select a portion of transparency requirements needed in order to achieve a
goal, or to constrain the measurement to a specific context (e.g., relevant regulations,
or standards).
In the following, we present how the elements proposed in the original meta-
model are interpreted and adapted to transparency in medical systems. Figure 4.2
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FIGURE 4.2: Model of availability requirements.
shows the model for availability. However, since the requirements are all infor-
mation-based and were selected in a way to represent every possible evidence, the
model can also generically be used as a basis for the model of any other information-
based requirement. Similarly, Figure 4.3 contains the model for auditability, but as
these requirements are highly representative for the mechanism-based family, and
all evidence is represented therein, therefore any other mechanism-based require-
ments can be modelled in a similar way. Elements in yellow are common to the two
models.
Properties
The central component of these models is the Property that is being described, specif-
ically Transparency. Its composing sub-properties are Availability, Auditability, Ac-
countability and Verifiability, and are represented by classes inherited from BaseProp-
erty.
In addition to transparency, two other properties are presented in this model:
Privacy and Usability. They have been introduced as secondary properties that need
to be considered in order to provide a fair transparency, as they might influence it.
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FIGURE 4.3: Model of auditability and accountability requirements.
However, even in a condition of very low privacy and usability, the system may not
fail to be transparent (see chapter 2). The two properties are, therefore, not analysed
in the perspective of defining transparency metrics.
Entity and Action
The actuation on the properties rests on the Entity element. An entity also performs,
or is affected by, an Action that happens over a period of time. As transparency
aims at sharing knowledge with users about how a system processes their personal
data, and the system is managed by a data controller, DataController and Processing
components are used. Here, data controllermay be interpreted as the Controller in the
GDPR.
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Evidences and Evidence processing
The characteristics of each requirement are represented by the Evidence, which cap-
tures the elements a user can observe with respect to the property of interest. Trans-
parency is a high-level concept, difficult to observe and measure. However, when-
ever the requirements for transparency 111.10, 111.13, and 211.3 are properly imple-
mented, the usersmust have access to pieces of information regarding the processing
of their personal data. In other words, a sufficient amount of information provided
to the user serves as a possible indicator that a system is actually transparent. Con-
sequently, in the first model we present (see Figure 4.2), the Information class is the
evidence associated with the Processing action. The same holds for the transparency
mechanisms. A system that complies with 222.1 and 232.1 must give users access to
some sort of mechanism to verify how their data have been processed. In the second
model (see Figure 4.3), this is represented by the evidence class Mechanism, and by
the associated evidence processing class VerifyingProcess.
The EvidenceProcessing class brings into the model the fact that the evidence, al-
though associated with the action performed by the entity, is not produced by it. In
the first model, Information is evidence of the fact that the Action of data processing
is undergoing, but it is generated by other processes, which are solely responsible
for informing and notifying the user. These processes are represented by the Inform-
ingProcess and NotifyingProcess classes.
According to the black-box approach described previously, the analysis is cen-
tred on the evidence itself, rather than on the process that collects the evidence. For
example, in the requirement 111.10, “S must inform P about who is responsible for
handling owned data”, the important aspect is that users are informed about the en-
tity responsible for handling their data. It does not matter if the data controller dis-
plays a list in the system highlighting who is responsible, or if it sends to the users
an e-mail with the name of the person in charge of their data. Therefore, the focus
of the analysis is on how well this information is able to satisfy the requirement.
The association isProvidedBy between the EvidenceProcessing and Evidence elements
emphasises this, describing in more detail what type of information is provided by
each process.
Requirement 111.10 is about providing information to the users. A simple list
of the people responsible for data processing should be enough for this requirement
to be fulfilled. Requirement 111.13 demands that the user be informed about the
protection of data. It is impossible to abstractly specify how this information looks
like, but in any case it needs to describe the policies of the data controller, so it
will be in the format of a descriptive document. Finally, requirement 211.3 asks for
notification whenever an extraordinary event (e.g., “break the glass”) happens. As
it does not specify any further details, a simple notification about the occurrence of
the event and the date when it happened is enough to fulfil this requirement. The
ListOfEntities, DescriptiveDocument and EventNotification components represent the
evidences in those requirements.
To further discuss the Evidence and EvidenceProcessing elements presented in the
second model, we first need to clarify the interpretation of auditability and account-
ability we adopt here. In the domain of medical systems, auditability and account-
ability are commonly interpreted as properties about access control (e.g., [71, 125,
235]). As such, they allow the users to monitor how and by whom their data has
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been accessed, used, and modified5. The concepts of “access”, “usage” and “modifi-
cation” are interpreted in this work as the basic actions for persistent storage: CRUD
(create, read, update and delete). In the following, auditability and accountability
will be regarded as mechanisms with respect to those actions.
As each requirement may be implemented in several different ways, depending
on the business model of the system implementing it, the analysis is based on the
evidence they produce (the black-box approach). The question, then, is how the
evidence of auditability and accountability mechanisms should be structured.
RFC 3881 [147] defines the format and minimum attributes that need to be cap-
tured in order to provide auditability and accountability for health systems. This
document describes the data to be collected for four different events, including e-
vents and actions that happen to patient’s data. It states that the system should doc-
ument “what was done, by whom, using which resources, from what access points,
and to whose medical data”. On this basis, the mechanism’s output should contain
the following event details, as abstracted in the evidence class EventDetails in Fig-
ure 4.3: description of the action performed; time of the event; whether the event
was successful or not; who performed the action; where the action was performed
(user interface, application, etc.); the data that suffered the actions.
4.2.2 Selecting quality attributes
Building on top of previous NFR literature, we search for suitable qualities that de-
fine the elements previously identified and presented. As an assistance for this task,
we first build a questionnaire whose goal is to clarify how to decide when a quality
is to be considered satisfied.
The questionnaire that we used to find out how to assess whether or not each
quality is satisfied is reported in Table 4.2. We defined the questions on the basis
of the definitions and descriptions found while exploring the literature. To main-
tain a high level of granularity, where necessary, questions are partitioned into sub-
questions.
Quality Question Sub-question
Accessibility
1. Is the system making the in-
strument available?
1.1. Is the system providing
an instrument that can be used
whenever needed?
2. Is the system providing
portable information?
2.1. Is the system providing in-
formation that can be used in
different environments?
2.2. Is the system providing in-
formation that can be extracted
in different formats?
2.3. Is the system providing in-
formation that can be accessed
through different means?
Informativ.
3. Is the system providing accu-
rate information?
3.1. Is the system providing
consistent and flawless infor-
mation?
4. Is the system providing up-
to-date information?
4.1. Is the system providing
timely information?
5The interpretation adopted here also seems to be the one followed by ISO/TS 18308:2004 [110], in
particular section 5.4.6.
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5. Is the information consistent
to what the user experiences?
5.1. Is the system providing in-
formation that can be observed
in the system by the user?
6. Is the system providing unbi-
ased information?
Understand.
7. Is the system providing the
minimum possible information
for the understanding of the
matter?
8. Is the system providing
enough details on the informa-
tion for the understanding of
the matter?
9. Is the system helping the user
to understand the information
provided?
10. Is the system providing
clear and neat information?
10.1. Is the system providing
information using the terminol-
ogy appropriate to the area?
10.2. Is the system providing in-
formation that does not use jar-
gon?
Validity
11. Is the system providing cor-
rect and precise mechanism?
11.1. Is the system providing
ways to verify a mechanism?
11.2. Is the system providing
mechanisms that can be tested
by experiment or observation?
11.3. Is the system providing
a mechanism that reaches the
goal for which it has been pro-
vided?
11.4. Is the system providing
the source code of the mecha-
nism?
TABLE 4.2: Qualities questionnaire. The questions in grey cells have
led to metrics
4.2.3 Defining metrics
Not all of the questions correspond to some metric. Questions whose answer may
vary depending on the user’s perceptions or that are context dependent, such as
question 6 and 10, have been disregarded. Instead, questions that admit objective
answers (the grey boxes in Table 4.2) have been assigned metrics to measure the
corresponding factors and sub-factors. As a consequence, the metrics we propose
here are based on quantitative analysis.
One may advocate that qualitative analysis have the advantage of capturing nu-
ances of human perceptions, and allowing for dynamic settings. And as such, may
be perceived as a natural choice for the medical domain. However, qualitative anal-
ysis have the advantage of providing reliable and objective measurements. Thus
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Compound Metric Description
Accessibility Reachability
How easy it is for a user to reach an informa-
tion or mechanism.
Portability How easy it is to transfer and use an informa-tion or mechanism in different systems.
Informativ.
Observability
Howmuch of the information provided can be
observed by the user in the real process of the
system.
Accuracy How consistent and correct the informationprovided is.
Currentness How up-to-date the information or the resultprovided by a mechanism is.
Understand.
Conciseness How straightforward is the information.
Detailing Whether the information is detailed enoughfor the general understanding of its subject.
Readability How easy it is for a user to read and under-stand a text.
Validity Effectiveness How satisfactory the mechanism provided is.
Operativeness Whether the mechanism functions and pro-duces an appropriate effect.
TABLE 4.3: Metrics for information-based requirements.
enabling software engineers to have an objective assessment of the quality of trans-
parency in early stages of development, and accommodating for transparency-by-
design. The metrics are discussed in details in the following.
The original model classifies metrics into two types: CompoundMetric and Base-
Metric. The first models metrics that are defined in terms of other metrics, while
the second actually uses the evidences for the calculations. As discussed previously,
when measuring the quality of transparency implementations, there are four factors
that need to be taken into account: Accessibility, Informativeness,Understandability and
Validity [217]. The four factors are represented as compound metrics in this work.
Whenever the data controller declares to have provided some kind of information to
the users (including through the use of a mechanism), that information is expected
to have the following features: 1. users must be able to easily obtain it (accessibility);
2. it conveys the precise knowledge (informativeness); 3. it is expressed in a compre-
hensible meaning (understandability). Mechanisms provided to the users should
also 4. be precise and provide correct results (validity).
Ten metrics (represented in both models) were defined to measure the quality of
information-based and mechanism-based requirements. Reachability and Portability
refer to the accessibility of the evidence. Observability, Accuracy and Currentness are
related to the informativeness of the evidence. Conciseness, Detailing and Readability
concern the understandability of the evidence. Finally, Effectiveness andOperativeness
relate to the validity of the evidence. These metrics, and a short description for each,
are summarised in Table 4.3.
By highlighting the specific pieces of evidence that are used to model trans-
parency and its sub-properties, it is possible to refine the metrics and define which
ones are suitable to be applied to each type of evidence. In particular, Observabil-
ity and Accuracy, as metrics intended to observe and compare statements about the
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process and intentions of the data controller against its actual practice, are not suit-
able for measuring notification of events. That is because events are considered as
extraordinary occurrences, such as overriding an access control policy, or a security
breach. Since they are unexpected, the user might not find any further information
(apart from the mere notification) to observe and compare them against. Conciseness
and Readability are also not suitable for application to all kinds of information, as
these metrics operate on a piece of information in the form of a text made up of sen-
tences. As such, evidence in other forms, e.g., a list, might not be evaluated using
those metrics. Conversely, metrics such as Portability and Currentness are shown to
be suitable for measuring the results of a given mechanism, even though they were
originally thought for information-based requirements.
4.3 Metrics
4.3.1 Reachability
This metric measures how easy it is for a user to reach a given instrument, if reach-
able at all. To measure the reachability Rc, we first define Nint as the number of
interactions the user needs to perform to reach the desired instrument. An inter-
action is considered as any action the user must perform, such as typing, clicking,
tapping, sliding, etc. Reachability applies to any sort of information or mechanism
the system provides, and we define its metric as follows:
Rc =
(
1, if 0  Nint  k
e(1 
Nint
k ), if Nint > k
(4.1)
Here k is the maximum number of interactions that is considered acceptable for
reaching the instrument. Equation (4.1) reaches the maximum value 1, whenever the
number of interactions needed is less or equal than the deemed acceptable. From
that point on, the degradation is exponential in the number of interactions. This
metric has been updated from the one originally presented in our previous work.
The changes we propose here are so that reachability scores the maximum grade 1
for any number of interactions smaller or equal than the considered as acceptable.
As many possible implementation for transparency mechanisms are acceptable,
it may not be trivial to identify when a mechanism is reached. In this work, we sug-
gest a mechanism is considered in place whenever users can reach its output, even
if a tool or plug-in is not visible to them. As such, the reachability of the mechanism
is measured considering the number of interactions until its output is reached.
4.3.2 Portability
This metric measures how easy it is for an information to be transferred and used
in different systems. To measure portability, we reused the popular classification
provided by the 5 star open data [18], which is a scheme for rating the degree of
structuredness of data on the web. It is a model that uses an incremental scale from
1 to 5. To measure how portable an information is, we need to verify whether the
properties described in each scale are implemented. We adapted the scale and nor-
malised it to our context as shown in Equation (4.2).
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P =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0, if no information available
0.2, if available in any open format
0.4, if available as a structured data
0.6, if available in a non-proprietary format
0.8, if uses URI
1, if based on linked data
(4.2)
This metric can also be applied to transparency mechanisms, by considering the
mechanism’s output. It measures to which extent the mechanism provides informa-
tion that could be easily used in other systems.
4.3.3 Observability
This metric measures how much of the information provided can be observed by
the user in the real process of the system. Observability is a metric derived from our
previous Accuracy metric. In here we split it in two metrics: observability that cap-
tures the amount of information that can be even observed in a system, and accuracy
which now tests only the observable information for its consistency and correctness.
This modification makes the transparency evaluation more fine-grained. To mea-
sure observability, we must first define what is considered a statement. Statements
are going to depend on the nature of the information, but we suggest that at least
claims and affirmations about what the system is or does should be considered. A
representation of the system’s process (for example, a model such as a business dia-
gram) might also be considered, as it may help in the assessment of observability.
Each statement should be linked to some part of the process the user can observe.
If it is not possible to link the statement, either because it is not present, or because
it is dubious, then the information should not be considered observable. The result
is the proportion of linked statements. If LS is the number of statements that can
be linked to some parts of the process, and NLS is the number of statements which
do not correspond to a specific part of the process, then observability Ob can be
expressed as shown in Equation (4.3).
Ob = LS
LS+NLS
(4.3)
4.3.4 Accuracy
This metric measures how consistent and correct the information provided is. Accu-
racy builds on top of the observability metric. To measure it, we must consider only
the observable statements identified for that purpose.
Each observable statement should accurately describe some part of the system’s
process. If the statement contains information that is either incorrect, or that is du-
bious because it is inconsistent to what the user experiences, then the information
should not be considered accurate. The result is the proportion of accurate state-
ments. In particular, if LS is the number of observable statements, and ALS is the
number of statements which accurately describe a specific part of the process, then
accuracy Ac can be expressed as shown in Equation (4.4).
Ac = ALS
LS
(4.4)
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4.3.5 Currentness
Currentness depends on the time that passes between something happening in the
system and the system providing information about it. More specifically, if t is the
amount of time that the system has taken to inform about the change, and tmax is the
amount of time that represents the maximum acceptable delay (i.e., the ideal time)
for updating that piece of information, then currentness is measured as shown in
Equation (4.5).
Cu =
(
1, if t  tmax
2 d t tmaxtmax e, if t > tmax
(4.5)
In other words, anything that takes less time than what would be deemed an
acceptable delay for that information has Cu = 1.
It should be noted that while some pieces of information should be updated in
a matter of minutes or hours (e.g., information on security breaches), for others a
longer time would be acceptable (e.g., results of a research with patients). The max-
imum acceptable delay tmax is highly dependent on the nature of the system and the
type of information that must be updated, and must be carefully chosen for each
case. Likewise, the acceptable delay should be the same for similar services offering
the same information. A poorly chosen delay will result in inaccurate currentness
values.
The ceiling function in the exponential simplifies themetric by providing discrete
values. Let us consider an example in which a piece of information is extremely rele-
vant, for instance because it concerns a security breach, and themaximum acceptable
delay is defined as one minute (tmax = 1). If the system takes one hour (t = 60) to
update the information, then the currentness is Cu = 2 59 ' 0. On the other hand, if
the acceptable delay in providing an information is 30 minutes, then this can be used
as the time unit, and the currentness is Cu = 2 d 60 3030 e = 2 1 = 0.5. This metric has
been updated from the one originally presented in [217]. In here, we adapt the vari-
able names for more suitable ones, and we apply the ceiling function to distinguish
between information provided under the maximum acceptable time delay tmax, and
information provided in the time range tmax  t < 2tmax. The present version of the
currentness metric produces a smaller grade for the second case.
This metric can also be applied to transparency mechanisms, by considering the
mechanism’s output. It measures how up-to-date the information provided by the
mechanism is.
4.3.6 Conciseness
The conciseness metric measures how straightforward an information is. We mea-
sure the conciseness of an information in terms of the average number of words per
sentence. The scales of this metric are based on recommendations for the English
language. While [47] suggests that the average length of sentences should be be-
tween 15 and 20, it is stated in [85] that an average of 5 to 8 words per sentence can
be read by people with moderate learning disabilities, and that by using common
words it is possible to help all users to understand a sentence with around 25 words.
For this reason, we use a Gaussian curve N(µ, s2), with a mean µ = 20 and a stan-
dard deviation s = 5, as expressed in Equation (4.6). However, we normalise this
function so that its maximum value is one. The resulting formula for measuring the
conciseness is shown in Equation (4.7). Here ASL denotes the average number of
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words per sentence, and it is calculated as NW/NS, where NW is the total number of
words, and NS is the total number of sentences.
N(µ, s2) =
e 
1
2s2
(x µ)2
s
p
2p
(4.6)
Co = sp2pN(µ, s2) = e  150 (ASL 20)2 (4.7)
We understand that conciseness is not only about short sentences, and that se-
mantics analysis should be considered too. What is presented here, however, is an
easy-to-calculate approximation for syntactic straightforwardness.
4.3.7 Detailing
This metric describes a strategy for measuring whether an information provided is
detailed enough for the general understanding of its subject. Detailing is measured
by checking if the main crucial details are present in an information that the system
provides. The crucial details will vary from information to information, but we sug-
gest that, at least, basic questions should be answered, such as: what? who? why?
when? to whom? which? and so on. The information provided has to be cross-
checked with the questions, and the result is a matrix of details provided versus
important details. The metric D is the proportion of important details provided.
The detailing matrix should be constructed in such a way that only the questions
pertinent to a given piece of information are counted towards the proportion. For
example, assuming the system must inform the users on how their data are stored
and who has access to them, questions like “why [is the data accessed]?” and “when
[was the data stored]?” are not pertinent.
If nI is the number of pieces of information provided, and mQ is the total number
of detailing questions, the detailing matrix has a size of nI ⇥ mQ. For each piece
of information i = 1 . . . nI , there will be a number PDi of questions pertinent to the
detailing metric, and a number NPDi = mQ   PDi of non-pertinent questions. The
non-pertinent questions are not relevant and therefore do not count towards the
metric. On the other hand, the pertinent questions can be partitioned into a number
di of questions for which the details are provided, and a number ui of questions for
which details are not provided, such that di + ui = PDi . Under these premises, the
detailing metrics D can be expressed as shown in Equation (4.8).
D = Â
nI
i=1 di
ÂnIi=1 P
D
i
= 1  Â
nI
i=1 ui
ÂnIi=1 P
D
i
(4.8)
A highly-detailed system (D = 1) will possibly answer all pertinent questions
for each piece of information.
4.3.8 Readability
This metric measures how easy it is for a user to read and understand a specific
text. There are several well-established formulas available for this purpose. Each
formula has its advantages and there are no general recommendations or standards
stating which one should be used in each case. To select the formula, we searched
the literature to understand how to measure readability in the medical domain (the
domain used for our requirements). The most used formulas are the Flesch-Kincaid
grade level (FKGL), the Simple Measure Of Gobbledygook (SMOG), and the Flesch
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Reading Ease (FRES) [57, 86, 119, 254]. FKGL and FRES are variants of the same
method, and both use the average sentence length and the average word length as
an input. SMOG is calculated using the number of long words (three syllables or
more). We chose to use FRES for being the only one that provides the results in
easiness grades.
As already introduced in conciseness metric, the average sentence length is mea-
sured as ASL = NW/NS, where NW is the total number of words and NS is the
total number of sentences. Similarly, the average number of syllables per word is
ASW = NSY/NW , where NSY is the total number of syllables. The FRES can be ex-
pressed as shown in Equation (4.9). In theory, the higher boundary of the FRES is
121.22, which is achieved by applying it to a sentence with one word of one syllable,
like “yes” or “no”. There is no theoretical lower boundary, but by applying the for-
mula to long sentences with long words it is possible to reach huge negative scores.
However, such extremes are non-realistic in the documentation of a system. The
common interpretation of FRES considers scores from 0 to 100 only [70]. As a mea-
sure of the readability metric R, we consider the bounded and normalised FRES, as
shown in Equation (4.10).
FRES = 206.835  (1.015⇥ASL)  (84.6⇥ASW) (4.9)
R =
8><>:
0, if FRES < 0
FRES
100 , if 0  FRES  100
1, if FRES > 100
(4.10)
4.3.9 Effectiveness
This metric measures how satisfactory the mechanism provided is. By decomposing
the mechanism into evidences, effectiveness can be defined in terms of the mech-
anism’s output. This metric partly overlaps with the previously-defined Detailing
metric. In other words, a mechanism is effective if the output it provides contains
enough details to understand whether and by whom the personal data has been ac-
cessed and used (i.e., the goal of the mechanisms in requirements 222.1 and 232.1).
As a consequence, in the model Effectiveness is a compound metric element by the
Detailing base metric.
The strategy is very similar to the one presented in Equation (4.8). Effectiveness
is measured by checking whether the goal of the mechanism is being reached. The
goal varies according to the requirements, but similarly we suggest that the output
of the mechanism addresses at least basic questions, such as: what? who? why?
when? If nI is the number of pieces of information provided as the output, and
mQ is the total number of questions, the effectiveness matrix has a size of nI ⇥ mQ.
For each piece of information i = 1 . . . nI , there will be a number PEi of questions
pertinent to the effectiveness metric, and a number NPEi = mQ  PEi of non-pertinent
questions. The pertinent questions can be partitioned into a number ei of questions
whose goal is reached, and a number vi of questions whose goal is not reached, such
that ei + vi = PEi . Under these premises, the efficiency metric E can be expressed as
shown in Equation (4.11).
E = Â
nI
i=1 ei
ÂnIi=1 P
E
i
= 1  Â
nI
i=1 vi
ÂnIi=1 P
E
i
(4.11)
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Even though detailing and effectiveness are calculated similarly, the two metrics
are differentiated because they give different insights about the quality of a trans-
parency instrument. That happens because the transparency mechanisms we con-
sider in this work intend to provide non-textual information to end users, i.e., data.
If data provided by amechanism is detailed enough for the understanding of a given
subject, this is an indicative that the mechanism is adequately accomplishing its pur-
pose. In this case, the same reasoning applied in detailing metric can be applied in
support to determine a mechanisms’ effectiveness. On the other hand, for textual
information this reasoning does not hold. The fact that information is detailed is
not sufficient to determine its effectiveness with regard to the understanding of a
subject. Matters such as reading ease have to be regarded as well.
4.3.10 Operativeness
Something is said to be operative if it is functioning and “producing an appropriate
effect”6. This metric proposes a strategy for defining whether or not a mechanism
is operative. It is inspired by the black-box tests of the audit type [212] and uses
the technique of equivalence partitioning [160]. It consists in partitioning the input
domain of a mechanism into equivalence classes, in such a way that it is reasonable
to assume that testing a value in a given class is equivalent to testing any other value
in the same class. In this context, the equivalence classes are based on the actions
executed in the system that a mechanism should process, and the test consists on
executing these actions and observing the output to verify if they were processed by
the mechanism.
For requirements 222.1 and 232.1, a reasonable set of equivalence classes can
be the CRUD actions. This set of equivalence classes can be expressed as E =
C [ R [ U [ D, the union of all possible actions, where C contains create actions,
R contains read actions, and so on. To measure operativeness, a sub-set of actions
A = {a0, a1, . . . , ak 1} : (A ✓ E) containing at least one action of each equivalence
class (i.e., (A \ C 6= ∆) ^ (A \ R 6= ∆) ^ (A \ U 6= ∆) ^ (A \ D 6= ∆)) must be
selected and tested. The test consists in verifying if the actions were correctly pro-
cessed and reported in the mechanism’s output. If one action is not reported, or
it is not possible to verify (e.g., deceptive or inconsistent information provided as
output), the entire test fails. In particular, if the set of actions A contains k actions,
and the number of actions that can be verified is represented by n, the operativeness
OA can be expressed as shown in Equation (4.12). The notation of this metric was
slightly adapted from the originally presented in our previous work.
OA = bn/kc (4.12)
The operativeness metric presents a strategy to rationally reason about a mecha-
nism’s functioning, without delving into subjective aspects, such as whether or not
the mechanism’s output conveys satisfactory knowledge. This metric is conserva-
tive, meaning that it considers that one counter-example is enough to show that a
mechanism is not properly functioning (this is represented by the floor function in
Equation (4.12)). A result of 1 can be interpreted as an indication that the mechanism
has performed as expected, supporting and inspiring a sense of confidence. Never-
theless, it must be noted that the operativeness of a mechanism is always measured
6Definition extracted from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
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with regard to one specific set of actions (here represented byA). The metric is there-
fore, always accompanied by the set of actions tested, lest the result be meaningless
and the test not be replicable. Each equivalence class should be measured, so it is
necessary to select at least one action from each of those. If it is not possible to select
one action from a particular class, it means that it is not possible to verify that class,
and the test should be considered unsuccessful. The metric is flexible and allows the
evaluator to decide how to couple the actions into classes, so it is possible to decide
on the granularity of the test. The most suitable equivalence classes and granular-
ity strictly depend on the peculiarities of the system implementing the mechanism.
Discussing what classes can be the most appropriate for a specific system is outside
the scope of this work.
4.4 Measurement
The measurement methodology presented here is based on the process of mon-
itoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation proposed in ISO/IEC 27004 stan-
dard [109]. This standard is intended to assist organisations in the evaluation of an
information security management system for the fulfilment of requirements defined
in another document of the series (ISO/IEC 27000). However, all the documents in
the series are produced to be broadly applicable. In here we consider the steps that
can be reused in the context of medical data, and adapt the process to measure the
transparency of systems handling such data.
The following subsections reflect the three parts of the measurement process de-
picted in Figure 4.4. They are composed by processes suggested in the original stan-
dard. We explicitly mention in the text where significant alterations were made.
4.4.1 Definition of goals
Before starting the analysis of a system, the goals of the measurement must be
defined. This process is represented by the first lane of the Measurement pool in
Figure 4.4. This task should not be done unilaterally by the requirements ana-
lyst (whether internal or external). The administrator of the system under analysis
should also be duly notified and, whenever appropriate, included in the definition
of goals. This task should be executed to ensure the fairness of the measurement
activities. We refer to the interested parts (the analysis team and the system admin-
istrator) as the stakeholders.
Prior to the analysis itself, the ISO/IEC 27004 standard suggests to identify the
data collection and analysis tools. In our context, we suggest this task should be
realised in two steps. First, the stakeholders should select the transparency require-
ments to be analysed. The measurement procedure we propose is flexible, and can
accommodate any combination of requirements. It does not mandate all require-
ments to be measured at the same time.
After selecting the requirements to be measured, the second step of identifying
data collection and analysis tools is to determine the metrics suitable for measur-
ing each of those requirements. To this end, the transparency models depicted in
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 can be used. The association between the classes extend-
ing BaseMetric and the ones extending Evidence show which metrics are suitable to
measure a given requirement. For instance, whenever a metric is associated with an
evidence of the type information, this metric is suitable for measuring information-
based requirements. This is also synthesised in Table 4.4.
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FIGURE 4.4: BPMN representation of the measurement process.
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Quality Metric Information-
based req.
Mechanism-
based req.
Accessibility Reachability XPortability X X
Informativeness
Observability X
Accuracy X
Currentness X X
Understandability
Conciseness X
Detailing X
Readability X
Validity Effectiveness XOperativeness X
TABLE 4.4: Metrics and the types of requirements they are suitable
for measuring.
4.4.2 Analysis
The analysis procedure (represented by the second lane of the Measurement pool in
Figure 4.4) starts with the data collection. For each requirement selected, it is neces-
sary to collect the appropriate evidence (information, or the output of a mechanism).
But the analysis of these evidences can only proceed if they are present in the system,
in a specific format. For example, to measure readability, information presented in a
textual form (natural language structured in periods and sentences) is needed. Other
types of information cannot be measured by that metric. The expected formats were
described throughout section 4.3, and are concisely presented in Appendix A.
In addition to the collection of the evidences, some metrics require further con-
textual information to be captured as well. Reachability, for example, requires the
measurer to capture the amount of interactions the user needs to perform in order
to find an information or mechanism’s output. The contextual information needed
for each metric has also been discussed in section 4.3, and it is similarly presented in
Appendix A.
After completing both sub-processes of the data collection (checking data against
expected formats, and capturing contextual information), the stakeholders have all
the data needed for the data analysis itself.
The data analysis process represents the application of the suitable metrics to the
data collected regarding each of the selected requirements. At this stage, the mea-
surer should apply the mathematical formulæ as specified in the previous section.
This procedure will generate several results that should be reported in a structured
way.
Each requirement measured in the systemwill result in a set of grades. Although
normalised and aligned on the same ranges, the metrics proposed are heterogeneous
and cannot easily be combined into a mathematical expression that can clearly mea-
sure transparency as a whole. Instead, we adopt a benchmarking strategy, where
each of the proposed metrics serves to assess the performance of one or more of the
factors that determine the transparency quality. The benchmark can be represented
as a radar chart (as shown throughout Appendix B).
Finally, a document containing all the results should be generated. In this docu-
ment, all requirements should be presented accompanied by their respective radar
charts. In order to avoid ambiguity it is necessary to specify whenever ametric could
not be applied (e.g., for lack of access, or incompatible data formats). This clarifies
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the difference between metrics that grade the minimum from metrics that could not
be measured. Whenever a metric (e.g., operativeness) requires additional informa-
tion for its interpretation, this information should be presented together with the
radar chart. Additionally, two general radar charts can be appended to summarise
the transparency measurement of the system. One chart should display the aver-
age of grades achieved by metrics applied to information-based requirements, while
the other displays the same for mechanism-based ones. An example of reporting
document can be found in Appendix B.
4.4.3 Interpretation
The result of transparency evaluation should be interpreted similarly to a perfor-
mance benchmarking, in which several transparency quality factors and sub-factors
are tested and evaluated in a system. These factors can be later used to compare
different systems, provided the evaluation is done with regard to the same set of
requirements and with the auxiliary metric parameters for all systems.
The transparency benchmark can also serve in support to assurance levels, sim-
ilar to the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL) proposed in the Common Criteria
standard [42]. The standard supports an objective evaluation of the security require-
ments implementation. Each evaluation is conducted in a system with regard to a
specific set of requirements called the security target. The standard defines 7 levels of
confidence. At each level, the rigour of tests realized in the system is increased, pro-
viding a greater assurance that the requirements are in fact reliably implemented.
However, these levels do not measure how secure the system is, they rather state the
level of tests executed.
In our context, EAL can be adapted to represent how thorough a system has been
tested with regard to transparency. If the set of transparency requirements selected
for evaluation (see subsection 4.4.1) represents the target, the level of assurance can
be defined with regard to the metrics used to evaluate them. In here we propose
4 Transparency Evaluation Assurance Levels (TEAL), based on the quality factors
identified in section 4.2.
TEAL1 is applicable when confidence that the information and mechanisms re-
ferred to in the target requirements exist in the system is desired. Accessibility
metrics should be applied, as they test whether information (or mechanisms’
output) provided to the end user can be obtained, and used;
TEAL2 is applicable when confidence that the information and mechanisms re-
ferred to in the target requirements are of good quality is desired. In addition
to Accessibility metrics, Informativenessmetrics should be applied as well, as
they test the excellence of the information (or mechanisms’ output) provided,
and how adequate they are when delivered to the end user;
TEAL3 is applicable when confidence that the information and mechanisms re-
ferred to in the target requirements are comprehensible is desired. In addi-
tion to Accessibility, and Informativeness metrics, Understandability metrics
should be applied as well, as they test syntactic and semantic aspects of the
knowledge the information (or mechanisms’ output) provided intends to pass;
TEAL4 is applicable when confidence that the information and mechanisms re-
ferred to in the target requirements are precise and correct is desired. In addi-
tion to Accessibility, Informativeness, and Understandability metrics, Validity
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metrics should be applied as well, as they test how appropriate the information
(or mechanisms’ output) provided is with regard to its goal.
A TEAL can only be fulfilled when all metrics associated with that quality fac-
tor are applied for each requirement in the target, and the previous TEAL levels
have already been reached. In addition, if a threshold is defined for each metric, a
given level can also represent the quality of the implementation, rather than only
the rigour in which the requirements were tested. The minimum acceptable grade
for each metric cannot be generally defined, but it will depend on the context of the
system under evaluation. We do not attempt to define target grades for our metrics,
as this task is outside of the scope of our work, and is the target of future research
directions.
Regardless of the context in which transparency is desired, the interpretation of
these results should provide an insight on the factors and requirements that have
room for improvement, and guide the way to a better transparency.
4.5 Use case
To test the applicability of our metrics we conducted a complete evaluation of trans-
parency in Microsoft HealthVault (please refer to section 1.1 to recall more details).
Out of the 36 transparency requirements, 15 were identified as implemented by Mi-
crosoft HealthVault, either fully or partially. Even though our evaluation was con-
ducted methodically and carefully, we do not claim to have exhaustively searched
for evidences of an implementation of transparency in Microsoft’s system. Some re-
quirements may have passed unnoticed in this process. We consider this tolerable
as our goal is solely to test the applicability of our metrics.
Here we discuss the evaluation highlights of two transparency requirements:
111.17 – S must make available a document explaining the procedures for leaving the service
and taking the data out from the service; and 222.1 – S must provide P with audit mecha-
nisms. The first is an information-based requirement, and the second is mechanism-
based. We also summarise the evaluation results by presenting the average of grades
achieved per metric. The full report of the results may be found in Appendix B.
4.5.1 Information-based requirement
To implement the first functionality (111.17), HealthVault provides information about
closing accounts in “Help”, under the section “Your HealthVault Account” – “How
do I close myHealthVault account?”. Additionally, further information can be found
in “How do I export and save health information from HealthVault?”.
To measure reachability, we first need to define the maximum number of accept-
able interactions k. For this example, we chose k = 3 based on usability best prac-
tices. In particular, the “three-click rule" is an unofficial rule in web design that
defends the users should be able to find any information within three clicks. Even
though there is evidence suggesting that the number of clicks is not the most im-
pacting factor in user experience, the three-click rule is still regarded as a good us-
ability practice (see [174]). To reach these information, users simply need to access
the “Help” section available through the main page of the system. Then go to “Your
HealthVault Account” and finally reach the section about leaving the service (“How
do I close my HealthVault account?”). Conversely, the information on how to take
data out of the service is not immediately presented, as the users need to access
the details on how to export and save their data. Since the information is spread
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throughout more than one document, we consider for this metric the total amount
of interactions needed to reach all the desired content, in this case: 3+ 1 = 4. The
reachability metric result inRc ' 0.71.
Regarding the portability of the account termination statements, Microsoft’s sys-
tems reaches the value P = 0.8. Applying Equation (4.2), we have the following: the
information is provided in HTML, an open format; since it is presented as HTML, it
is also structured, and available in a non-proprietary format; the information is avail-
able on the web and can be accessed through a Uniform Resource Locator (URL),
which is a subset of a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). Although the statements
contain a few links to other information that provide a better understanding, these
do not provide access to external data sources and cannot be considered linked data.
To test for observability we considered both pieces of information and chose the
main statements for each of those topics:
1. “Once your account has been closed, any information that you had stored in
your account will be permanently deleted, although data may remain on our
servers for 90 days.”
2. “To delete your account: Sign in to HealthVault. In the upper right, click your
name and then click Account settings. At the bottom of the page, click Close
account. Carefully review the information on the page, then click Close my
account.”
3. “The exception is if there are other custodians of records in your account. In
that case, you’ll be notified at the time you close the account, and those records
will not be deleted.”
4. “You can export and save your health information in two ways: as a spread-
sheet;”
5. “or as a CCR or CCD or HTML file.”
6. “To save health information as a spreadsheet: Sign in to HealthVault. On the
left side of the page, click the name of the type of information you want to save
as a spreadsheet. You’ll see the list view for that type of data. Click Export. In
the browser message that appears, click Save. Your information will be saved
in a spreadsheet format (.csv) that can be opened in Excel or other spreadsheet
software.”
7. “You can create a CCR or CCDwith information from yourHealthVault record,
but keep in mind that CCRs and CCDs don’t support all types of health infor-
mation, so they won’t necessarily contain everything in your record.”
8. “To save information in your HealthVault record as a CCR or CCD or HTML
file: Sign in to HealthVault. On the Home page, click Current and then click
Export. Select the file format that you want to use. Select the type or types of
information that you want to export. If you want to, select the date range for
the data. Click Export. In the browser message that appears, click Save. Your
information will be saved as a file on your computer.”
Statement 1 is the only one that cannot be observed in the system by a user.
Hence, observability metric reaches Ob = 0.88.
To test for accuracy we considered statements 2 to 8 (only the observable ones).
Statements 2, and 4 to 8 could be easily verified, as for each of those the system
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contains areas available to the users. Statement 3, on the other hand, cannot be
considered accurate. The information provided leads the user to believe the data
with more than one custodian cannot be deleted, but this is not true. At the moment
of the account termination the user is notified about the existence of data with more
custodians, and the system allows the user to chose whether to delete these data or
not. One may argue the information provided is also not false. However, when a
user chooses to delete all data, it stays unclear whether the data shared with other
custodians was also deleted to them, or if they were simply deleted from the user’s
account and transferred to the other custodians. Because this misunderstanding is
caused by the information provided to the users, we consider it not accurate. As a
result we have Ac = 0.86.
Microsoft HealthVault provides no information on how long they take to update
the help section once something has changed in the system. We do not have enough
information to calculate currentness. Thus currentness is not measurable without
access to the internal system.
In average, sentences in the account termination statements are 14.91 words long,
considerably less than the mean considered in the metric. In other words, these
statements are rather succinct. This value, applied to Equation (4.7), provides a con-
ciseness value of Co ' 0.59. The readability of the account termination statements is
slightly better. When applied to these statements the FRES formula results in 63.95;
applied to Equation (4.10), it provides a readabilityR ' 0.63.
The detailing metric can be calculated considering the purpose for which the in-
formation has been made available. In this case, the user must have access to ex-
planations about leaving the service and taking data out of it. So the account ter-
mination statements, ideally, should help the users understand what to do to leave
the service, and how to proceed to take the data out of the service. For this require-
ment, the information is already separated into two categories, which we identify
through a three-letter acronym to simplify the visualization of the results: “How do
I close my HealthVault account?” (CMA) and “How do I export and save health
information from HealthVault?” (ESI). The detailing metric reaches the maximum
score D = 1, as all the desired details are provided by the statements.
Delivered Details
Desired Details CMA ESI
How to proceed to leave the service? X
How to proceed to take data out from the service? X
TABLE 4.5: Detailing matrix 111.17: desirable details compared with
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
4.5.2 Mechanism-based requirement
The second requirement 222.1 – “Smust provide Pwith audit mechanisms” is imple-
mented byMicrosoft HealthVault by providing a way for users to consult the history
of accesses and changes made on their data. They can see the changes made by one
specific person or application, or even see the history of access rights granted. These
functions are centralised in a section called “Record history”, under “All changes in
the last 6 months” (which we abbreviate as CLM in the following), and also “Views
of User’s record in the last 30 days” (shortened in VUR). We consider the combina-
tion of these two tools as the audit mechanism provided by HealthVault.
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The section “Record History” can be accessed with one click from the main page,
provided the user is already logged in the system. Users then need another click
to access one of the two previously-mentioned tools, summing up to 2 interactions
needed to reach each tool. Similarly to the way we calculated reachability for the
previous requirement, here we also consider that the user reaches the audit mecha-
nism after having accessed both tools, with a total amount of 2+ 2 = 4 interactions.
Considering the same parameter k = 3, Microsoft HealthVault reaches again the
scoreRc ' 0.71 in the reachabilitymetric with regard to this requirement.
The portability measurement is also similar to what we did for the previous re-
quirement. However, the audit mechanism scores P = 0.6, less than the account
termination statements. This happens because, while the information provided by
the CLM tool makes use of URIs, this is not true for the VUR tool. Since the mecha-
nism is partitioned into the two parts, we cannot consider the overall mechanism’s
output portable if parts of it do not reach the same portability level.
In this work we interpret auditability and accountability as properties related
to access control. Hence, to measure currentness we need to define the acceptable
amount of time (tmax) in which the system has to provide information about a data
access, after it has happened. Ideally, such information should be available shortly
after the action took place. Thus, for the effect of the calculations we define it is
acceptable to take up to 10 seconds for the system to display the information: tmax =
10s. According to our tests, Microsoft HealthVault displays information on accesses
immediately after they happened. From the user’s perspective, it is very difficult to
precisely calculate the amount of time taken until this information is available, as
it is necessary to isolate other external factors that may be interfering with the time
perceived, e.g., network delays. However, even considering the time taken t = 5s
(more than the time perceived in every test we did), with regard to requirement 222.1
Microsoft HealthVault still reaches the maximum grade Cu = 1.
In our example, we claim that HealthVault provides audit mechanisms by mak-
ing a “Record History” available to its users. As discussed in section 4.2.1, for a
mechanism to be effective in helping a user to audit the actions executed in his or
her record, it requires means to check details such as: what actions happened in the
system with regard to the user’s data; when the action happened; whether the ac-
tion was successful; from where the action was executed; and which data suffered
the action. As seen in Table 4.6, HealthVault reaches four out of the five desired goals
in the CLM auditability tool, but only three out of five in the VUR tool. Thus, the
effectivenessmetric scores E = 0.7.
Delivered Outputs
Desired Goals CLM VUR
What is the action? X X
When did it happen? X X
What was the outcome?
From what source/application? X X
Which data suffered the action? X
TABLE 4.6: Effectiveness matrix 222.1: desirable goals compared with
the real outputs. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent goals.
Finally, to measure the operativeness of the HealthVault’s audit mechanism, we
first had to define the set A = {createData, readData, updateData, deleteData} of
actions to be tested in the system. For the effect of our study, we deemed it sufficient
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to test only one action per equivalence class. The test consisted in executing the
actions in A, i.e., creating a personal record, reading a personal record, and so on;
and checking if they were properly captured by the audit mechanism. As the test
succeeded for every action executed, the audit mechanism reached O = 1.
4.5.3 Summary
A summary of the results discussed previously is presented in Figure 4.5. The results
for the first requirement (information-based) are shown in blue, and those for the
second one (mechanism-based) are in orange.
(A) Requirement 111.17. (B) Requirement 222.1.
FIGURE 4.5: Examples of scores achieved by an Information-based
and a Mechanism-based requirement.
The assessment of Microsoft HealthVault is presented in Figure 4.6. In here
we consider the average of scores achieved by each requirement analysed. Non-
applicable metrics are disregarded in the calculation of averages. Scores achieved
by information-based requirements are shown in Figure 4.6a, whereas Figure 4.6b
displays the scores for the mechanism-based ones.
(A) Information-based requirements. (B) Mechanism-based requirements.
FIGURE 4.6: Synthesis of the transparency measurement in Microsoft
HealthVault.
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4.6 Discussion: on metrics’ relevance and soundness
The GDPR discusses and presents transparency as a user-centric concept. This no-
tion is supported in the guidelines by the WP29, which points out that “the quality,
accessibility and comprehensibility of the information is as important as the actual con-
tent of the transparency information, which must be provided to data subjects.” [10,
paragraph 4]. Article 12 of the GDPR also sets the general rules regarding transpar-
ent information. It states that informationmust be concise, transparent, intelligible, eas-
ily accessible, and written in clear and plain language. All these concepts relate closely
to the quality factors we explore in this work.
The same guidelines by WP29 offer interpretations to those concepts. According
to the guidelines “concise and transparent” information should be understood as an
information presented efficiently and succinctly in order to avoid information fatigue
(paragraph 8). These concepts are captured by the conciseness, detailing and effi-
ciency metrics. The concept “intelligible” means that information should be under-
stood by an average member of the intended audience (paragraph 9). The guidelines
suggest the level of intelligibility can be tested, among others, through readability
tests. This concept clearly relates to our readability metric. The “easily accessible”
concept means that the data subject should not have to search for the information, that
how it can be accessed should be apparent (paragraph 11). For information pro-
vided in mobile applications, the guidelines suggest this requirement can be met by
ensuring the information is never more than “two taps away”. This concept closely
relates to our reachability metric, which considers user interactions (including taps)
in its formula.
Article 12 of the GDPR also states that information must be “in writing, or by
other means, including, where appropriate, by electronic means”. According to the
transparency guidelines, written information should follow best practices for “clear
and plain language”. This includes having the information provided in a simple
manner, avoiding complex sentences and language structures, and having concrete and
definitive information (paragraph 12). These concepts are also captured by the con-
ciseness and readabilitymetrics. Regarding other electronicmeans, theWP29 recom-
mends the use of layered privacy statements or notices whenever the data controller
maintains a digital presence (paragraph 17), which is the scenario we consider in
this work. The concept of layered information closely relates to the format in which
information is presented, and our portability metric covers this aspect.
Articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR further add time constrains to the provision
of information. Moreover, the guidelines suggest that providing information in a
timelymanner is a vital element of transparency and a fair processing of data (para-
graph 27). These concepts are closely related to our currentness metric.
Another document is referred to byWP29 on best practices for clear writing [60].
This document suggests to follow the “7 questions approach” (What? Who? When?
etc.) in order to determine if the relevant information is being covered in a text. This
recommendation directly relates to detailing and effectivenessmetrics. Also relevant
to this work, it is suggested that a text should be short and simple, having 20 words
per sentence on average. This is measured by the conciseness metric in our work,
which also considers an average of 20 words per sentence on its formula.
The remaining metrics, e.g., observability, accuracy, and operativeness, do not
have a direct correlation with transparency practices, as do the aforementioned ones.
Yet they extrapolate the essence of the accountability principle, which requires the
controller to demonstrate that processing happens in a lawful, transparent and fair
manner (GDPR, Article 5.2). These threemetrics assess howmuch of the information
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provided can be observed and tested for consistency with the real process of the
system.
Our metrics have also proved to be sound when applied to a real use case. By
conducting a complete assessment of transparency in Microsoft HealthVault, we
demonstrate that our metrics are applicable to obtain a reasonable estimation of a
system’s transparency with respect to a specific set of desired requirements. Some
of the results achieved in this assessment, however, may lead to a different conclu-
sion. We comment on them next.
No requirement evaluated in HealthVault achieved the highest grade on porta-
bility. However, we do not believe this to be an indicator that our metric is un-
reasonable. To achieve the highest grade on portability, the information provided
should be based on linked data, a principle not yet fully adopted by data controllers
and providers (see [22]). However, linked data still represent the state of the art for
portability of information. We expect to see some development in the area, espe-
cially in the light of the new right to data portability introduced by Article 20 of the
GDPR, according to which data subjects shall have the right to receive data “in a
structured, commonly used and machine-readable format”.
Often, the currentnessmetric could not be applied to measure information-based
requirements. This happens because of the lack of data regarding the time in which
changes occurred in the system, preventing one to understand how timely the infor-
mation is. However, this metric is justified by the timing requirements imposed by
the GDPR. In the guidelines for transparency it is explained that providing timely
information is crucial for transparency. Additionally, in light of the accountability
principle, data controllers are required to “justify why the information was provided
at the time it was” (paragraph 28). Even though this comment is made with regard
to specific types of information, it demonstrates that our currentness metric is not
measuring unrealistic aspects of transparency in a system.
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Private verification of access logs
Verification is, by the pure meaning of the word, “the process of establishing the
truth, accuracy, or validity of something"1. Verifiability is regarded in literature as a
property desired inmany information systems (e.g., [52, 53, 128]). It is also presented
as one of the properties composing the principle of transparency, which is said to
promote accountability and to realize people’s right to privacy (see section 2.3).
In the medical systems domain, verifiability (also called auditability) has been
explored with regard to access control (e.g., [71, 125]). Even though there are so-
lutions proposed for verifying access of personal data in medical systems (e.g., [87,
89, 192, 206]), to the best of our knowledge, none do that while ensuring the details
about patient’s information are kept confidential [87, 245]. In fact, according to Butin
and Le Métayer [30], this is the most commonly used argument against verifiability
in the context of personal data protection.
This chapter is dedicated to study the effects of privacy in aspects of transparency.
In particular, we demonstrate how independent verifiability can be realized in a
private fashion. We model an initial theoretical solution for detective compliance
through verifiability in a patient-centred medical system. We use searchable encryp-
tion techniques for that. This solution allows for the access logs frommedical system
to be independently checked by a third party tool without leaking private informa-
tion. It also protects the verification conditions by encrypting the queries executed
by this third-party. Moreover, empowering users with the ability of privately check-
ing compliance with access policies, helps supporting the confidence these users
have in the system.
5.1 Aspects of Transparency and Privacy
The relationship between transparency and privacy is clearly troubled: transparency
is a property related to disclosure of information, while privacy is often associated
with confidentiality of information. If transparency is seen as the opposite of secrecy
[173], transparency and privacy become contradicting requirements [208], and there
should be a balance between transparent data access and the preservation of privacy
[127].
However, transparency is still considered necessary to assert data ownership and
privacy of users [205]. Transparency has been studied as a privacy goal, in the sense
of increasing privacy awareness [150], and as a way of addressing users’ privacy
concerns [100]. In fact transparency and privacy can still be conceptually realised if
the information transparency intends to reveal is not the same that privacy intends
to protect [19]. In particular, with regard to the interpretation we adopt in this work,
1Definition taken from the Online Oxford Dictionaries
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helping patients understanding about their choices, the system’s processes, the exis-
tence of entities which have access to personal data, and so on, can be done without
leaking any sensitive data. That is the view point of the majority of our requirements
(see chapter 3), they refer to transparency’s sub-property of availability.
Instead, here we focus on requirements about the sub-property of verifiability,
which pose more challenge to privacy. As verifiability is regarded as a property
related to access control in the medical systems domain, realising it requires demon-
strating that personal and private data has only been used in compliance with a
given policy. This process may end up exposing the patients, as log on data access
and usage itself reveals potentially sensitive information [100]. Allowing patients
to manually verify compliance with policies is possible, and could potentially solve
the friction between transparency and privacy, but is not ideal. It would overwhelm
them with the technical charge.
A good verifiability solution in the medical domain should be automatically exe-
cuted. To demonstrate good faith and commitment towards the fair use of personal
data, it is also desired that medical systems allow the verification process to be ex-
ecuted independently. In a way that the patient can choose to trust the system with
the verification task, or to execute it with an external auditing tool (e.g., a TET).
However, those requirements are not easily achieved together with privacy. The in-
dependent verification requirement, while fostering the trust on the systemmay also
become a privacy vulnerability to the the subjects involved if proper measures are
not in place. No personal and private information should be leaked during the verification
process, even if unintentionally.
5.2 Related works
A survey fromReuben et al. [188] classifies the existing automated audits for privacy
compliance verification. They study several solutions and separate them according
to their auditing goals. The authors highlight three main goals:
1. Audit for ex post obligations – which regards compliance with after-the-fact obli-
gations that cannot be verified beforehand, e.g., mandatory deletion of data
after a fixed amount of time;
2. Audit for permitted exceptions – which includes exceptional actions that happen
in case of emergency (break-the-glass policies); and
3. Audit for access legitimacy – which intends to demonstrate compliance with the
data owner’s preferences.
Audits for ex post obligations do not necessarily imply on disclosure of personal
data. In fact Butin and Le Métayer [30] propose a formal framework for verifying
compliance in a privacy friendly way. They check compliance with data protec-
tion policies based on logs free of any personal data. However, they are not able to
demonstrate compliance with access policies. They only verify properties such as
“delete requests are fulfilled before expiration of request fulfilment delay", and “no
personal data should appear in an abstract state after its global deletion delay has
expired."
Audits for permitted exceptions and for access legitimacy pose more challenge
for the privacy of personal and sensitive data. In most of the cases they mandate
the analysis of audit logs, which contain information on who accessed what kind of
information from whom [87, 245]. In here we intend to demonstrate how one could
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conduct these kind of audits in a private manner. For this purpose we show a model
to automatically verify the latter (access legitimacy). Our scheme is capable of identi-
fying accesses that do not match the user’s preferences. Which can be later manually
investigated for permitted exceptions (break-the-glass policies, for example). Auto-
matic verification of permitted exceptions in a private manner would require a more
in-depth study that is outside of the scope of this work.
In [87] authors point out security and privacy issues involved in making access
policies and audit logs available in medical domain. They advocate that policies and
logs, even though not containing personal and sensitive information (only references
to it), may be enough for revealing details that should be kept private. Someone in
possession of such policies and logs can gain knowledge of what kind of treatment
a patient has received in the past, or what types of medical data are available. Au-
thors advocate that by properly controlling the access to policies and logs it is possi-
ble to solve this privacy issue. They propose an adapted Information Accountability
Framework [76] in which only the patient (data owners), medical professionals and
medical authorities (e.g., government agency conducting audits) can access the poli-
cies and logs with restrictions according to their roles.
However, this work is not suitable to be applied to our context. In [87] indepen-
dent auditing processes, one of our goals, are not considered. Even if this work was
adapted to allow independent verification, the principle of privacy would still not
be realised. External entities would still have access to more information than nec-
essary to the purpose of verification. Restricted access control when applied in an
uncontrolled environment (possibly insecure) does not suffice to prevent leakage of
personal information.
While in [87] the confidentiality of sensitive information is realized only by con-
trolling access to policies and logs, Walters et al. [245] propose a different solution
for the problem: to operate on encrypted audit logs.
In [245], authors assume a scenario in which a system is being audited but the
controllers of the system do not wish to share information from the audit logs with
other entities. Similarly, the authors also believe it is possible to learn sensitive de-
tails about the system and the users by analysing the logs. For example, one can
instantly learn what actions were conducted by a given user. The authors build an
scheme for conducting searches in encrypted audit logs. For each log registered,
the system should define a few keywords with which this log can be found. It then
distributes searching capabilities for those keywords only to specific authorized per-
sons. Each log is encrypted with a key that can only be retrieved by a person that
possess searching capabilities for, at least, one of its keywords. Consequently, this
scheme only allows authorized persons to decrypt the audit logs.
The audit process presented in [245] cannot be fully independent though. It relies
on the system providing searching capabilities to the auditor for the given set of ac-
tions he or she can audit. Despite that, this scheme is also not in accordance with the
privacy principle. In our scenario, in order to verify compliance with the patient’s
preferences the auditor would search for log entries matching the set of allowed ac-
tions and be able to decrypt them, in detriment of the patient’s privacy. Ideally the
external entity should not be able to decrypt, only learning whether or not a given
log entry matches a search (and consequently is an allowed action) would suffice.
Two other works by Peeters, Pulls et al. propose a scheme for privacy-preserving
transparency logging [172, 177]. The authors present a TET in the form of a crypto-
graphic scheme that enables users to access logs of events that happened to their per-
sonal data. In [177], four main requirements shape the resulting scheme: 1. integrity
of logs; 2. confidentiality of logs; 3. undistinguishable logs; and 4.
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identifiers. Their scheme allows for the storage of encrypted logs in a distributed
fashion. Logs can only be accessed by the concerned users, and modifications to
logged data cannot go undetected. In [172], the authors propose improvements to
the original scheme to allow for publicly verifiable proofs of logs’ author, time, recip-
ient andmessage. The improved scheme combines concepts from authenticated data
structures, forward key generation and secure messaging protocols to resist against
stronger adversaries. While both works are comprehensive in addressing problems
of confidentiality and integrity of logs, their goal is not to simplify the verification
for compliance with policies. Their scheme allows only for manual verification of
logs.
There are several other works that, similarly to the ones mentioned above, sug-
gest schemes for privately processing personal data. The majority of those use
searchable encryption techniques for that. In what follows we present the most rel-
evant of those works while reviewing basic concepts of the technique.
5.2.1 Searchable encryption
Searchable Encryption (SE) techniques were initially introduced in the context of
outsourced databases. With the growth of the amount of data generated, came an
increasing need for outsourced options to store it. However, one cannot fully trust
outsourced databases and may want to keep its data confidential. One possible so-
lution to guarantee confidentiality involves encrypting the data before the storage
on the database. Only the ones in possession of the key can decrypt it and learn its
contents. However, denying the database access to the information increases the dif-
ficulty of performing queries and selectively retrieving data. Searchable encryption
techniques try to approach this problem by allowing the database to execute queries
on encrypted data.
Search on encrypted data was initially introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky
[81], and Song et al. [216]. It is, to this day, an active research area with three main
research directions [27]: to improve efficiency; to improve security; and to enhance
the expressiveness of the search. Usually we see a trade-off between them. For
example, guaranteeing a stronger security usually compromises the efficiency.
An important scheme based on searchable encrypted index was first presented
by Goh [80] and later considered in other works (i.e. [32, 152, 170] and many others).
For each encrypted data, keywords are extracted and those are used to generate an
encrypted index. In the outsourced database scenario, the indexes are generated by
the client and sent with the respective encrypted data to the database. Later, the
client can send an encrypted query and the indexes will help the database/server
to search over the encrypted data without the need of decryption. Indexes and
queries should not leak information about the encrypted data, while guaranteeing
that clients obtain what they are searching for.
There are specific techniques for searching on public key [24, 26, 78] and sym-
metric key [46, 80, 216] encrypted data. The last one is known as Symmetric Search-
able Encryption (SSE). Several works presented solutions for searching single key-
words [35, 46, 245]. Other schemes propose a search using more expressive keyword
searches, such as conjunctions [25, 28, 82, 209], ranges [25, 209], or even dealing with
keyword occurrence frequency [28]. This improves the expressiveness and security
of searches, as opposed to perform several single-keyword searches and combin-
ing the results [152]. A few even more expressive schemes support general Boolean
searches with conjunction, disjunction and negation of keywords in Disjunctive Nor-
mal Form (DNF) and/or Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) [32, 66, 116, 129, 152, 170].
5.3. Technical aspects of Medical Systems 67
We demonstrate later that these works are of a special interest since it is possible to
model our problem into queries in a Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF).
Symmetric searchable encryption are usually applied to scenarios where data
owners want to query their own encrypted data stored in some third party server.
In our work we propose the use of SSE techniques in a slightly different scenario,
where data owners (patients) share their data with medical services and use SSE to
independently verify accesses, while guaranteeing the confidentiality of their per-
sonal data.
It is necessary to note though, that we have a few different (and more relaxed)
requirements in comparison to the conventional application of SSE in outsourced
data storage. The first is related to the amount of data stored, searched and returned:
while outsourced data applicationsmay have to deal with large amounts of data, our
application deals only with the event registers (logs) related to one specific patient
(details in section 5.3). We assume these logs to be in a smaller scale. This implies
that the use of SSE algorithms with non-optimal search time is not prohibitive in our
application. Second, the patient already has access to all encrypted data and uses
the verifier only for auditing. Therefore, if the search returns all the data, which is
an expected result for the cases where no violation of the policy was made, we can
save on communication and avoid returning everything again to the client, i.e., we
can return just a positive message instead.
5.3 Technical aspects of Medical Systems
As discussed previously the term “medical systems" is broad and encompasses sev-
eral types of systems with different goals: clinical data management systems, tele-
medicine systems, hospital information systems, pharmaceutical, etc. In this chap-
ter we only distinguish those which are patient-centred. The goal of these systems
is to allow the patient to be in control of the personal data being processed. Exam-
ples of patient-centred medical systems are Microsoft HealthVault2, and the national
Dossier de Soins Partagé3 (Shared Care Dossier in English) from Luxembourg. The
reader my refer to section 1.1 to review concepts related to these systems. From this
point on we may refer to patient-centred systems simply as medical systems.
Generally speaking we can assume patient-centred medical systems to adopt a
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) system [104]. In DAC systems the owner of a
resource, in our case the patient, may grant or revoke access to other entities (users)
based on their identities. We do not affirm that every patient-centredmedical system
implements DAC exactly as described in [104]. We just claim their access control
method resembles DAC and could be modelled using it. For the sake of simplicity
we assume discretionary access control policies as a set of fixed size clauses as shown
in Equation (5.1), where idi is the identity of the person authorized to realize an
action actionj on the patient’s data.
p = {(idi, actionj)} (5.1)
It is, however, unrealistic to assume one access control system to be the perfect
fit for every variation of medical systems. We do not attempt doing that. We instead
chose to model our solution based on DAC systems to demonstrate that private ver-
ification can be accomplished even in systems implementing highly malleable and
2https://www.healthvault.com/
3https://www.esante.lu/portal/fr/espace-patient/le-dsp-au-quotidien,199.html?
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granular access control mechanisms. We present arguments to endorse this claim in
section 5.5. And later, in ??, we discuss how our solution can also handle other types
of policies richer in attributes.
Our simplified policy is only suitable to represent patient-centred medical sys-
tems though. In general these systems do not handle the definition of pre-conditions,
post-conditions, obligations and other more complex policies that may be found in
other types of medical system. To add more representativeness to the verification
one could also explore revocation of access rights, which would mandate clauses to
be time anchored. However, this is out of our scope. We restrict ourselves to the
study of static policies and verification without temporal aspects.
Every action a person realizes on the patient’s data, whether authorized or not,
should be registered as an event in the audit logs. Similarly to how we defined the
policies, we do for the register of events. We do not go into details on how they
are in fact implemented because that may vary in different implementations. But
according to a recent work [249] which surveys log files in the medical domain, it is
reasonable to assume at least the following attributes would have to be registered in
order to provide verifiability: 1. event identification (action) – the action performed;
2. date and time (t); 3. actor identification (id) – who performed the action; 4. object
identification (ob) – the data that suffered the actions. Some standards are more
complete and consider more attributes (i.e., RFC 3881 [147]), but in general these
four attributes are commonly observed in medical systems [249]. We assume the
register of events simply as the set of logs as displayed in Equation (5.2).
L = {(action, t, id, ob)} (5.2)
5.4 Model description
As described in section 5.3, our scenario assumes a patient-centred medical system.
Users of such a system should be able to verify whether their data has been accessed
in compliance to the access policy. We assume three different players:
• Medical System: Stores patient’s data, which can be accessed by its owner
(the patient), and few predetermined professionals. This decision is agreed
with the patient through an access policy.
• Patient: May want to verify if specific statements of the policy are being en-
forced, or search for possible violations.
• Verifier: Third party tool or mechanism responsible for verifying compliance
of the medical system with regard to specific statements of the agreed policy.
Additionally, we also assume the ideal solution would take into consideration
the following requirements:
• Automated verification: The medical system should provide means for the
patients to avoid the overburden of manually verifying logs;
• Independent audit: Allowing a third party to verify compliance with privacy
policies demonstrates good faith and commitment towards the fair use of per-
sonal data;
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• Privacy: During the auditing, patients’ privacy should be ensured – only the
strictly necessary information to determine compliance should be disclosed.
From this information one should not be able to infer any personal details
about the patients.
Patients should access and be able to export logs of actions performed on their
data. However, data and the logs are private and should only be accessed by its
owner (the patient) and a few designated medical staff. Therefore, both patient
and the medical system are interested on keeping communications confidential. We
chose to encrypt data with a symmetric key that is only known by the medical sys-
tem and the patient. Keys differ for each patient of the system.
Patients may require the logs related to their data to check if the agreed policy
is being followed. They can decrypt all logs received and verify by themselves, or
they have the option to execute this task with an independent verifier. For that, the
patient simply redirects the encrypted logs to the verifier. Since the verifier does not
have access to the key used for encryption, a (good) traditional symmetric encryp-
tion is enough to guarantee that this verifier will not learn any information about
the events these logs represent. Finally, in order to allow the verifier to operate over
the encrypted logs while protecting the patient’s privacy, we propose the use of SSE.
5.4.1 Trust model
The medical system we model is assumed to be honest, but not trustworthy. In sys-
tems that implement break-the-glass, for example, the policy may be relaxed and
this can cause abuses. It may also be the case that the access control mechanism
implemented does not flawlessly represent the policy agreed prior the disclosure of
data. In both cases the medical system does not act ill-intentioned, but the patients’
data can still be misused, and this may cause mistrust. Hence, the medical system’s
goal is to regain the trust of its users. This is realized by allowing them to indepen-
dently verify whether the system has acted in compliance with the agreed policy.
By doing that, we also avoid requiring the patient to place major trust in one single
entity.
Our attacker model also assumes an honest-but-curious verifier, which will not
actively behave dishonestly, but my retain any information disclosed to it. We also
assume an external attacker, who will try to extract or infer information on the pa-
tients. The attacker is assumed to have access to the verifier, and any information
exchanged between the other players. Because our goal is to demonstrate how in-
dependent verifiability can be achieved in a private manner (without leaking any
sensitive information), we are only interested in what an attacker can learn through
the use of the verifier. The capabilities of the attacker towards the medical system
are not explored in this work.
In order to avoid a possible collusion between medical system and verifier, we
suggest the implementation of several verifiers by different entities. In this way,
the patients can double-check with different verifiers in case of suspicion. Verifiers
would avoid collusion with medical systems in order to maintain reputation, and
medical systems would avoid collusion with verifiers as that can be identified by
other verifiers. Verifiers can also be tested by the users with a set of logs and policies
for which the expected results are known. Even though these approaches do not
demonstrate the verifier correctness, they provide stronger evidences that can be
used as criteria to support the choice of verifier.
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It is important to note that we do not investigate into the matter of how to en-
sure the logs’ accuracy and integrity. This topic is out of the scope of our work. We
assume the medical system is honest and has its own reliable and trustworthy log-
ging mechanism, and that it securely stores and handles data and logs. For insights
on how logging mechanisms can be achieved accounting for logs’ accuracy and in-
tegrity, we remand the reader to [172, 177]. The following section presents in details
our proposal for verification using searchable encryption.
5.5 Solving verification with Searchable Encryption
Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) schemes are popular in cloud settings. Data
owners store encrypted data in an outsourced database, perform encrypted queries,
and receive the encrypted data they searched for. We propose the use of SSE in a
different setting: to verify whether the medical system is compliant to the access
policy agreed with the patient. This verification is done through an external and
independent audit. In our scenario, the verifier plays the role of the outsourced
cloud service (even though it is not necessarily remote) and the patient is the data
owner. We have added a third role played by the medical system, that is responsible
for encrypting the data and generating the search indexes.
Next we present our scheme dividing it into the encryption of logs and index
generation, the query generation and policy verification.
5.5.1 Encryption and index generation
For each patient that requires his or her logs, themedical system performs a key agree-
ment process, where system and patient agree on a symmetric key k to be used for
encryption and decryption. After that, the medical system encrypts each log indi-
vidually and generates an index for each one of them, summarizing its content. The
index includes all the keywords that can be searched in the encrypted data. Specifi-
cally for our scenario, the index of a log should contain the keywords related to the
policy, such as the action registered by that log and the identity id of the user who
performed the action (see Equation (5.2)). The index generation depends on the SSE
method used, but a common requirement is that no keyword in the index should be
exposed. This is usually achieved by encrypting or through the use of scrambling-
related techniques [28, 66, 80, 152]. We abstract the process of encryption and index
generation in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 EncryptLogs(logs[n])
Input: array of logs with n entries
for each i 2 {1, . . . , n} do
c[i] = Enc(k, logs[i])
keywords = extractKeywords(logs[i])
index[i] = generateIndex(k, keywords)
end for
Output: c, index
5.5.2 Query generation
The medical system sends indexes and encrypted logs to the patient, who can redi-
rect this information to the verifier for auditing purposes. On the patient’s side, the
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main computation is related to the query generation. The query indicates which
clauses the patient wants to verify. By generating one query containing each clause
in the policy p (see Equation (5.1)), it is possible to determine compliance. We
present here Algorithm 2 as a generic algorithm for query generation.
One may question the simplicity of our policy model; we only consider the iden-
tity of the actor and the action executed. We chose to do so in the interest of sim-
plifying its description; our model supports other types of access control policies.
It also supports any number of attributes by computing additional keywords in the
indexes and conjunctions of the query. The model we propose can handle the veri-
fication of actors’ roles, attributes, sections of personal data, for example. Given the
medical system supports such attributes in its policy and register them in the audit
logs.
In a traditional SSE approach, the data owner would generate an encrypted
query and the database should simply execute this query over the indexes and return
the respective encrypted data that matches the search. We adopt a similar approach.
Here we assume that the patient has access to the policy agreed with the medical
system. The patient then generates an encrypted query that contain the clauses from
the policy, in order to check if the actions registered in the logs comply with the pol-
icy agreed. If the policy and the key used to encrypt the logs and indexes do not
change, this query could also be further reused by the same patient.
We represent our query as a Boolean expression in a Disjunctive Normal Form
(DNF). We assume a simple policy containing only a set of s identities and t actions
as keywords, and relations in the format (idi, actionj) representing a clause of the
policy allowing a person identified by idi to execute actionj. To search for all logs
that match the policy, the patient can generate a query in the DNF form as follows:
(idi1 ^ actionj1) _ . . . _ (idis ^ actionjt), where (idi ^ actionj) is an allowed relation of
the policy.
We abstract the query generation with a call to “generate query". The details of
this generation depend on the SSEmethod, but it basically identifies the clauses from
the DNF expression and perform specific computations depending on the method
used. Since we don’t want the verifier to obtain information about the encrypted
logs, some computation must be performed on the query as well to guarantee its
confidentiality. This is a reasonable assumption considering that several SSE algo-
rithms already guarantee that by using encryption or scrambling-based techniques
[32, 116, 152]. As an example, the query generation by Moataz and Shikfa [152] con-
sists on converting keywords to vectors, and applying consecutive multiplications,
sums and divisions to them. The confidentiality in this case is guaranteed by incor-
porating random integers in the query computation (see [152, Section 4.2] for more
details).
Note that the query generation is quite flexible, since it allows the patient to
search for a range of different options. For example, he or she can search for all logs
that match the policy, for some combination of specific clauses from the policy, or
even for logs that do not match the policy by simply negating the search expression.
It is important to note that most SSE schemes (specially the most traditional ones)
search for single keywords on encrypted data. Here we require the use of a more
expressive SSE that supports Boolean queries, such as the solutions proposed in [32,
116, 152]. Algorithm 2 summarizes the process of query generation.
Recall that we created indexes for the encrypted logs with the keywords (idi,
actionj) contained in each log. The verifier can then search through the logs indexes
and identify the ones that match at least one of the conjunctions (idi ^ actionj) from
the query. Here we considered small policy clauses, but if necessary, we can easily
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Algorithm 2 GenerateQuery(p)
Input: Policy p = {(idi, actioni)} with m clauses
DNF = empty string
for each i 2 {1, . . . ,m} do
DNF = DNF k(idi ^ actioni)
if i 6= m then
DNF = DNF k_
end if
end for
Q = generateQuery(DNF)
Output: Q
adapt the query to be more expressive. For example, by considering extra informa-
tion such as identification of the objects that suffered the actions. In order to incor-
porate extra keywords in the search, these keywords also need to be incorporated in
the policy and during the generation of the logs’ indexes.
5.5.3 Policy verification
After the verifier receives the encrypted logs, respective indexes, and the query Q,
it has enough information to perform the verification for policy compliance. The
search process consists on going through the encrypted logs to find the ones that
match the query. For each log, the verifier obtains the corresponding index and use
it to check if it matches the query. Here we call this comparison “test" and the logs
that “pass" the test are added to the vector of results. If a log pass a test, it means
that this log contains at least all the keywords from one of the conjunctions of the
query, which represents compliance with one of the clauses of the policy.
Note that the search depends on the SSE method as well. Some constructions
propose visiting each encrypted data and its indexes [152], while others present
some more efficient search methods [66, 116, 170]. After the search, the verifier
sends to the patient a list of encrypted logs that match the query. As logs, indexes,
and queries are encrypted, the verifier is not able to learn anything about the con-
fidential information. As an example, the verification by Moataz and Shikfa [152]
consists on visiting every index and comparing it to the query. Generally speaking,
every index is multiplied by the query and the ones that output a result equals to
“1" correspond to logs that satisfy at least one clause from the policy. Algorithm 3
summarizes the our verification process.
Algorithm 3 Search(Q, c[n], index[n])
Input: Encrypted query Q, vector c with n encrypted logs, and their indexes
for each i 2 {1, . . . , n} do
r = test(Q, index[i])
if r = true then
result.add(c[i])
end if
end for
Output: result
The results can be simplified by returning the number of logs that match the
query, or a custom message for the special cases, such as “All logs match your
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query", or “No logs match your query". If further investigation is desired, Algo-
rithm 3 can easily be adapted to return the logs that caused a mismatch. If the pa-
tient is interested in learning the cause for the mismatch he or she can decrypt those
logs (using the key k) and understand what event is not compliant to the policy. Al-
ternatively, these logs could be redirected to the medical system in order to inquire
for a justification. How to better display and interpret the results, or how to request
for justification are definitely relevant issues, but we understand they would require
a research on their own. We refrain from delving into those matter in this work.
5.6 Complexity and security analysis
Several searchable encryption schemes are designed for the settings of big data ap-
plications, where there is a large amount of encrypted data and it is, for example,
infeasible to search through every single record. Our scenario is slightly different
and some of the assumptions in those settings are not applicable here. In what fol-
lows we discuss how technical aspects of SSE methods impact our solution. We first
examine aspects of computational complexity of those methods (subsection 5.6.1)
and later we discuss about their security (subsection 5.6.2).
5.6.1 Complexity
The efficiency of our scheme is directly related to the efficiency of the SSE method
used. However, the use of non-optimal SSE methods, such as [32, 152], while pro-
hibitive for big data applications, is acceptable in our scenario. In fact, SSE tech-
niques are very well suited for our application. Our verifier processes only the audit
logs related to one specific patient. These logs are assumed to be small pieces of
data and in a much smaller scale than in cloud settings. Consequently, the efficiency
problems presented in outsourced databases are not applicable here. Moreover, the
generation of keywords in our application does not require complex calculations.
The keywords are defined by the policy and logs, and can be automatically extracted
from those.
Other more efficient SSE methods, such as the ones with sub-linear search time
[116, 170], could also be considered here. In this case, the efficiency would depend
on the query we are searching for. When searching for all logs that match the policy,
it is expected the result to be close to the total amount of logs n. Hence, our search
complexity will end up being close to O(n) as well. However, when searching for
the logs that do not match the policy, or that match some specific patters, we should
expect a small number of results. In this case, methods that have search time close
to the number of results may be the right choice. We assume the complexity of our
worst-case scenario to be O(n).
Intuitively one would tend to believe that the most efficient SSE methods on
the literature are the best fit. However, there are trade-offs on these methods that
need to be consider. Some of these methods use complicated structures and increase
the spacial complexity, and others end up revealing parts of sensitive information.
For a more extensive discussion on the trade-offs related to expressiveness of the
query, efficiency, and security, the reader may want to refer to [27]. The choice of
the method is not straightforward, it needs to be carefully studied. However, we
suggest that in cases where the number of logs (n) is reasonable, it is a good practice
to prioritize secure over efficient methods, even if they offer search complexity of
O(n).
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5.6.2 Security
The confidentiality of personal information in our scheme is provided by the chosen
symmetric key encryption algorithm. To avoid brute force and the most common
attacks it is recommended to use encryption algorithms that have at least 112 bits
of security (i.e. AES) [12]. Moreover, the use of deterministic encryption algorithms
commonly implies in the leakage of patterns [27]. Therefore, the most secure SSE
schemes are usually non-deterministic.
The security of the scheme is not only given by the encryption algorithm though,
it also depends on the security of the SSE method itself. The SSE methods in the
literature present a concern on the amount of information that can be inferred by
the results of the search. Although they do not reveal directly the content of the
encrypted data, the majority of these schemes will not prevent probabilistic analysis
if the same data is repeatedly searched. This is a problem common to any application
of this nature.
In our application the verifier returns all the results that match an specific query.
This means that the verifier knows which encrypted logs are being returned, but not
their plain content. The same applies to the attacker we consider in our model, since
we assume it has access to the verifier and any exchanged message. There are SSE
methods that aim to hide all information. In this way, the verifier is not even able to
detect which logs are being returned to the data owner. However, these SSEmethods
are usually based on oblivious RAMs (ORAMs), and are not efficient in practice (for
more details, see survey [27]).
We understand that the searches will usually be related to the logs that match or
do not match the policy. By analysing the number of results from an specific query
one could guess which search was performed. The search with several results is
likely to be a search for all logs that match the policy, and the search with a few
results is probably for the logs that do not match the policy. In this sense the verifier
(or attacker) would be able to identify which logs match/do not match the policy,
but would not be able to learn their content. We do not consider this as a threat to
our scheme. A well chosen encryption algorithm would make sure that encrypted
logs and queries are not available in plain text (they are encrypted or scrambled
depending on the SSE scheme). Nonetheless, it is important to consider this case
when applying our solution to other scenarios.
It is also important to note that any technical limitation of the underlying schemes
(symmetric encryption or SSE) also reflects on a limitation of our proposed solution.
We can cite, for example, the case of compromised or revoked private keys. In this
case every data encrypted with that key is assumed to be compromised as well. A
known solution to neutralize the potential damage is to reduce the lifetime of the
key, and for example, use session keys instead of a single private key. In our sce-
nario this solution would come at the cost of recalculating the queries, which could
no longer be reused. This is the classical trade-off between efficiency and security.
Furthermore, a slight modification of our scheme is also needed to cope with
the problem of compromised keys. Compromising one session key is enough for
breaking privacy, even if forward and backwards secrecy are maintained, and no
other message is obtained. The damage cause by compromising one session key is
proportional to the amount of logs encrypted with that key. Therefore, to minimize
this problem, only a small subset of logs should be verified at a time, i.e. the logs of
the day or past week. Note that the maximum number of logs that are encrypted by
the same session key is determined by the security guarantees required for specific
applications of our scheme.
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Accomplishing Transparency in
Medical Systems
The new European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is now entirely in
force, and electronic systems handling personal and identifiable data need to ensure
that processing is lawful, fair and transparent. While the principles of lawfulness and
of fairness express legalistic concepts, transparency can be interpreted as a socio-
technical concept. It is a social concept because it is intended to aid individuals in
understanding how their data is processed, and whether it is processed lawfully and
fairly. It is technical because it should be realised as a technical feature whenever
appropriate [10, see paragraphs: 4, 7].
The interest in transparency grew in the past few years after the European Union
first proposed the principle in the early drafts of the GDPR. The interest has been
mainly from a technical point of view. Transparency has been discussed as a princi-
ple of accountability in the cloud computing domain [19], it has been presented as
a privacy goal and precondition for intervenability [149], and it has also been stud-
ied for its meaning in the area of electronic medical systems [218, 223]. Similarly,
in the same period we have seen the emerging of several Transparency Enhancing
Tools (TETs), which are typically system-independent tools intended to help indi-
viduals to gain more knowledge about their data (see [63, 256] for literature reviews
on TETs).
Despite the rising number of works on transparency, defining compliance with
the GDPR principles remains an open problem. Generally speaking, determining
compliance with regulations is not an easy task. Regulations express legal require-
ments and define concepts in a generic language, which admits several interpreta-
tions. While this is done on purpose, so regulations reach a broad audience, it also
hinders the task of defining compliance. However, from a purely technical perspec-
tive, one could attempt determining the degree of presumption of compliance con-
cerning the principle of transparency by leveraging on the existing literature. How
far are we from realising transparency in real systems? Can TETs help systems in
the task of providing transparency to their users? In this chapter, we explore these
questions, specifically in the domain of electronic medical systems.
The domain of medical systems is particularly interesting for a use case as it
deals with highly sensitive and private personal data; thus reviewing the technical
requirements proposed to implement transparency in the domain (see chapter 3),
and comparing them to Articles extracted from the GDPR and a few selected TETs
recently discussed in the literature may reveal interesting correlations.
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6.1 Related works
To the best of our knowledge, only a few works discuss matters of compliance with
the GDPR principles (i.e., [21, 149, 185]). In [149], the authors systematically as-
sess the privacy goal of intervenability and explore the relationship between inter-
venability requirements with transparency ones. To this aim, the authors first de-
rive and structure technical requirements by analysing the international standard
ISO/IEC 291000 and the European GDPR for descriptions of the privacy principle
and the formulations of the regulation. The requirements were then extracted with
formulations close to the found in the original documents. Even though in this work
technical (international standard) and legal (GDPR) documents are used, they are
not compared. The requirements studied in this work are instead extracted from
these documents.
In [21] the authors propose a Transparency Enhancing Tool (TET) in the form
of a privacy dashboard. To define the relevant features to be implemented, they
derived technical requirements from the right of access presented by the GDPR, the
previous European Data Protection Directive, and the Federal Data Protection Act
from Germany. The authors present eight requirements extracted from the data pro-
tection laws but do not compare them with any other source. Similarly, Raschke et
al. propose a GDPR-compliant dashboard in [185], which is shaped by requirements
extracted from the GDPR. In this work, however, only four high-level features are
presented: the right to access data, obtaining information about involved processors,
rectification and erasure of data, and consent review and withdraw.
Four works review TETs [63, 159, 167, 256]. The work by Murmann and Fischer-
Hübner [159] surveys the literature searching for tools achieving ex post transparency.
The authors explore aspects of usable transparency— derived from legals provisions
in the GDPR, and well accepted usability principles. The authors identify mean-
ingful categories of tools based on functionalities and implementation, for instance,
and propose a classification using those categories. Although this work is compre-
hensive in exploring the characteristics of usable TETs, it does not explicitly map
technical aspects of the tools with the GDPR provisions they help accomplishing.
Compliance with the GDPR, hence, is not in the scope of this study.
There are works, however, which compare andmap legal requirements and tech-
nical requirements, principles and designs. In particular, [67] reviews usability prin-
ciples of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) in a few selected TETs. To this aim,
the authors first gather requirements from workshops and by reviewing the pro-
posal of the GDPR (document available at the time), the previous European Data
Protection Directives, and a few other related documents, such as the opinions from
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Legal provisions for transparency and
accountability that have implications about HCI are considered in this work. These
requirements are then mapped to three HCI concepts, which in turn are discussed
in the context of the TETs. Even though the mappings and correlations presented
in this work are thoroughly discussed, the authors do not present a structured pro-
cedure followed when defining them. It is our interpretation that those correlations
were identified manually.
The German Standard Data Protection Model (SDM)1 also classifies GDPR’s pro-
vision in terms of data protection goals (e.g., availability, transparency, intervenabil-
ity), and comments on technical measures that help to guarantee transparency, such as,
documentation of procedures, logging of access and modifications. These measures
1https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/uploads/sdm/SDM-Methodology_V1.0.pdf
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relate to our requirements, but are more high-level. We believe our requirements
could be classified according to them, allowing us to select TETs that can accom-
plish transparency as described by the SDM. We leave this task to future works. We
will discuss here the similarities between our work and the SDM, and clarify where
they differ.
6.2 Transparency in the GDPR
Transparency is a property championed by the GDPR as one of the main principles
in personal data processing (see chapter 4). But how transparency is characterised by
the Regulation? The GDPR gives no clear characterisation of it. For that, one must
review the Articles of the Regulation that refer to the principle, even if indirectly.
We selected those Articles by following a systematic peer review approach in four
rounds: 1. Selection; 2. Filtering; 3. Revision; and 4. Validation of Articles. These
rounds were conducted with the help of two other researchers, and are depicted in
Figure 6.1.
The first round, Selection, was executed independently by two researchers, each
researcher selected a preliminary list of Articles relating to transparency according
to their understanding. Both researchers had previous experience with transparency
and TETs, so the expectation was that the combined knowledge covers the general
perception of transparency in different technical domains. The selection was con-
ducted separately so the understanding of one researcher would not bias the other,
and the selections would be as comprehensive as possible.
Following that, the second round, Filtering, consisted in combining the two pre-
liminary lists and revisiting every Article selected by, at least, one researcher. The
two researchers defended their interpretation of transparency, agreed on a common
understanding, and extracted categories of Articles that cover that understanding.
These categories comprise not only Articles about transparency but also other prop-
erties and artefacts that support the implementation of transparency. The categories
are the following:
1. Concerning data subjects (SUB) – Articles describing the knowledge that should
be made available to the data subjects concerning their data;
2. Concerning authorities (AUT) – Articles describing the knowledge that should
be made available to authorities (e.g., Data Protection Officers, or auditors)
concerning the processing of personal data;
3. Empowerment (EMP)2 – Articles mandating the provision of means for the data
subjects to react (e.g., rectification, and erasure);
4. Quality of transparency (QUA) – Articles which qualify transparency and de-
scribe how information should be presented to data subjects (e.g., concise, easy
to understand);
5. Certification (CER) – Articles which foresee certification as a means to demon-
strate that personal data is being processed according to the regulations;
6. Consent (CON) – Articles commenting on the need for the data subjects to con-
sent with usage and processing of data.
2Also know as intervenability [149].
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FIGURE 6.1: Methodology for selecting transparency related Articles
from the GDPR.
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We then filtered the Articles according to the categories. The resulting list consists
mostly of the intersection of the two preliminary lists, but it is complemented by a
few other Articles agreed among the researchers.
Third round, Revision, was also executed by two researchers, one of which was
not involved in the previous steps of the analysis to reduce selection bias. The re-
searchers independently reviewed the guidelines by the Working Party. Both re-
searchers selected the Articles that, according to their interpretation, are mentioned
in the guidelines as related to transparency. The resulting lists were then compared
and combined. In this round, the lists were very similar. We believe this happened
because the guidelines are more explicit about their interpretation of transparency.
Finally, the fourth round, Validation, was conducted as a sanity check for our
selection of Articles. We compared our list with the list resulting from the tasks
in the third round. The comparison intended to understand the relevancy of our
selection of Articles by calculating how many Articles mentioned in the guidelines
were covered by us (in first and second rounds). Our selection covers approximately
93% of the Articles in the guidelines. We consider our list sufficiently relevant.
We comment here only on the Articles mentioned in the guidelines that we opted
not to include in our study. Article 12.5 describes when the charge of a fee may (or
may not) be applied when information is provided to data subjects regarding per-
sonal data. Even though this Article is related to transparency, it does not describe
a technical feature of a TET or system. Article 20 describes the right to portability.
Articles 25.1 and 25.2 are both regarding the implementation of data protection by de-
sign and by default. This concept is instead related to the security property of privacy.
Hence those Articles were not selected in our list. However, we include Article 25.3,
which foresees the use of certification mechanisms to demonstrate compliance with
Article 25.1 and 25.2. We understand this Article defends the right of data subjects
to be aware of how their data is processed (in line with data protection principles),
and as such, is in line with our interpretation of transparency.
In addition, we also compare our list with the presented by the SDM regarding
the protection goals of transparency and intervenability (the ones we consider in our
work as well).
Our selection does not contradict the list presented by the SDM, it is simply more
detailed. The majority of Articles listed by the SDM are also considered in our se-
lection. With the exception of Articles 5.1.(d), 5.1.(f), and 20 — regarding accuracy
of data, security of personal data, and portability of data— which contain provi-
sions on the quality of the data provided by transparency, and should be verified
for compliance in every tool. Article 40, referring to the design of codes of conduct
for controllers and processors, and could hardly be accomplished through the use of
TETs. And Article 42, on certification, which are considered in section 6.4.
Our final list of selected transparency-related GDPR Articles (paragraphs and
sub-paragraphs) comprises 79 items. The list can be found in Table 6.1.
Art. Par. Sub-par. SUB AUT EMP QUA CER CON
5 1 a X2 X
6 1 a X
7
1 X
2 X
3 X X
9 2 a X
11 2 X
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12
1 X
3 X
4 X
7 X
13
1
a X
b X
c X
d X
e X
f X
2
a X
b X
c X
d X
e X
f X
3 X
14
1
a X
b X
c X
d X
e X
f X
2
a X
b X
c X
d X
e X
f X
g X
3
a X
b X
c X
4 X
15
1
a X
b X
c X
d X
e X
f X
g X
h X
2 X
3 X
16 X
17 X
18 X
19 X
21 1 X
2 X
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3 X
4 X
5 X
22 1 X2 c X X
25 3 X
26
1 X
2 X
3 X
30
1 X
2 X
3 X
4 X
32 3 X
33
1 X X
2 X X
3 X
4 X X
5 X
34 1 X2 X X
TABLE 6.1: Transparency-related GDPR Articles, paragraphs and
sub-paragraphs, categorised according to the 6 categories identified
in the second round of our methodology.
6.3 Correlating GDPR Articles and technical requirements
To correlate the Articles from the GDPR and the technical requirements for trans-
parency in medical systems, we developed a simplified parser based on natural lan-
guage processing techniques. Our process consists in the analysis of the text corpora
(6.3.1), extraction of corpus-based glossaries and parsing of the corpora (6.3.2), and
final adjustments (6.3.3). We did not conduct any statistical analysis, nor part-of-
speech tagging (techniques applied in more sophisticated natural language process-
ing algorithms). Instead, we iterated a few times realising small adjustments in our
glossaries, re-evaluating the results of the parsing and, whenever needed, manually
adding or removing a correlation.
Our approach is indeed only possible as our glossaries are context-based, lim-
ited to the terminology found in the GDPR and our requirements. We are aware
of existing efforts in interpreting and translating laws, regulations, and other legal
documents (e.g., [13, 162, 250]). We do mean to compete with them, but rather state
that our parser, in the specific problem herein addressed, has given sufficiently good
results.
6.3.1 Text corpora analysis
The first step was carried out manually. We first analysed the two text corpora: the
Articles and provisions in the GDPR, and a set of technical requirements for trans-
parency in the medical domain (see chapter 3). A text corpus is described as a “large
body of linguistic evidence typically composed of attested language use", but has
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GDPR terms Technical terms
[action (not)] taken on a request N/A
[identity] of the controller responsible for handling owned data
[identity] data protection officer who has the authority to investigate
purpose of processing terms [of use]
legal basis for processing policy; regulation
[conditions for] provision of data regulation; terms [of use]
TABLE 6.2: Glossary of equivalent terms regarding the information
to be provided to data subjects. Information between brackets are
contextual and do not constitute the key-term.
GDPR terms Technical terms
rectification N/A
erasure [of personal data] revoked consent
restriction [of processing] N/A
copy of the personal data mechanisms for accessing [personal data]
object [process of data] N/A
not to be subject [to a decision] N/A
exercise his or her rights N/A
withdraw his or her consent revoked consent
TABLE 6.3: Glossary of equivalent terms regarding the rights of data
subjects. Information between brackets are contextual and do not
constitute the key-term.
been used nowadays for a wide variety of text collections [151]. Our set of require-
ments is not a text corpus in its typical meaning, as they are not composed by stan-
dardised terms. In this sense, our requirements constitute a text corpus in its modern
interpretation: a text collection tailored to one specific domain. The GDPR, on the
other hand, represents better a classic text corpus, as it is stable, well-established and
composed by standard legal terminology.
We analysed the text corpora and familiarised with the differences between the
terminologies, as one corpus comprises technical terms and the other legalistic jar-
gon. The terms found in one corpus were interpreted and linked to terms in the
other corpus. As a result of this task, we highlighted potential connections between
requirements and GDPR Articles and established a preliminary list of correlations.
6.3.2 Extraction of corpus-based glossaries and Parsing
To ensure the consistency of our correlation procedure, we automated the compar-
isons by extracting possibly-equivalent terms and structuring them in glossaries.
Terms found in the GDPR were mapped to their equivalent technical terms, found
in the list of requirements. The knowledge base needed for realising this step came
from revisiting the preliminary list of correlations, fromwhere we extracted the key-
terms that seem to have triggered each correlation. We identify correlations accord-
ing to a few textual elements present in the GDPR Articles: the information to be
provided to the data subject; the rights the data subject must have; the techniques
described in the Article; and few selected keywords. We organised each of these in
hash tables that represent, in way, simplified corpus-based glossaries (see Table 6.2,
6.3, 6.4, and 6.5).
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GDPR terms Technical terms
[do not] permit identification data privacy; to protect [data]; [data] pro-
tection; [data is] protected; separation [of
data]
appropriate security to protect
withdraw revoke
not in a position to identify N/A
automated decision-making N/A
obtaining [personal data] gather; infer; aggregate
copy of personal data mechanism for accessing [personal data]
automated means N/A
only personal data which are nec-
essary
data minimisation
record of [processing of data] accountability; audit
unauthorised without authorisation
unlawful vulnerability; breach
accidental loss data loss; breach
accidental destruction N/A
accidental damage N/A
profiling N/A
data minimisation N/A
existence of the right ownership
shall not apply N/A
TABLE 6.4: Glossary of equivalent terms regarding the techniques
described in the GDPR. Information between brackets are contextual
and do not constitute the key-term.
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GDPR terms Technical terms
security security
consent consent
request for consent N/A
written declaration terms [of use]
purposes of the processing terms [of use]
concise [information] N/A
intelligible [information] N/A
[information] easily accessible N/A
[information] using clear [lan-
guage]
N/A
[information using] plain lan-
guage
N/A
icons N/A
third party third party; third parties; sub-providers;
whom it purchases services
recipients who has access; sub-providers; third party;
whom it purchases services
international other countries; extraterritorial; country
adequacy decision by the com-
mission
comply with legal requirements; issues
with respect to laws and regulations; leg-
islative regimes
period N/A
categories of personal data detailed information [on the data collected]
source [from where of personal
data originate]
[information on] data collected about [the
data subject]
not collected from the data sub-
ject
[information on] data collected about [the
data subject]
joint controllers different parties
arrangement agreement
responsibilities responsibilities
respective roles responsibilities
breach breach
without undue further delay timely
document comprising facts [that
enables to verify compliance]
evidence
able to demonstrate evidence
shall not apply N/A
TABLE 6.5: Glossary of equivalent terms regarding the keywords
found in the GDPR. Information between brackets are contextual and
do not constitute the key-term.
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Some key-terms were intentionally marked as not applicable as they brought al-
most no contribution to the final correlation list. For example, the term “trans-
parency" found in Article 5.1(a) “Personal data shall be processed lawfully, fairly
and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject (’lawfulness, fairness and
transparency’)". This Article is comprehensive and should relate to every single re-
quirement from our list, as it mandates data to be processed transparently. To ensure
our list had only themostmeaningful correlations, we decided to explicitlymark this
term as not applicable (N/A). The same applies to the term “shall not apply", which
is present in Articles (or paragraphs and sub-paragraphs) describing an exception to
another Article. In other words, it presents the circumstances in which our require-
ments do not need to be implemented. Hence, any correlation found with an Article
of this sort is likely to be a false-positive. To avoid this, we marked the term as not
applicable. It is important to note that terms marked like this are not the same as
terms absent from our glossaries. While the first will force a mismatch between a
GDPR Article with that term and any possible requirement in our list, the second
will just be disregarded when computing the correlations.
The computation of the correlations is based on an automatic parser. Initially,
it parses each GDPR Article to identify the all the key-terms they contain. Then the
requirements are parsed, searching for the ones which present at least one equivalent
term for each key-term found. Our criteria for a match between an Article and a
requirement is that all key-terms from the first are represented in the second. The
correlation procedure is abstracted in Algorithm 4.
The correlation computation is realised in steps (as shown in Algorithm 5): we
run the same parsing algorithm for each glossary, and later we merge the results of
each comparison in one final list. By doing so, we maintained the correlating crite-
rion decoupled, which simplified the process of re-evaluation of the terms and their
possibly-equivalents. It also helped in balancing the asymmetry between GDPR Ar-
ticles and our technical requirements, as the Articles are generally more verbose and
encompass too many key-terms. Separating the terms into four glossaries ensured
our criterion is not too restrictive, and that Articles can be correlated by one or sev-
eral categories of textual elements.
6.3.3 Final adjustments
After computing the correlations based on the glossaries of terms, we reviewed the
resulting list and compared with our preliminary list of correlations. Each correla-
tion was analysed, but we focused on the discrepancies between the lists. For those,
we semantically interpreted the Article and requirement marked as correlating to
understand the context in which the key-terms appeared, and whether or not they
had the similar meaning. We realised this procedure in a peer review manner. The
correlations were then adjusted accordingly. We highlight here a few of themanually
adjusted correlations.
According to our initial list, requirement 111.2 on information about how data
are stored and who has access to them, should correlate with Article 15.1(c), which
describes the rights of the data subject in obtaining from the controller the recipients
of personal data. The requirement and the Article have a clear correlation. How-
ever, it was being disregarded by our parser as the Article contains the key-term
“third countries" which does not appear in the requirement. As this key-term is
responsible for several other well-fitted correlations, we opted for adjusting this ex-
ception manually. Similarly, the correlations with requirement 111.18, on describing
the ownership of the data, had to be adjusted. We understand that describing the
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Algorithm 4 Correlate(articlesGDPR[n], requirements[m], glossary{}[])
Input: array articlesGDPR with n entries, array of requirements with m entries,
hash table of lists representing the glossary of equivalent terms
keys = glossary.getKeys()
for each i 2 {1, . . . , n} do . For each GDPR Article
for each key in keys do
if articlesGDPR[i].containsString(key) then
keyTerms[i].add(key)
end if
end for
for each j 2 {1, . . . ,m} do . For each requirement
matchFound = FALSE
for each term in keyTerms[i] do
equivalentTerms[] = glossary{term}
for each value in equivalentTerms do
if requirements[j].containsString(value) then
matchFound = TRUE
break
end if
matchFound = FALSE
end for
if !matchFound then
break
end if
end for
if matchFound then
correlatedArticles[i].add(requirements[j])
end if
end for
end for
Output: correlatedArticles
Algorithm 5 Init()
Let: articlesGDPR[n] be the list of n selected GDPR Articles, requirements[m] be
the list of m technical requirements, in f ormation{}[] be a glossary of information
that should be provided to the data subject, rights{}[] be a glossary of the rights
the data subject has, technique{}[] be a glossary of techniques mentioned in an
Article, keywords{}[] be a glossary of keywords found in the Articles;
resultI[] = Correlate(articlesGDPR[], requirements[], in f ormation{}[])
resultR[] = Correlate(articlesGDPR[], requirements[], rights{}[])
resultT[] = Correlate(articlesGDPR[], requirements[], technique{}[])
resultK[] = Correlate(articlesGDPR[], requirements[], keywords{}[])
for each i 2 {1, . . . , n} do
f inalCorrelation[i] = resultI[i] [ resultR[i] [ resultT[i] [ resultK[i]
end for
Output: f inalCorrelation
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ownership means to clarify what means to be the owner of a piece of data. In other
words, to inform and describe the rights the data subjects have regarding the control
of their data. In this sense, requirement 111.18 also relates to Articles 13.2.(c), 14.2.(c)
and 21.4. Our parser captured a few relevant correlations for this requirement, but
not all of them. We manually added those remaining correlations.
We also adjusted Articles and requirements that were marked as correlating by
key-terms but were semantically different. For example, requirement 111.3, which
requires the system to inform the users about the purchase of services, andArticle 19,
which requires the controller to communicate the erasure or rectification of personal
data to its recipients. The same goes for requirement 111.19, regarding the disclosure
of policies, regulations and terms, and Article 16, regarding the right to rectification
of data. In both cases, the requirements andArticles were erroneously correlated and
manually removed from the final list. Finally, we did the same for requirement 221.7,
which mandates the provision of evidence that revoked consent has been executed.
It had been erroneously correlated with Articles 7.1, 13.2.(c) and 14.2.(d) caused by
the key-terms “consent" and “withdraw", present in those Articles.
Some other correlations were also considered for adjustments, as they were not
present in our preliminary list, but were left untouched after a closer semantic anal-
ysis. For example, requirement 111.7, about describing procedures and mechanisms
planned in cases of security breaches, correlating to Articles 33.3 and 33.5, and re-
quirement 111.15 about informing onwho has the authority to investigate any policy
compliance, which is also correlated with 33.3. These Articles describe the informa-
tion to be provided to data subjects in case of a data breach. Initially, the correlation
was not considered as the requirements are ex ante (information to help the users
understand what will happen to their data), and the Articles are, in a sense, ex post,
as the data breach already happened. However, if the information described in the
requirement is made available beforehand, in the event of a data breach, it will fa-
cilitate compliance with Article 33 from the GDPR. For this reason, we keep these
correlations.
Similarly, requirements 221.2,5,8 are correlatedwith Article 5.2 of the GDPR (con-
troller shall be accountable and responsible for demonstrating compliance with the
lawfulness, fairness and transparency principles). The requirements, at first glance,
seem unrelated to the Article, and to each other. However, the three requirements
demand the users be presented with evidence of security breaches, of recovery from
them, and of permission history. As evidence, by definition, is a piece of information
or data that is used to prove or disprove something, we understand they contribute
to demonstrate compliance. Even though these correlations were not identified in our
initial list, we decided to keep them.
GDPR Requirements GDPR Requirements
5.1.(a) 14.3.(c)
5.2 111.16, 111.20, 221.1, 221.2,
221.3, 221.4, 221.5, 221.7,
221.8
14.4
6.1.(a) 221.7 15.1.(a) 111.19
7.1 15.1.(b) 221.6
7.2 15.1.(c) 111.2, 111.4
7.3 221.7 15.1.(d)
9.2.(a) 15.1.(e) 111.18
11.2 15.1.(f)
12.1 15.1.(g) 221.6
88 Chapter 6. Accomplishing Transparency in Medical Systems
12.3 15.1.(h)
12.4 15.2 111.4, 111.11, 221.3
12.7 15.3 112.1
13.1.(a) 111.1 16
13.1.(b) 111.15 17 221.7
13.1.(c) 111.19 18
13.1.(d) 111.3, 111.4, 111.14 19 111.2, 111.4,
13.1.(e) 111.2, 111.3, 111.4 21.1
13.1.(f) 111.4, 111.11, 221.3 21.2
13.2.(a) 21.3
13.2.(b) 111.18 21.4 111.18
13.2.(c) 111.18 21.5
13.2.(d) 22.1
13.2.(e) 22.2.(c)
13.2.(f) 25.3
13.3 26.1 111.14
14.1.(a) 111.1 26.2 111.14
14.1.(b) 111.15 26.3 111.14
14.1.(c) 111.19 30.1 221.5, 222.1, 232.1
14.1.(d) 221.6 30.2 221.5, 222.1, 232.1
14.1.(e) 111.2, 111.3, 111.4 30.3
14.1.(f) 111.4, 11.11, 221.3 30.4
14.2.(a) 32.3
14.2.(b) 111.3, 111.4, 111.14 33.1 111.7, 211.1, 211.4, 221.8
14.2.(c) 111.18 33.2 111.7, 211.1, 211.4, 221.8
14.2.(d) 111.18 33.3 111.7, 111.15, 211.1, 211.4,
221.8
14.2.(e) 33.4 211.4
14.2.(f) 221.6 33.5 111.7, 211.1, 211.4, 221.8
14.2.(g) 34.1 111.7, 211.1, 211.4, 221.8
14.3.(a) 211.5 34.2
14.3.(b)
TABLE 6.6: Final list of correlated GDPR Articles and technical re-
quirements. 72% of the requirements are correlated (26 out of 36).
6.4 Transparency Enhancing Tools
We conducted a review of the literature looking for any recent scientific work or
project indexed by the keywords “transparency enhancing tools". We restricted
our search to works published from 2014 onward, the year the GDPR started to
be strongly supported by the European Parliament3. By adding this time restric-
tion, we include in our study only tools potentially designed in line with the GDPR
principles. We then broaden our study with the works related to our initial pool of
selected works. A few works surveying TETs helped us defining a list of tools for
our study (i.e., [21, 63, 159, 167, 210, 256]). To help selecting the relevant tools we
classified them according to the following categories proposed in [256]:
3http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-186_de.htm
6.4. Transparency Enhancing Tools 89
• Application time – describes the point of time at which the tool provides trans-
parency to the data subjects;
• Execution environment –where the tool is operated;
• Data type – the types of data the tool provides insights about;
– Volunteered – data a user actively and knowingly discloses;
– Observed – data a user passively discloses (results from interactions with
the system);
– Incidental – data about a user that is disclosed by others;
– Derived – data inferred about the user;
– Policy – insights on the service’s privacy policy;
• Target – the audience the tool is targeted for;
• Delivery mode – how the tool notifies the data subjects about relevant infor-
mation on their data;
• Authentication level – the level of authentication of users the tool requires;
• Interactivity level – the level of control the data subjects can exercise over their
data (from a technology perspective);
– Read-only – tool only provides insights on the users data;
– Interactive – allows for restriction/modification of Collection and Usage
practices, orModification and Deletion of data;
• Scope – the range of services/organizations the tool considers when providing
transparency;
• Assurance level – the extent to which data subjects can determine the correct-
ness and completeness of the information provided by the tool;
– Not trusted – cannot be verified;
– Semi trusted – cannot be guaranteed by technical means, but can be man-
ually verified;
– Trusted – guaranteed by technical means;
• Transparency dimension – information extent with regard to different stages
of data utilisation cycle;
– Collection – by whom data is collected;
– Analysis – information on inference antecedents;
– Usage – purposes for usage of data;
– Second usage – how third-parties use personal data, and conditions for
data transfer;
• Attacker – the source of possible threats;
• Information source – the source of the information provided by the tool.
As a result of this exercise, we found 27 tools that are potentially linked to the
transparency principle. In what follows, we present them classified by their TETs
category, proposed in [256]. This categorisation, TETCat, takes into account the As-
surance level,Application time and Interactivity level of the tools. The full categorisation
is shown in Table 6.7.
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6.4.1 Assertion tools
Tools are classified as the assertion type whenever the correctness and completeness
of the information they provide cannot be verified (either technically or manually).
These tools can only provide users with information on the data controller’s alleged
processing practices. The TETCat does not further distinguish between assertion
tools as their trustworthiness remains unaffected even under different manifestation
of other parameters. As a consequence, this category covers tools with diverse goals.
Examples of assertion tools are third-party tracking blockers. These tools are
commonly implemented as web-browser plug-ins which help the users becoming
aware of trackers gathering information about themwhile browsing the web, for the
purpose of, e.g., advertising or analytic. These tools also allow the users to inter-
act and block such trackers. Mozilla Lightbeam4 (ML), Disconnect me5 (DM), and
Privacy Badger6 (PB) are examples of tracking blocker tools.
Those tools offer very similar features to the users, with the exception of Privacy
Badger (PB). When this tool detects a new third-party script is tracking the user in
three different websites, it automatically blocks them, without the need for the users
to configure their preferences.
Tools that educate users on matters related to privacy protection are also con-
sidered assertion tools. One example of such a tool is the Privacy Risk Analysis
(PRA) [48], which allows users to express their preferences, and visualise the impact
on privacy risks through a user-friendly interface. Another example is Me and My
Shadow7 (MMS) which informs users about what happens to their data, how trace-
able they are on the internet and gives tips about existing privacy tools and digital
shadow.
Privacy Score8 (PS) can also be classified as an assertion tool. It tests websites
and ranks them according to their security and privacy features (tracking, encryp-
tion of traffic and messages, protection against attacks). For each feature tested it
also presents brief explanations which serve as material to educate users on privacy
protection subjects.
Finally, Access My Info9 (AMI) also falls under the assertion category. AMI is
a web application that helps users to create legal requests for copies of their data
from service providers based on the Canadian privacy legislation (PIPEDA). This
tool differs from the previous ones as it does not per se provide information on the
service’s practices, nor educates the users on privacy matters. However, we consider
it under the same category as it cannot ensure the service providers will properly
process the requests. The tool provides a wizard which guides users in requesting
data from dating, fitness, and telecommunications services. Despite being a web
application, the wizard is implemented as a script running on the user’s browser.
AMI collects no information about the users unless explicitly authorised by them.
6.4.2 Awareness tools
These are the first type of tools providing information verifiable for completeness
and correctness. The TETCat suggests different terminology for tools which provide
technical means to verify its information (i.e., Trusted), and tools which information
4https://www.mozilla.org/lightbeam
5https://disconnect.me/
6https://www.eff.org/privacybadger
7https://myshadow.org/
8https://privacyscore.org/
9https://openeffect.ca/access-my-info/
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can be verified manually by a user or an auditor (i.e., Semi Trusted). However, for
the TETCat, they do not distinguish between the two assurance levels. Similarly, we
refrain from evaluating this aspect of the tools. We only distinguish them between
Not trusted and (Semi) Trusted, being the last the assurance level given to tools that
provide somewhat trustworthy information.
Awareness tools provide Ex ante transparency, and interactivity level ofRead only.
Tools in this category help the user becoming aware of the privacy policy of the
service provider but do not provide the users with controls over the processing of
data. Examples of such tools are machine readable or interpreted policy languages
and certification seals and marks.
Platform for Privacy Preferences Project10 (P3P) is an example ofmachine-readable
language tool. It proposes a language for describing a website’s privacy policy in
a standard format which can be retrieved and interpreted automatically by web-
browsers. It enables the users to be informed of the website intentions towards the
use and collection of their data in a consistent way, without requiring them to read
the entire privacy policy of each website they visit. Even though works on P3P are
currently suspended, we include it in our study as it has strong support from the
academic community.
On a different approach, the Usable Privacy Project11 [199] proposes a tool that
automatically annotates privacy policies. The tool eases the reading of policies by in-
terpreting it and highlighting parts of the text according to a fine-grained annotation
scheme.
Other examples of awareness tools are the certification seals. European Privacy
Seal (EuroPriSe), for example, provides a transparent privacy compliance certifica-
tion of IT products and IT-based services with European data protection regulations
[61]. Another example is the TrustArc (TArc), a tool which provides a trust mark on
privacy practices and data governance. It follows certification standards based upon
recognised laws and regulatory standards, such as OECD Privacy Guidelines, and
GDPR [236].
6.4.3 Declaration tools
These tools are very similar to awareness tools, but they offer some level of interac-
tivity. In our pool only one tool falls under this category: PrimeLife Policy Language
(PPL) [68]. With this tool, users can interact and negotiate policies.
PPL is comparable to the awareness tool P3P as it proposes a machine-readable
language for privacy policies. However, PPL further supports the description of
privacy preferences from the users. So the service provider’s declared intentions can
be matched and checked for compliance with the user’s preferences. PPL expresses
policy in terms of authorisations, e.g., for what purposes the service provider will
use the data, and obligations it is willing to fulfil for collected data items (e.g., to
delete the data after a certain period, or to log all accesses to the data).
6.4.4 Audit tools
Audit TETs present users with Ex post or Real time transparency. Tools in this cate-
gory include those that allow for access and verifiability of data, but do not provide
means for the users to interact and intervene with the data processing (i.e., Read only
tools).
10https://www.w3.org/P3P/
11https://explore.usableprivacy.org/
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Examples of tools easing access to personal data are: A4Cloud Data Track12 (DT)
[69], Personal Data Table (PDT) [210], Digi.me13, and the Blue Button14.
Data Track is a user side ex post transparency tool that displays what personal
data the service provider has stored, which was received from the user explicitly,
implicitly, or derived. The tool is a proof-of-concept that parses location history
from Google take-out. Personal Data Table is a similar tool, however in an earlier
stage of maturity. PDT is a transparency implementation pattern. It describes a
standardised table which contains information on personal data the service provider
handles, such as, the data itself, the reasons for collection, who has access to it, and
so on.
Digi.me is an application that helps to retrieve a copy of personal data from sev-
eral different services (e.g., social media, finance, and health). The application does
not store any personal data, it copies the data into the storage of the user’s prefer-
ence. By using this tool the user can visualise, search, and choose to share these data
with other apps. Even though Digi.me allows the users to share, and consequently
to control the collection and usage of personal data, it is not considered interactive.
That is because it does not provide means for the users to control processing from
the source where the data were retrieved.
Finally, the Blue Button is an initiative to standardise the right to access personal
medical data in the USA. Blue Button-enabled portals display a logo, which symbol-
ises that users are allowed to visualise and download their data.
On the verifiability side, there are discussions regarding transparency, but tools
of this type are still in the idealisation phase. Privacy Evidence (PEv) [194], for exam-
ple, proposes the generation of pieces of evidence based on structured policies (P3P
and NAPS), secure logs (with hash chain scheme to guarantee confidentiality and
integrity, for instance), and logs view that allow to scan through the logs and match
with the policy. Transparent Accountable Data Mining (TAMI) [247] similarly pro-
poses a posteriori privacy compliance checks on data mining. It is intended to check
for data usage that is logically allowed to happen, but that legally should not be used
in support to a given conclusion (inference). The proposed architecture is composed
of a policy-aware logs module, a policy language framework, and a policy reasoning
tool. Both tools are thoroughly discussed, but we found no implementation of them.
Finally, Private Verification of Access (PVA) (see chapter 5) also proposes a scheme
for a posteriori access control compliance checks, but that operates under a data min-
imisation principle. The scheme suggests the use of a third-party tool which can
operate on encrypted data access logs to check for matches (or mismatches) with a
given access policy. The tool allows for a private independent audit of a system.
6.4.5 Intervention tools
Tools in this category allow users to verify properties about the processing of their
data. They differ from audit tools as they also provide means for them to interact
and control the terms of data collection and usage.
Privacy Through Transparency (PTT) [206], for example, proposes the use of a
Provenance Tracker Network (PTN) which stores the logs for any transaction re-
alised in a personal data flagged as sensitive, and allows for a posteriori audits. The
logs are distributed in a network of trusted peers, preventing a single point of fail-
ure. Every sensitive data has a usage restriction associated with it, and every use of
12https://github.com/pylls/datatrack
13https://digi.me/
14https://www.healthit.gov/topic/health-it-initiatives/blue-button
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data needs to be justified by a usage intention. This tool allows data owners to anal-
yse logs and search for mismatches between the usage restrictions and intentions.
They are allowed to request for explanations in case mismatches are found. The
model assumes a non-prohibitive access control mechanism and supports Break-
the-Glass (BTG) policies.
Privacy eSuite15 (PeS) is a web-service consent engine that centralises consent
and access rules with support to purpose of use. This tool also supports the inte-
gration with other services, such as the myConsentMinder, a web application that
allows patients to manage their privacy preferences, and the Universal Audit Repos-
itory, that logs all accesses and attempts, notifies when a BTG happens, and simpli-
fies audits through searches and report capabilities.
6.4.6 Remediation tools
These are the most comprehensive tools according to the TETCat. They comprise
functionality to exercise control over data collection and usage, and also to modify
and delete personal data stored by a data controller. Tools in this category are usually
found in the format of privacy dashboards or data vault/marketplace applications.
PrivacyInsight (PI) [21] and GDPR Privacy Dashboard16 (GPD) [185] are both
examples of privacy dashboards within this category of TETs. PrivacyInsight is a
dashboard whose main feature is to visualise (as a provenance graph) the flow of
personal data into, through and out of an organisation. PrivacyInsight also provides
full access to all personal data and allows users to exercise their rights over that
data (e.g., erasure, and rectification). The GDPR Privacy Dashboard is intended to
help users visualising, and requesting rectification or erasure of the data stored by a
service provider. Both tools are designed to be easily adopted by any organisation.
Google Dashboard17 (GD), and Microsoft Dashboard18 (MD) are also examples
of such tools, however they serve only their own organisation. Both tools allow the
users to manage privacy settings, and to see, download, and manage personal data
stored in their account.
Finally, the openPDS (oPDS) [156], and Meeco19 (Mee) are examples of data
vault/marketplace applications. The openPDS tool is a meta-data storage. Com-
bined with SafeAnswers it allows for the privacy of the users by computing answers
on the client side, and only sending third-party applications anonymous results. The
results can also be aggregated with the ones from other users. Meeco, on the other
hand, is a personal data marketplace which allows users to add, organise, edit, and
progressively share their information. The Meeco client stores the terms the user
agreed to, and records events of interaction with personal data in an event chain.
15http://hipaat.com/privacy-esuite/
16http://philip-raschke.github.io/GDPR-privacy-dashboard
17https://myaccount.google.com/dashboard
18https://account.microsoft.com/account/privacy
19https://www.meeco.me/
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TABLE 6.7: Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs) classified according to their characteristics. (T)TP = (Trusted) Third Party; C =
Collection; U = Usage; M = Modification; D = Deletion; A = Analysis; 2ndU = Second Usage.
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6.5 General picture
To have a general picture of transparency’s development, we compared the list of se-
lected TETs with our technical requirements. Doing so enabled us to understand the
extent in which TETs can realise transparency in medical systems, and also to have,
by transitivity, a list of TETs which can help achieve compliance with the provisions
of the GDPR.
The TETs categorisation facilitated the comparison between the tools and the list
of requirements. Mainly, we pre-selected the tools and requirements by their ap-
plication time (i.e., ex ante, ex post/real time) and matched them manually according
to the other categories, and descriptions whenever needed. The result of this effort
is shown in Table 6.8. Exceptions were made only in two specific cases: regarding
requirement 112.1, and when comparing certification seals tools.
The first is concerning requirement 112.1 on the provision of mechanisms for
accessing personal data. In the context of medical systems, this requirement is con-
sidered ex ante as the data about the patients are typically generated by other users
in the system, rather than being provided by the patients themselves. As a conse-
quence, allowing these patients to access their data can be interpreted as a manda-
tory pre-condition for them to anticipate what will happen to their data. However,
in the context of TETs, tools which allow for the access of personal data are consid-
ered ex post. In this specific case, we understand there is a close correlation between
the requirement 112.1 and those tools, even if their application times do not match.
The second exception is regarding certification seals. We consider them ex ante,
but admit a correlation between them and ex post requirements. Certification seals
are tools which can serve as convincing evidence that a system complies with a given
criterion. If the criteria regard the processing of data, these seals can help a data
subject anticipating what will happen to their data, and whether it is going to be
processed in a secure manner. However, from the perspective of the system, when
it is evaluated for the certification, the processing of data is already happening. For
this reason, we accept the correlation between ex ante certification tools and a few
relevant ex post requirements.
After matching the TETs with our technical requirements, we managed to deter-
mine the tools which can help achieve compliance with the GDPR provisions. We
did so by transitivity, for each tool matched to a given requirement, we set that this
tool is also closely linked to the GDPR Articles that given requirement matches (see
Table 6.6). This exercise highlighted, for example, the transparency aspects which
are not yet covered by TETs. In Table 6.8 we summarised the results of this compari-
son, a full report of themmay be found in Appendix C, where we expand the GDPR
Articles into the paragraphs and sub-paragraphs relevant to this work. In what fol-
lows, we comment on our findings concerning the technical and legal aspects of
transparency.
6.5.1 Technical aspects
Three requirements regarding terms and conditions seem not to be addressed by any
TET: 111.1 on information regarding the physical location where data is stored; 111.4
on the existence of third-party services and sub-providers; and 111.14 on clarifica-
tions of responsibility in case of the existence of third-party services. We believe this
information could be provided together with the terms and conditions of service.
Even though the tool provided by the Usable Privacy Project (UP) aims at facilitat-
ing the reading of information provided in the terms and conditions, we did not
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TET Requirements GDPR Articles
Mozilla Lightbeam 211.5, 221.6 14, 15
P3P 111.2, 111.3, 111.16, 111.18,
111.19
5, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21
PrimeLife Policy
Language
111.2, 111.3, 111.16, 111.18,
111.19
5, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21
Data Track 112.1, 221.5, 221.6, 221.7 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17, 30
Privacy Insight 112.1, 221.4, 221.5, 221.6,
221.7
5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17, 30
Privacy Risk Analy-
sis
111.9, 111.13
GDPR Privacy Dash-
board
112.1, 211.5, 221.4, 221.6,
221.7
5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17
Personal Data Table 112.1, 211.2, 211.3, 211.5,
221.4, 221.6, 221.7
5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17
Disconnect me 211.5, 221.6 14, 15
Me and My Shadow 111.8, 111.13, 111.16, 111.19 5, 13, 14, 15
EuroPriSe 111.16, 221.1, 221.3, 221.4 5, 13, 14, 15
Privacy Score 111.6, 111.12, 111.13
Google Dashboard 112.1, 211.5, 221.6, 221.7 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17
Privacy Evidence 221.1, 221.4, 221.5, 222.1,
232.1
5, 30
TAMI Project 211.2, 211.3, 211.5, 221.1,
221.4, 222.1, 232.1
5, 14, 30
Privacy Through
Transparency
211.2, 211.3, 221.1, 221.4,
221.5, 222.1, 232.1
5, 30
Private Verif. of Ac-
cess
211.2, 211.3, 221.1, 221.4,
222.1, 232.1
5, 30
Privacy Badger 211.5, 221.6 14, 15
Access My Info 112.1, 221.6 14, 15
TrustArc 111.16, 221.1, 221.3, 221.4 5, 13, 14, 15
openPDS 211.5, 221.6, 221.7 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17
Digi.me 221.6, 221.7 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17
Microsoft Dash-
board
112.1, 211.5, 221.6, 221.7 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17
Privacy eSuite 221.1, 221.5, 221.7, 222.1,
232.1
5, 6, 7, 9*, 17, 30
Meeco 221.6, 221.7 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17
Blue Button 112.1, 221.6 14, 15
Usable Privacy 111.5, 111.10, 111.11, 111.15,
111.17, 111.19
13, 14, 15, 33
TABLE 6.8: Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs), the technical re-
quirements and GDPR Articles they help realising (* added manu-
ally). Articles not addressed by TETs: 11, 12, 16, 18, 22, 25, 26, 32,
34.
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identify tags for the requirements above. For this reason, we do not consider these
requirements as addressed.
There are other relevant developments on the reading of terms and conditions,
and policies, such as the CLAUDETTE project20, which makes use of artificial in-
telligence to automatically evaluate the clauses of policy for their clarity and com-
pleteness in the light of the GDPR provisions. Another relevant functionality in this
regard is the Lost in Small Print21 from Me and My Shadow (MMS), which reveals
and highlights the most relevant information in the policy of a few selected popular
services. We decided not to include those tools in our study as the first only evalu-
ates the quality of the policy, without helping data subjects in the understanding of
its contents, and the second for only providing a few selected examples of policies.
Nevertheless, it is possible to see the matter is already subject of attention. We expect
to see a different scenario concerning tools for terms and conditions in the future.
We also observed a lack of tools covering technical aspects of data processing.
For example, requirements 111.5 about informing how the system ensures data is not
accessed without authorisation, and requirement 111.20 on evidence of separating
personal data from metadata, are not addressed by any of the tools we studied. The
reason for this is not clear, as other requirements about the use of specific security
mechanisms (111.12), and how to protect data (111.13) also cover technical aspects
and seem to be subject of attention of TETs. We speculate this lack of attention may
be due to the target audience, which in general has no technical education andwould
not value the provision of such information. Another possible explanation is that
this sort of information is provided together with others, and we missed to identify
them in our selected tools.
Finally, another set of requirements which seem to have less attention is regard-
ing security breaches and attacks. They constitute the majority of requirements not
addressed by any TET: 111.7, 211.1, 211.4, 221.2, and 221.8. As security breaches are
unforeseen events, it does not come as a surprise that there are no tools for aiding
the understanding of issues related to them. Nonetheless, it is important to notice
that the GDPR reserves two Articles to provisions on personal data breaches (Art. 33
and 34), one of which is dedicated to describing how to communicate such matters
to the affected data subjects. Being the health-care industry among the ones with
most reported breaches, and being medical data in the top three most compromised
variety of data (for more details, see results of the data breach investigation [239]),
we consider this to be an area in need of further development.
6.5.2 Legal aspects
Only a few Articles from the GDPR do not seem to be covered by any of our selected
transparency tools. We consider an Article as not covered when none of its para-
graphs or sub-paragraphs is correlated to at least one TET. Examples of this are the
Articles related to certification (articles marked as CER in Table 6.1). While Article
25 regards data protection by design and by default, Article 32 has provisions on
security of processing, but both mention that compliance with such Articles may be
demonstrated through the use of approved certification mechanisms referred to in
Article 42.
Despite having included two certification seals in the list of TETs we studied
(i.e., EuroPriSe, and TrustArc), we cannot confirm they are approved certification
mechanisms. According to EuroPriSe, their criteria catalogue has not been approved
20https://claudette.eui.eu/
21https://myshadow.org/lost-in-small-print
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pursuant to Article 42(5) GDPR, and they have not been accredited as a certifica-
tion body pursuant to Article 43 GDPR yet22. Regarding TrustArc, we did not find
enough information about this matter.
A few transparency quality and empowerment related Articles (QUA and EMP
in Table 6.1) are also not addressed by our selected tools. Article 12, for exam-
ple, qualifies the communications with the data subject and states that it should be
concise, easily accessible, using clear and plain language, and by electronic means
whenever appropriate. In our understanding, this Article does not correlate to any
specific tool because it is transverse to all of them. This Article has provisions re-
garding the quality of communications; hence, all tools communicating information
to data subjects should be affected by it. In chapter 4 we discuss metrics for trans-
parency which, in line with this reasoning, consider the information provided to fi-
nal users “being concise", or “being easily accessible" as indicators that transparency
is properly implemented.
Article 12 also has provisions regarding the data subject’s rights, as do Articles
16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 26. While Articles 17, 19 and 21 do relate to some tools as
transparency and empowerment are closely linked, empowerment related Articles
are either partially addressed by transparency tools, or not addressed at all. Meis
and Heisel [149] present relevant developments in this topic. The authors discuss
the privacy goal of empowerment (referred to by the authors as intervenability) and
its relationship to transparency. For instance, Article 12 relates to their requirement
T4 and T5, andArticle 17 relates to requirement I10. The analysis of the requirements
proposed in [149] and their relationship with TETs falls out of this work’s scope. De-
spite that, at least concerning Articles describing the rights the data subject towards
the processing of personal data (e.g., Art. 22, and 26), we believe policy, terms and
conditions tools could also address them, but we found no tool addressing those
subjects.
It is important to notice that a few Articles which appear not to be covered by
any TET, are not considered in this analysis because they do not match by key-terms
with any of our requirements. We investigate two of them manually: Articles 11,
and 9. Article 11 has provisions on processing which does not require identification.
We consider this Article in our study as its paragraph 2 states that the controller
shall inform the data subjects when it is not in a position to identify them (category
SUB in Table 6.1). It also further states that in such a case, Articles 15 to 20 (on the
exercise of data subject’s rights) shall not apply. In this sense, Article 11 describes a
case when empowerment tools (related to Articles 15 to 20) are not required. It does
not make sense to discuss the relationship of this Article and TETs in our list.
Article 9, on the other hand, has provisions on data subject’s consent for data
processing of special categories of personal data, including data concerning health.
Privacy eSuite tool (PeS) is a web-service consent engine specifically tailored to col-
lect and centralise consent for the processing of health data. This tool is connected
with Article 9, and in the interest of completeness, we manually added this corre-
lation in Table 6.8. However, PeS is a proprietary tool designed in line with the
Canadian regulations. We found no means to determine to which extent this tool
can help achieving the provisions in the GDPR.
Being consent one of the basis for lawful processing of personal data described in
the GDPR, the number of tools addressing this subject seems suspiciously low. This
fact does not imply that medical systems and other services are currently operating
22See https://www.european-privacy-seal.eu/EPS-en/Criteria.
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illegally. We are aware that collecting consent for processing data is a practice. How-
ever, we are interested in tools designed that facilitate the task of collecting consent
and help users to be truly informed and aware of the consequences of consent they
are giving.
We investigated this more closely and searched for tools aiming at informed con-
sent. Among our findings there are mostly tools and frameworks aiding the collec-
tion of informed consent for digital advertising23. We also found mentions to the
EnCoRe (Ensuring Consent and Revocation) project, which presents insights on the
role of informed consent in online interactions [248]. The project appears to have
finalised, and we found no tool proposed to address the collection of informed con-
sent.
One could claim that informed consent can be collected when the user agrees
with the terms and conditions, or privacy policies, for which there are tools pro-
posed (e.g., P3P, PPL, and UP). While that may be one possible solution, special at-
tention is required that the request for consent is distinguishable from other matters
(as per GDPR Article 7). It is also important to note that consent to the processing of
personal data shall be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous24. In such
case, implicitly collecting consent for processing data is arguably against the provi-
sions in the GDPR, a viewpoint also defended in [248]. In that work, the authors
discuss the extent to which terms and policies are even read and understood, and
that, in this sense, consent is unlikely to be truly informed and freely given.
23See Conversant, IAB Europe, and ShareThis.
24GDPR Article 4 (11).
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Concluding remarks
Transparency is a new property that is becoming crucial as a promoter of the quality
of service and as a guarantee of respect for users’ rights. This interpretation is the
essence of the principle proposed in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
which upholds that people must have the right to know whether devices and online
services entrusted with their personal data manage it securely and privately. Pro-
viding such information to end users is of paramount importance: what a device,
an application, a service do, what they access, and for what purpose. Transparency
comes into play by enabling users to endow devices and services (and their man-
ufacturers and providers) with a motivated trust. Used to express commitment to
users and clarify accountability, transparency may also become a significant compe-
tition factor.
Designing for transparency, however, is not a simple task. The problem is com-
plex: as much relevant information as possible should be provided to the users;
however, since users might lack the technical skills to understand the content of the
information or to isolate meaningful material in an information flood, the informa-
tion should be carefully selected and presented in a concise and intelligible form.
Moreover, transparent solutions should be designed with the best interest of users
in mind. Transparency should not put personal and private information at risk. Un-
derstanding how to realise this in the context of medical systems is the purpose of
this research project. We recall here our goal:
Research goal. To provide a formal operational definition for transparency and to design
solutions to achieve it in medical data systems.
This research project contributes to the understanding of transparency. It sheds
light on how to decide if a solution complies with the data protection regulation and
the dramatic changes it brought when it became applicable, on 25 May 20181. The
result of this research represents a first step into the definition of a framework to
guide the implementation of transparency-by-design. It does so by: 1. clarifying the
understanding of transparency in the medical data systems context; 2. defining a
set of metrics that can be used to measure transparency, and how one should con-
duct such measurement; 3. modelling a private Transparency Enhancing Tool (TET)
for the transparency sub-property of verifiability; 4. and finally by discussing how
current TETs can help a medical system in the task of accomplishing transparency.
In what follows we review our research questions, and discuss how our work has
answered them.
1Regulation (EU) 679/2016, Article 99.2.
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How can transparency be defined in medical data systems and how does it
relate to other security properties?
Transparency is not a monolithic concept. It is instead a complex quality partitioned
into several properties and concepts. In the first part of this work, we have studied
various interpretations for transparency, and its relationship with other well-known
properties (see chapter 2). We cannot claim to have included all possible concepts
that one may find be linked to transparency. However, at least in the domain of
medical data systems availability, verifiability/auditability, and accountability are
the properties that we have found to contribute the most to a precise understanding
of transparency.
We also studied transparency in respect to other properties, namely empower-
ment, usability and privacy. Empowerment, which is about giving patients control
on their data, emerged to be a complementary property to transparency. Together,
transparency and empowerment help realise openness, a concept that we argue in-
cludes transparency. Usability and privacy do not contribute directly to the notion
of transparency, but support it and help enhance its quality.
In order to provide an operational definition of transparency, we have selected
the most suitable interpretation we found and proposed a definition for it in the
medical systems domain. Based on this definition, we then elicit 36 technical require-
ments that suggest how to realise transparency (see chapter 3). These requirements
are diverse, but there are a few factors they have in common: they all demand for the
provision of information (e.g., about policies, processes), or mechanisms to get that
information. These factors offer different perspectives under which transparency
can be viewed.
How can transparency be assessed in a system?
To answer this question, we have proposed a Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) ap-
proach to the transparency of a system. We introduce a UML model that unfolds
transparency into basic and concrete elements, much easier to measure than the
high-level property of transparency itself. By regarding accountability as one of the
building blocks for transparency, we demonstrate the original meta-model (tailored
to model accountability) applies to the domain of transparency in general.
The MDE approach presented in this work clarifies that the implementation of
transparency is not so much relevant as the output they deliver to the users. Under
this new perspective, it is possible to gather howwell implemented the transparency
of a system is by looking at the information provided to the users, and the output of
a mechanism available to them.
In this work, we prove that the transparency of a system is not just a high-level
concept, but a quality that can be measured. We do so by defining a set of metrics
that can be used to evaluate some of the most significant factors of transparency,
and also by proposing a methodology that helps perform a thorough assessment of
the implementation of transparency in a system (see chapter 4). Our metrics and
our measurement methodology provide a meaningful way of benchmarking trans-
parency and comparing systems. We do not claim, however, to have a complete
set of metrics, nor that our metrics are as accurate as possible. However, we have
demonstrated our metrics are relevant both a) in the context of the new data protec-
tion regulation, and b) technically, when applied to real systems.
Chapter 7. Concluding remarks 105
How can transparency be realised in a privacy-friendly manner?
To answer this question, we investigated the transparency sub-property of verifia-
bility, which we believe to pose more challenges to the privacy of patients. To be
able to verify whether a system acted in compliance with a given policy the verifier
needs access to audit logs. These logs may reveal private information about the pa-
tients. Revealing them is not in the best interest of the patients. But not revealing
themwouldmean the patient needs to trust themedical systemwith the verification;
obliging the patient to place significant trust in one single entity. In this work, we
demonstrate that Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) can be adapted to provide
the right balance between transparency and privacy.
In chapter 5 we propose the introduction of an entity for auditing the medical
system on behalf of the patient. We name this entity verifier. We propose the im-
plementation of the verifier as a Transparency Enhancing Tool (TET) controlled by
the patient or by a third party would suffice to accomplish: 1. automated verification
– patients should not be required to manually verify audit logs; 2. independent au-
dit – demonstrates the honest intentions of the medical system and helps building
reputation; and 3. privacy – protects the right for privacy of the patients.
By using SSE methods, we allow the verifier to operate on encrypted logs. In
this way, protecting the interests of the patient. Our scheme defines that compliance
is achieved whenever a log entry matches, at least, one clause in the policy. This
scheme is possible since the policy describes every allowed action in the system.
The SSE method allows then the verifier to search for those matches over encrypted
audit logs and the obfuscated policy clauses. Thus ensuring no third-party will learn
any sensitive information. With this scheme, one can only learn the number of logs
that match (or not) a given search. Something we consider acceptable in our scheme
since the logs are encrypted and indistinguishable from each other, and the policy
is obfuscated. We understand that this is a necessary trade-off between privacy and
verifiability in medical systems.
Can transparency be achieved with the existing tools?
The implementation of transparency as defined in this work will make medical sys-
tems fully patient-centred. This change may come with some resistance, as it will re-
quire significant architectural modifications in the current Health Information Tech-
nology (Health IT). However, several tools have been proposed to enhance trans-
parency and can be leveraged by the most diverse systems.
We finalise our research project by systematically reviewing the literature of
Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs) in search of what exists to implement the
principle of transparency as described by the GDPR. We guided our selection by
the technical requirements for medical systems that we have found be semantically
correlated with the Articles of the GDPR that define, directly or indirectly, trans-
parency.
Our contribution, however, goes beyond a comparative review of the literature.
We systematically analyse transparency in support to identify the GDPR concepts
still in need of more development. We also discuss the tools which can help accom-
plish transparency, or give suggestions on how to implement it in medical systems.
Out of the 21 GDPR Articles we study here, 12 seem to be, at least partially, ad-
dressed by our selected TETs.
This selection mediated by technical requirements may look like a limitation of
our approach, but by doing so, we managed to have insights on issues that have less
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attention in works tailored to discuss compliance with the provisions of the GDPR.
For instance, we noticed that matters related to Break-the-Glass (BTG) (i.e., require-
ments 211.2 and 211.3) are not correlated with any provisions from the GDPR. This
topicmay be of specific interest in themedical systems domain. Althoughwe did not
find a clear correlation between these requirements and any GDPR Article, we also
have no reasons to believe BTG is out of the scope when discussing data protection
principles. A clear indication of that is the number of TETs addressing the subject
(e.g., PDT, TAMI, PTT and PVA): although in their early stage of development, some
still in the idealisation phase which suggests the subject is new, but of interest for
the TETs community. Works defending that exercising access control of data in one
single point ignores the genuine possibility that data is available or can be inferred
from somewhere else [247], suggests that adopting BTG is a suitable alternative that
will help emphasise the importance of individual accountability towards the usage
of data.
Similarly, we also found TETs which only correlate to our requirements (e.g.,
PRA, and PS). We believe they may serve as an inspiration to fill the gap we iden-
tified regarding tools for consent and security breaches. Privacy Score (PS), which
tests web pages for known security vulnerabilities and provide a short explanation
of them, could serve as inspiration for the development of tools explaining secu-
rity breaches to a broad public. While Privacy Risk Analysis (PRA), which explains
the risks and consequences of having a piece of personal data disclosed, could be
adapted to help users in giving de facto informed consent.
7.1 Future works and Open problems
Throughout the development of this project, we identified some future works and
open problems that remain to be explored. We classified them in four main cate-
gories. In what follows we explore them.
Transparency assessment. In this work, we assess transparency in a medical sys-
tem. However, assessing it in different domains could bring interesting results.
Based on that, one could analyse the differences in the results in order to classify
the various sub-factors of transparency according to their importance in specific do-
mains. We study transparency from the end-users’ perspective, but alternatively
one could evaluate the transparency implementation in a new use case, but having
access to the internal documentation and Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC)
(i.e., with the assistance of the service provider). Such an analysis could unveil de-
tails (which could be assessed on their own) about the asymmetry of information
between the provider and the user. The information asymmetry problem is well-
known but, to the best of our knowledge, has never been explored from an analytic
perspective.
The metrics proposed to assess transparency in this work have a clear limita-
tion, they only account for textual information. Several Transparency Enhancing
Tools (TETs) represent information with aid of graphical and visual elements (e.g.,
PS, PI, UP). A possible future direction for this work is to understand how visual el-
ements can be included in the measurement of transparency. One starting point is to
study the TETs categories presented by Murmann and Fischer-Hübner [159], which
consider aspects of information representation, visual guidance, and visualisation
perspective. However, to the best of our knowledge there are no standardised icons
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or graphic guidelines to help informing on data protection subjects. Thus making
the task of objectively assessing such graphical elements far from trivial.
Verifier. The verifier we propose in this work is limited to the identification of log
entries that match and the ones that do not match a given policy. The latter can then
be manually investigated for permitted exceptions (Break-the-Glass (BTG) policies),
or other events also relevant in medical systems, such as delegation. Including these
events in our verifier is a natural evolution of our proposal.
The formalisation of our scheme is another possible future work. A first action-
able task towards this goal would be to extend that model to account for access
legitimacy. To do so, we will have to take a more careful look into the representation
of events (logs) and authorised actions (policy) and to define protocols for obtaining
and transferring these data between the players. A good starting point is to study
and adapt the work from Butin and LeMétayer [30]. We will also need to investigate
deeper on the SSE schemes in order to select the most suitable ones. The extension
of searching capabilities is directly dependant on the evolution of these schemes.
Transparency Enhancing Tools. In this study, we reason about the tools on which
a system can leverage to accomplish transparency as a technical principle: we do
not discuss how to ensure legal compliance with the GDPR. However, we identified
a few future developments which we believe will contribute to better coverage of
transparency. We present in this work several tools tailored to one single use case (a
few even designed for one specific organisation). Although they are comprehensive
in addressing transparency, other systems could not immediately apply them. Ex-
amples are the Google and Microsoft Dashboards (GD and MD). Those tools should
serve as a role model for a possible generic Transparency Enhancing Tool. Other
tools are already prepared for general use but are designed with a focus on other
regulations in mind. One example of such a tool is the Privacy eSuite (PeS), which is
tailored to Canadian regulations. Similarly, Usable Privacy (UP) intends to highlight
the most relevant parts of a privacy policy for the American public. Adapting those
tools to the provisions in the GDPR seems to be an interesting future development
for the state-of-the-art in transparency.
Trustworthiness. A future research direction that stretches along the line of this
work is to define a methodology to assess how transparency affects the trustwor-
thiness of a system. Trustworthiness has several interpretations, but one that seems
to be well accepted is that it is related to the assurance the system will perform as
expected (e.g., [8, 154, 171]). Transparency can foster trust if interpreted as a means
to provide evidence of the well-functioning of a system concerning data usage and
protection. However, recent works demonstrate that, in certain circumstances, pro-
viding too much transparency could erode the user’s trust in the system [126]. This
work explores the effects of transparency in the context of algorithmic interfaces,
such as search results personalisations, and creation of custom radio stations. To the
best of our knowledge, no similar study has been conducted in the medical data sys-
tems domain. Howmuch can transparency affect patient’s perceptions of awareness
and trust? This question remains unanswered.
One other possible direction is to investigate the approach proposed by Stark and
Wagner [225] in the context of electronic voting. The authors propose an approach to
collect substantial evidence that the reported outcome of an election is correct. Three
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main components compose this approach: strongly software-independent voting
systems; compliance audits; and risk-limiting audits.
We believe it is possible to apply this approach in medical systems through the
use of transparency mechanisms (e.g., verifier, but not limited to it). Suggesting that
the three components described by Stark and Wagner can be achieved, at least to
some extent, through a combination of our transparency requirements. In order to
verify this hypothesis, it would be necessary to determine which components map
to our transparency requirements and whether or not our requirements suffice to
cover the three components.
It remains an open problem how to demonstrate that this framework can be
adapted to provide convincing evidence that medical systems are functioning as in-
tended. Nevertheless, if such a task can be realised, the resulting framework could
provide grounds to reinforce the trust framework of the system.
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Transparency measurement
procedure
In this document we present metrics descriptors in a format adapted from ISO/IEC
27004 standard. The categories Suitability, Computation andConsiderationswere added
to ease the understanding, and the categories Frequency and Responsible parts are not
filled, as they highly depend on the system being measured. Additionally, the cat-
egory Information need, also suggested in the standard, was omitted. This category
was intended to clarify the contribution of each metric. We judged it unnecessary in
our context, as theMeasure ID, in combination with the requirement being measured
already clarify that.
A.1 Measure descriptors
Measure ID Reachability
Suitability Applies to information and mechanisms;
Measure Linear and inverse exponential
Computation
1. Determine a number k maximum number of interac-
tions that is considered acceptable to perform in or-
der to find the information/mechanism’s output;
2. Whenever the system allows login, start analysing
from the screen after the successful login; Otherwise
start from the main screen;
3. Extensively search for information/mechanism that
implement the requirement;
4. Stop when reaching the information or the expected
output of the mechanism (even if incomplete);
5. Count the amount of interaction Nint needed to reach
it from the initial screen; An interaction is a click, typ-
ing, or anything that requires the user to actively do
something to change the current state of the system;
6. MeasureRc.
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Formula/scoring Rc =
(
1, if 0  Nint  k
e(1 
Nint
k ), if Nint > k
Target 1
Implementation evi-
dence
Any kind of information or mechanism’s output; Number
of acceptable interactions; Grade reached by that number
of interactions;
Frequency
Responsible parties
Data source Documents; Notifications; Communications to users;
Mechanism’s output;
Reporting format Grade; k; Nint
Considerations In case the evidence is spread across multiple parts of the
system, calculate the amount of interaction Nint needed to
reach every single data source, and measure Rc consider-
ing their sum.
TABLE A.1: Reachability metric
Measure ID Portability
Suitability Applies to information and mechanisms;
Measure Scale
Computation
1. Measure P .
Formula/scoring P =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0, if no information available
0.2, if available in any open format
0.4, if available as a structured data
0.6, if available in a non-proprietary format
0.8, if uses URI
1, if based on linked data
Target 1
Implementation evi-
dence
Any kind of information or mechanism’s output;
Frequency
Responsible parties
Data source Documents; Notifications; Communications to users;
Mechanism’s output;
Reporting format Grade
Considerations In case the evidence is spread across multiple parts of the
system, calculate portability for every single data source,
and consider the lowest grade.
TABLE A.2: Portability metric
Measure ID Observability
Suitability Only suitable for information;
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Measure Proportion
Computation
1. Determine whether the information contains state-
ments with claims or affirmations about the system’s
behaviour; only applicable if it does;
2. Select a total of LS+NLS of statements, at least one
per section/subject of the information;
3. Determine the number LS of statements which can be
observed or linked to the system’s process;
4. Determine the number NLS of statements which can-
not be linked, either because not present, or dubious;
5. Measure Ob.
Formula/scoring Ob = LSLS+NLS
Target 1
Implementation evi-
dence
Descriptive documents; List of entities;
Frequency
Responsible parties
Data source Policies; Terms of use; Any document that describes the
practice of the system;
Reporting format Grade, statements
Considerations In case the evidence is spread across multiple parts of the
system consider everything as one single data source.
TABLE A.3: Observability metric
Measure ID Accuracy
Suitability Only suitable for information;
Measure Proportion
Computation
1. Determine the number LS of statements which can
be observed or linked to the system’s process; only
applicable for those;
2. Determine the number ALS of statements that accu-
rately (correctly and consistently with the user’s ex-
perience) describe some part of the system’s process;
3. Measure Ac.
Formula/scoring Ac = ALSLS
Target 1
Implementation evi-
dence
Descriptive documents; List of entities;
Frequency
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Responsible parties
Data source Policies; Terms of use; Any document that describes the
practice of the system;
Reporting format Grade, statements
Considerations Builds on top of Observability metric (see itemA.3); In case
the evidence is spread across multiple parts of the system
consider everything as one single data source.
TABLE A.4: Accuracy metric
Measure ID Currentness
Suitability Applies to information and mechanisms;
Measure Inverse exponential
Computation
1. Determine the maximum acceptable delay tmax in
which the information or mechanism output should
be made available;
2. Collect the time t taken for the system to provide the
information or mechanism output in the same unit as
the ideal time frame;
3. Measure Cu.
Formula/scoring Cu =
(
1, if t  tmax
2 d t tmaxtmax e, if t > tmax
Target 1
Implementation evi-
dence
Any kind of information or mechanism’s output; The time
inwhich the informationwasmade available; The tolerable
amount of time for the information to be made available;
Frequency
Responsible parties
Data source Documents; Notifications; Communications to users;
Mechanism’s output;
Reporting format Grade, tmax
Considerations In case the evidence is spread across multiple parts of the
system, calculate currentness for every single data source,
and consider the lowest grade.
TABLE A.5: Currentness metric
Measure ID Conciseness
Suitability Only suitable for information;
Measure Average words per sentence
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Computation
1. Determine the nature of the information, only appli-
cable if it is a text (with at least one sentence);
2. Select a tool to aid calculating the average sentence
length ASL;
3. Measure Co.
Formula/scoring Co = e  150 (ASL 20)2
Target 1
Implementation evi-
dence
Any kind of information provided in text format
Frequency
Responsible parties
Data source Documents; Notifications; Communications to the user;
Reporting format Grade
Considerations In case the evidence is spread across multiple parts of the
system consider everything as one single data source.
TABLE A.6: Conciseness metric
Measure ID Detailing
Suitability Only suitable for information;
Measure Proportion
Computation
1. Separate the data source into nI pieces of information
(e.g., sections of a document, elements in a list, . . . );
2. Determine a list of questions related to the require-
ment; [One question per subject in the requirement
statement] OR [Apply the 5W (Who, What, Where,
When and Why)];
3. For each piece of information i = 1 . . . nI select a
number PDi of pertinent questions for which details
should be provided; non-pertinent questions should
not be considered;
4. For each piece of information i = 1 . . . nI identify the
number di of questions for which the details are pro-
vided, and number ui of questions for which details
are not provided, such that di + ui = PDi (do not con-
sider how well explained the details are);
5. Measure D.
Formula/scoring D = Â
nI
i=1 di
Â
nI
i=1 P
D
i
Target 1
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Implementation evi-
dence
Any kind of information or mechanism’s output; The de-
tails it is supposed to provide to the user;
Frequency
Responsible parties
Data source Documents; Notifications; Communications to users;
Mechanism’s output;
Reporting format Grade, matrix representing the pieces of information i and
the questions;
Considerations In case the evidence is spread across multiple parts of the
system consider everything as one single data source.
TABLE A.7: Detailing metric
Measure ID Readability
Suitability Only suitable for information;
Measure Flesch reading ease
Computation
1. Determine the nature of the information; Only appli-
cable if it is a text (with at least one sentence);
2. Select a tool to aid calculating the average sentence
length ASL and average number of syllables per
word ASW;
3. Calculate FRES;
4. MeasureR.
Formula/scoring FRES = 206.835   (1.015 ⇥ ASL)   (84.6 ⇥ ASW) R =8><>:
0, if FRES < 0
FRES
100 , if 0  FRES  100
1, if FRES > 100
Target 1
Implementation evi-
dence
Any kind of information provided in text format
Frequency
Responsible parties
Data source Documents; Notifications; Communications to the user;
Reporting format Grade
Considerations In case the evidence is spread across multiple parts of the
system consider everything as one single data source.
TABLE A.8: Readability metric
Measure ID Effectiveness
Suitability Only suitable for mechanism;
Measure Proportion
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Computation
1. Separate the mechanism’s output into nI pieces of in-
formation (e.g., tool’s output, if more than one tool is
provided for the same requirement, elements in a list,
. . . );
2. Determine a list of questions a user intends to have
answered when using the mechanism (i.e., the goals
of the mechanism); [One question per subject in the
requirement statement] OR [Apply the 5W (Who,
What, Where, When and Why)];
3. For each piece of information i = 1 . . . nI select a
number PEi of pertinent questions which should be
answered by it; non-pertinent questions should not
be considered;
4. For each piece of information i = 1 . . . nI identify the
number ei of questions which are answered by the
mechanism (goals reached), and number vi of ques-
tions which are not answered (goals not reached),
such that ei + vi = PEi ;
5. Measure E .
Formula/scoring E = Â
nI
i=1 ei
Â
nI
i=1 P
E
i
Target 1
Implementation evi-
dence
Mechanism’s output;
Frequency
Responsible parties
Data source Mechanism’s output; The goals the mechanism is sup-
posed to reach;
Reporting format Grade, matrix representing the delivered outputs and the
desired goals (questions);
Considerations In case the evidence is spread across multiple parts of the
system consider everything as one single data source.
TABLE A.9: Effectiveness metric
Measure ID Operativeness
Suitability Only suitable for mechanism;
Measure Proportion
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Computation
1. Define the set of equivalence classes E = C [ R[U [
D, the union of all possible actions relevant to the
system (e.g., create document, edit personal informa-
tion, . . . ); where C contains create actions, R contains
read actions, U contains update actions, D contains
delete actions;
2. Select a sub-set of actions A = {a0, a1, . . . , ak 1} :
(A ✓ E), that contains at least one action of each
class (i.e., (A \ C 6= ∆) ^ (A \ R 6= ∆) ^ (A \U 6=
∆) ^ (A \ D 6= ∆))
3. Measure OA.
Formula/scoring OA = bn/kc
Target 1
Implementation evi-
dence
Mechanism’s output
Frequency
Responsible parties
Data source Mechanism’s output, Actions to be tested;
Reporting format Grade; set of actions A tested
Considerations In case the evidence is spread across multiple parts of the
system consider everything as one single data source.
TABLE A.10: Operativeness metric
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Evaluation of Microsoft
HealthVault
B.1 Information-based requirements
B.1.1 111.1 – Smust provide Pwith real time information on physical data
storage and data storage location of different types of data
The information used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Microsoft
Privacy Statement", under “Other Important Privacy Information" – “Where We
Store and Process Personal Data" (WPD).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 3 1
Portability 0.8
Observability Statements: 1. “Typically, the primary stor-
age location is in the customer’s region or in
the United States, often with a backup to a
data centre in another region." 2. “The stor-
age location(s) are chosen in order to oper-
ate efficiently, to improve performance and
to create redundancies in order to protect the
data in the event of an outage or other prob-
lem." 3. “When we engage in such transfers,
we use a variety of legal mechanisms, includ-
ing contracts, to help ensure your rights and
protections travel with your data." 4. “Mi-
crosoft Corporation complies with the EU-US
Privacy Shield Framework and Swiss-US Pri-
vacy Shield Framework as set forth by the US
Department of Commerce regarding the col-
lection, use and retention of personal informa-
tion transferred from the European Union and
Switzerland to the United States." 5. “If there
is any conflict between the terms in this pri-
vacy policy and the Privacy Shield Principles,
the Privacy Shield Principles shall govern."
0
Accuracy N/A
Currentness N/A
Conciseness 0.9626282259
Detailing See Table B.2 0.25
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Readability 0.227023
TABLE B.1: Attributes and grades per metric referring to requirement
111.1.
Delivered Details
Desired Details WPD
Is the information provided in real time?
Is there information on physical storage?
Where is the data stored? X
Which type of data is stored?
TABLE B.2: Detailing matrix 111.1: desirable details compared with
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
FIGURE B.1: Transparency measurement of requirement 111.1.
B.1.2 111.2 – S must inform P on how data are stored and who has access
to them.
The information used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Microsoft
Privacy Statement", under “Other Important Privacy Information" – “Security of
Personal Data" (SPD).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 3 1
Portability 0.8
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Observability Statements: 1. “We store the personal data
you provide on computer systems that have
limited access and are in controlled facilities."
2. “When we transmit highly confidential data
(such as a credit card number or password)
over the Internet, we protect it through the use
of encryption." 3. “Microsoft complies with
applicable data protection laws, including ap-
plicable security breach notification laws."
0
Accuracy N/A
Currentness N/A
Conciseness 0.9372548956
Detailing See Table B.4 0.5
Readability 0.2593
TABLE B.3: Attributes and grades per metric referring to requirement
111.2.
Delivered Details
Desired Details SPD
How is data stored? X
Who has access to data?
TABLE B.4: Detailing matrix 111.2: desirable details compared with
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
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FIGURE B.2: Transparency measurement of requirement 111.2.
B.1.3 111.5 – S must inform P how it is assured that data are not accessed
without authorisation.
The information used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Microsoft
Privacy Statement", under “Other Important Privacy Information" – “Security of
Personal Data." (SPD).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 3 1
Portability 0.8
Observability Statements: 1. “We store the personal data
you provide on computer systems that have
limited access and are in controlled facilities."
2. “When we transmit highly confidential data
(such as a credit card number or password)
over the Internet, we protect it through the use
of encryption." 3. “Microsoft complies with
applicable data protection laws, including ap-
plicable security breach notification laws."
0
Accuracy N/A
Currentness N/A
Conciseness 0.9372548956
Detailing See Table B.6 1
Readability 0.2593
TABLE B.5: Attributes and grades per metric referring to requirement
111.5.
Delivered Details
Desired Details SPD
How is it assured that data are not accessed without
authorisation?
X
TABLE B.6: Detailing matrix 111.5: desirable details compared with
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
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FIGURE B.3: Transparency measurement of requirement 111.5.
B.1.4 111.6 – S shouldmake available a document that describes the adopted
mechanisms for securing data against data loss as well as data pri-
vacy vulnerabilities.
The information used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Help", un-
der “Privacy and Security" – “How does HealthVault help keep my information pri-
vate?" (KIP).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 3 1
Portability 0.8
Observability Statements: 1. “We apply security and pri-
vacy standards throughout the HealthVault
development process." 2. “Microsoft won’t use
your information in HealthVault to person-
alise ads or services without explicit permis-
sion." 3. “Microsoft HealthVault allows you
to manage access not just by other people,
but by apps you use as well. " 4. “Health-
Vault servers are located in controlled fa-
cilities." 5. “All health information transmit-
ted between HealthVault servers and program
providers’ systems is encrypted." 6. “Whenwe
back up data, the media are encrypted."
0.17
Accuracy Statement 3. 1
Currentness N/A
Conciseness 0.5388748092
Detailing See Table B.8 0.5
Readability 0.356684
TABLE B.7: Attributes and grades per metric referring to requirement
111.6.
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Delivered Details
Desired Details KIP
Which are the mechanisms adopted for securing data
against data loss?
Which are the mechanisms adopted for securing data
against privacy vulnerability?
X
TABLE B.8: Detailing matrix 111.6: desirable details compared with
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
FIGURE B.4: Transparency measurement of requirement 111.6.
B.1.5 111.7 – S should make available a document that describes the pro-
cedures and mechanisms planned in cases of security breaches on
P’s data.
The information used tomeasure this requirement can be found in the “Help", under
“Privacy and Security" – “What happens if someone gains access to my HealthVault
account?" (GAA)
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 3 0.8
Portability 0.8
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Observability Statements: 1. “If we learn of any potential
breach of a HealthVault account, we will in-
vestigate, and, where appropriate, take ac-
tions possibly including blocking or suspend-
ing access to your account." 2. “If we deter-
mine there might have been a breach of your
account, we will notify you via the contact
information you have provided in your ac-
count." 3. “To provide an alternative contact
address: Sign in to HealthVault. In the upper
right, click your name and then click Account
settings. Under Security, click Change security
info. Enter the alternative contact information
and click Save."
0.33
Accuracy Statement 3. 1
Currentness N/A
Conciseness 0.8241176336
Detailing See Table B.10 1
Readability 0.4248765
TABLE B.9: Attributes and grades per metric referring to requirement
111.7.
Delivered Details
Desired Details GAA
Which are the procedures planned in case of security
breach?
X
Which are the mechanisms planned in case of security
breach?
X
TABLE B.10: Detailing matrix 111.7: desirable details compared with
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
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FIGURE B.5: Transparency measurement of requirement 111.7.
B.1.6 111.9 – Pmust be made aware of the consequences of their possible
choices in an unbiased manner.
The information used tomeasure this requirement can be found in the “Sharing" sec-
tion, as a warning before inviting someone to share the personal data. Additionally,
further information can be found in the following page, under “What can a record
custodian do?" (WCD).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 2+ 1 1
Portability 0.6
Observability Statements: 1. “Sharing your record with a
person you trust allows them to see, update,
or delete information, depending on the level
of access you give them." 2. “A custodian is
someone who has full access to all the infor-
mation in a HealthVault record, with the abil-
ity to see, change, add to, share and delete
any of that information." 3. “Custodians can
see information marked as confidential by
other users, and they can see a history of all
changes made to the record, including deleted
items in the HealthVault trash." 4. “Custodi-
ans can permanently delete information from
the record." 5. “In US accounts, custodians can
manage Direct email addresses and send Di-
rect messages on behalf of the record." 6. “All
custodians have equal access to the record."
7. “Be very selective about who you give cus-
todian access to, since they will have full con-
trol over the record, including the ability to re-
move your access to it."
0.86
Accuracy Statements 1 to 7. 1
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Currentness tmax = 5s (before the actual choice, but at most
5 seconds after the user enters the sharing sec-
tion)
1
Conciseness 0.9866420204
Detailing See Table B.12 1
Readability 0.401633
TABLE B.11: Attributes and grades per metric referring to require-
ment 111.9.
Delivered Details
Desired Details Sharing WCD
What are the consequences? X X
Is the information unbiased? X X
TABLE B.12: Detailing matrix 111.9: desirable details compared with
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
FIGURE B.6: Transparency measurement of requirement 111.9.
B.1.7 111.11 – S must inform P about storage in other countries and com-
pliance issues related to this storage with respect to laws and regu-
lations of both the other country and their own country.
The information used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Microsoft
Privacy Statement", under “Other Important Privacy Information" – “Where We
Store and Process Personal Data." (WPD)
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 3 1
Portability 0.8
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Observability Statements: 1. “Typically, the primary stor-
age location is in the customer’s region or in
the United States, often with a backup to a
data centre in another region." 2. “The stor-
age location(s) are chosen in order to oper-
ate efficiently, to improve performance and
to create redundancies in order to protect the
data in the event of an outage or other prob-
lem." 3. “When we engage in such transfers,
we use a variety of legal mechanisms, includ-
ing contracts, to help ensure your rights and
protections travel with your data." 4. “Mi-
crosoft Corporation complies with the EU-US
Privacy Shield Framework and Swiss-US Pri-
vacy Shield Framework as set forth by the US
Department of Commerce regarding the col-
lection, use and retention of personal informa-
tion transferred from the European Union and
Switzerland to the United States." 5. “If there
is any conflict between the terms in this pri-
vacy policy and the Privacy Shield Principles,
the Privacy Shield Principles shall govern."
0
Accuracy N/A
Currentness N/A
Conciseness 0.9626282259
Detailing See Table B.14 1
Readability 0.227023
TABLE B.13: Attributes and grades per metric referring to require-
ment 111.11.
Delivered Details
Desired Details WPD
Are data stored in other countries? X
Are there compliance issues related to that? X
TABLE B.14: Detailingmatrix 111.11: desirable details comparedwith
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
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FIGURE B.7: Transparency measurement of requirement 111.11.
B.1.8 111.13 – S must inform P on how to protect data or how data are
protected.
The information used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Help", un-
der “Privacy and Security" – “How does HealthVault help keep my information pri-
vate?" (KIP).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 3 1
Portability 0.8
Observability Statements: 1. “We apply security and pri-
vacy standards throughout the HealthVault
development process." 2. “Microsoft won’t use
your information in HealthVault to person-
alise ads or services without explicit permis-
sion." 3. “Microsoft HealthVault allows you
to manage access not just by other people,
but by apps you use as well." 4. “Health-
Vault servers are located in controlled fa-
cilities." 5. “All health information transmit-
ted between HealthVault servers and program
providers’ systems is encrypted." 6. “Whenwe
back up data, the media are encrypted."
0.2
Accuracy Statement 3. 1
Currentness N/A
Conciseness 0.53887480925
Detailing See Table B.16 0.5
Readability 0.356684
TABLE B.15: Attributes and grades per metric referring to require-
ment 111.13.
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Delivered Details
Desired Details KIP
How can someone protect data?
How is data protected? X
TABLE B.16: Detailingmatrix 111.13: desirable details comparedwith
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
FIGURE B.8: Transparency measurement of requirement 111.13.
B.1.9 111.17 – S must make available a document explaining the proce-
dures for leaving the service and taking the data out from the ser-
vice.
The information used tomeasure this requirement can be found in the “Help", under
“Your HealthVault Account" – “How do I close my HealthVault account?" (CMA).
Additionally, further information can be found in “How do I export and save health
information from HealthVault?" (ESI).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 3+ 1 0.7165313106
Portability 0.8
B.1. Information-based requirements 129
Observability Statements: 1. “Once your account has beenclosed, any information that you had stored
in your account will be permanently deleted,
although data may remain on our servers for
90 days.” 2. “To delete your account: Sign in
to HealthVault. In the upper right, click your
name and then click Account settings. At the
bottom of the page, click Close account. Care-
fully review the information on the page, then
click Close my account.” 3. “The exception is
if there are other custodians of records in your
account. In that case, you’ll be notified at the
time you close the account, and those records
will not be deleted.” 4. “You can export and
save your health information in two ways: as
a spreadsheet;” 5. “or as a CCR or CCD or
HTML file.” 6. “To save health information as
a spreadsheet: Sign in to HealthVault. On the
left side of the page, click the name of the type
of information you want to save as a spread-
sheet. You’ll see the list view for that type of
data. Click Export. In the browser message
that appears, click Save. Your information
will be saved in a spreadsheet format (.csv)
that can be opened in Excel or other spread-
sheet software.” 7. “You can create a CCR or
CCD with information from your HealthVault
record, but keep in mind that CCRs and CCDs
don’t support all types of health information,
so they won’t necessarily contain everything
in your record.”
0.88
8. “To save information in your HealthVault
record as a CCR or CCD or HTML file: Sign
in to HealthVault. On the Home page, click
Current and then click Export. Select the file
format that you want to use. Select the type or
types of information that you want to export.
If you want to, select the date range for the
data. Click Export. In the browser message
that appears, click Save. Your information will
be saved as a file on your computer.”
Accuracy Statements: 2 to 8. Statement 3 is not consid-
ered accurate.
0.86
Currentness N/A
Conciseness 0.5956142816
Detailing See Table B.18 1
Readability 0.6395535
TABLE B.17: Attributes and grades per metric referring to require-
ment 111.17.
130 Appendix B. Evaluation of Microsoft HealthVault
Delivered Details
Desired Details CMA ESI
How to proceed to leave the service? X
How to proceed to take data out from the service? X
TABLE B.18: Detailingmatrix 111.17: desirable details comparedwith
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
FIGURE B.9: Transparency measurement of requirement 111.17.
B.1.10 111.19 – S must provide P with disclosure of policies, regulations
or terms regarding data sharing, processing and the use of data.
The information used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Microsoft
Privacy Statement", and it is spread throughout several sections: “Personal Data
That We Collect" (PDC), “How We Use Personal Data" (UPD), “Reasons We Share
Personal Data" (SPD), “Cookies & Similar Technologies" (CST), “Other Important
Privacy Information" (IPI), and “Microsoft Health Services" (MHS). To test for Ob-
servability and Accuracy we only consider statements exclusively related to Health-
Vault (MHS).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 1+ 1 1
Portability 0.8
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Observability Statements: 1. “You can use more than one
credential with HealthVault to help ensure
continued access”; 2. “You can add or re-
move data to a health record you manage
at any time”; 3. “As a custodian, you can
share data in a health record with another per-
son by sending an email invitation through
HealthVault. You can specify what type of
access they have (including custodian access),
how long they have access, and whether they
can modify the data in the record”; 4. “In
the United States, we enable participating
providers to obtain reports about whether the
information they send to a record is used”;
5. “You can review, edit or delete your Health-
Vault account data, or close your HealthVault
account at any time”; and 6. “You can unsub-
scribe from these emails [communications] at
any time”.
0.83
Accuracy Statements 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6. Statement 1 is not
considered accurate.
0.8
Currentness N/A
Conciseness 0.9620950775
Detailing See Table B.20 1
Readability 0.3481985
TABLE B.19: Attributes and grades per metric referring to require-
ment 111.19.
Delivered Details
Desired Details DWC UPD SPD CST IPI MHS
How is data shared? With
whom? For what purpose?
X
How is data processed? For what
purpose?
X X
How is data used? For what pur-
pose?
X X X
TABLE B.20: Detailingmatrix 111.19: desirable details comparedwith
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
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FIGURE B.10: Transparency measurement of requirement 111.19.
B.1.11 211.5 – S must inform P if and when data is gathered, inferred or
aggregated.
The information used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Microsoft
Privacy Statement" (MPS), and it is spread throughout the entire document. To test
for Observability and Accuracy we only consider statements related to collection of
personal data (“Personal Data That We Collect").
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 1 1
Portability 0.8
Observability Statements: 1. “The data we collect depends
on the context of your interactions with Mi-
crosoft and the choices that you make, includ-
ing your privacy settings and the products
and features that you use. We also obtain data
about you from third parties." 2. “Where pro-
viding the data is optional, and you choose
not to share personal data, features like per-
sonalisation that use such data will not work
for you."
0
Accuracy N/A
Currentness N/A
Conciseness 0.8671199163
Detailing See Table B.22 0.5
Readability 0.4592695
TABLE B.21: Attributes and grades per metric referring to require-
ment 211.5.
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Delivered Details
Desired Details MPS
Is information gathered? X
Is information inferred? X
Is information aggregated? X
When is information gathered?
When is information inferred?
When is information aggregated?
TABLE B.22: Detailing matrix 211.5: desirable details compared with
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
FIGURE B.11: Transparency measurement of requirement 211.5.
B.1.12 221.5 – Smust provide Pwith evidence regarding permissions his-
tory for auditing purposes.
The information used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Record
history" section, under “Miscellaneous and access-related changes to Username’s
record" (MAC).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 2 1
Portability 0.6
Observability N/A
Accuracy N/A
Currentness tmax = 10s 1
Conciseness N/A
Detailing See Table B.24 1
Readability N/A
TABLE B.23: Attributes and grades per metric referring to require-
ment 221.5.
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Delivered Details
Desired Details MAC
Is there information regarding permission history? X
TABLE B.24: Detailing matrix 221.5: desirable details compared with
the delivered details. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
questions.
FIGURE B.12: Transparency measurement of requirement 221.5.
B.2 Mechanism-based requirements
B.2.1 112.1 – S must provide P with mechanisms for accessing personal
data.
The evidence used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Home" page.
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 0 1
Portability 0.6
Currentness tmax = 10s 1
Effectiveness See Table B.26 1
Operativeness A = {createData, updateData, deleteData,
createSharedData, updateSharedData, delete-
SharedData}
1
TABLE B.25: Attributes and grades per metric referring to require-
ment 112.1.
Delivered Outputs
Desired Goals Home
Does the mechanism provide access to personal data? X
TABLE B.26: Effectiveness matrix 112.1: desirable goals compared
with the real outputs. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
goals.
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FIGURE B.13: Transparency measurement of requirement 112.1.
B.2.2 222.1 – Smust provide P with audit mechanisms.
The evidence used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Record his-
tory" section, under “All changes in the last 6 months" (CLM), and also “Views of
Username’s record in the last 30 days" (VUR).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 2+ 2 0.7165313106
Portability 0.6
Currentness tmax = 10s 1
Effectiveness See Table B.28 0.7
Operativeness A = {createData, readData, updateData,
deleteData}
1
TABLE B.27: Attributes and grades per metric referring to require-
ment 222.1.
Delivered Outputs
Desired Goals CLM VUR
What is the action? X X
When did it happen? X X
What was the outcome?
From what source/application? X X
Which data suffered the action? X
TABLE B.28: Effectiveness matrix 222.1: desirable goals compared
with the real outputs. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
goals.
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FIGURE B.14: Transparency measurement of requirement 222.1.
B.2.3 232.1 – Smust provide P with accountability mechanisms.
The evidence used to measure this requirement can be found in the “Record his-
tory" section, under “All changes in the last 6 months" (CLM), and also “Views of
Username’s record in the last 30 days" (VUR).
Metric Attributes Grade
Reachability k = 3; Nint = 2+ 2 0.7165313106
Portability 0.6
Currentness tmax = 10s 1
Effectiveness See Table B.30 0.75
Operativeness A = {createData, readData, updateData,
deleteData}
1
TABLE B.29: Attributes and grades per metric referring to require-
ment 232.1.
Delivered Outputs
Desired Goals CLM VUR
What is the action? X X
When did it happen? X X
What was the outcome?
Who did the action? X X
From what source/application? X X
Which data suffered the action? X
TABLE B.30: Effectiveness matrix 232.1: desirable goals compared
with the real outputs. Greyed-out cells represent the non-pertinent
goals.
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FIGURE B.15: Transparency measurement of requirement 232.1.
B.3 Summary
In what follows, two radar charts are presented to summarise the grades achieved
by Microsoft HealthVault in the transparency measurement. The chart depicted in
Figure B.16 represents the average grade achieved by the Information-based require-
ments analysed. While the one in Figure B.17 represents the average grade achieved
by Mechanisms-based ones. Metrics not applied (grade shown as N/A) are not
counted in the average.
FIGURE B.16: Average of grades for Information-based requirements.
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FIGURE B.17: Average of grades for Mechanism-based requirements.
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5.1.(a) 0
5.2 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 19
6.1.(a) x x x x x x x x x x 10
7.1 0
7.2 0
7.3 x x x x x x x x x x 10
9.2.(a) x* 1
11.2 0
12.1 0
12.3 0
12.4 0
12.7 0
13.1.(a) x 1
13.1.(b) x 1
13.1.(c) x x x x 4
13.1.(d) x x 2
13.1.(e) x x 2
13.1.(f) x x x 3
13.2.(a) 0
13.2.(b) x x 2
13.2.(c) x x 2
13.2.(d) 0
13.2.(e) 0
13.2.(f) 0
13.3 0
14.1.(a) x 1
14.1.(b) x 1
14.1.(c) x x x x 4
14.1.(d) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 14
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14.1.(e) x x 2
14.1.(f) x x x 3
14.2.(a) 0
14.2.(b) x x 2
14.2.(c) x x 2
14.2.(d) x x 2
14.2.(e) 0
14.2.(f) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 14
14.2.(g) 0
14.3.(a) x x x x x x x x x 9
14.3.(b) 0
14.3.(c) 0
14.4 0
15.1.(a) x x x x 4
15.1.(b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 14
15.1.(c) x x 2
15.1.(d) 0
15.1.(e) x x 2
15.1.(f) 0
15.1.(g) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 14
15.1.(h) 0
15.2 x x x 3
15.3 x x x x x x x x 8
16 0
17 x x x x x x x x x x 10
18 0
19 x x 2
21.1 0
21.2 0
21.3 0
21.4 x x 2
21.5 0
22.1 0
22.2.(c) 0
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25.3 0
26.1 0
26.2 0
26.3 0
30.1 x x x x x x x 7
30.2 x x x x x x x 7
30.3 0
30.4 0
32.3 0
33.1 0
33.2 0
33.3 x 1
33.4 0
33.5 0
34.1 0
34.2 0
TABLE C.1: Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs) and the GDPR Articles, paragraphs, and sub-paragraphs they help realising (* added
manually).
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